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   i	  
Executive	  Summary	  
 China’s	  growing	  assertiveness	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region	  is	  increasing	  the	  need	  for	  deepened	  security	  ties	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  allies	  at	  the	  very	  time	  the	  U.S.	  faces	  a	  constrained	  budget	  environment.	  The	  U.S.	  is	  reducing	  its	  nuclear	  arsenal,	  straining	  the	  credibility	  of	  extended	  nuclear	  deterrence	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  its	  allies.	  	  Facing	  an	  increasingly	  assertive	  China,	  both	  Japan	  and	  Australia	  are	  deepening	  military	  cooperation	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  with	  one	  another.	  	  Japan	  is	  exploring	  ways	  to	  reinterpret	  its	  constitution	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  play	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  collective	  self-­‐defense,	  has	  lifted	  restrictions	  on	  defense	  cooperation,	  and	  is	  playing	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  security	  cooperation	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  Australian	  government	  is	  increasing	  its	  defense	  budget;	  acquiring	  new	  capabilities,	  to	  include	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  attack	  submarines;	  and	  is	  considering	  granting	  greater	  access	  to	  Australian	  facilities	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
 
Australian	  Views	  of	  the	  Changing	  Security	  Environment	  and	  Extended	  
Deterrence	  
 Australian	  security	  planners	  consider	  three	  alternative	  futures	  for	  China:	  (1)	  China,	  under	  the	  strong	  leadership	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China	  (CPC),	  pursues	  an	  increasingly	  assertive	  foreign	  policy;	  (2)	  the	  CPC,	  fearful	  of	  losing	  authority,	  acts	  assertively	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  legitimacy	  and	  divert	  attention	  from	  domestic	  matters;	  or	  (3)	  poor	  economic	  performance	  leads	  to	  mass	  demonstrations	  and	  potential	  revolution.	  	  	  	  
	   ii	  
Discussions	  of	  Australian	  security	  increasingly	  portray	  Canberra	  as	  having	  to	  choose	  between	  its	  economic	  relationship	  with	  Beijing	  and	  its	  security	  relationship	  with	  Washington.	  However,	  that	  view	  is	  simplistic.	  	  Although	  the	  U.S.	  no	  longer	  dominates	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  economically,	  Australia’s	  economic	  dependence	  on	  China	  is	  often	  overstated.	  	  Whereas	  Australia	  and	  China	  trade	  mostly	  in	  raw	  materials,	  Australia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  trade	  more	  in	  services.	  	  In	  addition,	  flows	  of	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  between	  China	  and	  Australia	  are	  small	  compared	  with	  Australia’s	  investment	  relationships	  with	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Mainstream	  Australian	  strategic	  thinkers	  believe	  that	  the	  external	  security	  environment	  is	  increasingly	  challenging	  and	  that	  China’s	  authoritarian	  and	  expansive	  policies	  are	  a	  concern.	  A	  recent	  poll	  by	  the	  Lowy	  Institute	  found	  that	  almost	  half	  of	  the	  Australian	  population	  (48	  percent)	  thinks	  it	  “likely”	  that	  China	  will	  become	  a	  military	  threat	  to	  Australia	  in	  the	  next	  20	  years.	  	  In	  the	  current	  strategic	  environment,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  has	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  seize	  the	  opportunity	  to	  strike	  first	  at	  unhardened	  and	  lightly	  defended	  bases.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  shifting	  military	  balance	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region,	  many	  argue	  that	  Australia’s	  strategic	  significance	  has	  increased,	  and	  thus	  that	  Canberra	  must	  acquire	  the	  capability	  both	  to	  deter	  attacks	  independently,	  increase	  its	  value	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Australia-­‐U.S.	  alliance,	  and	  exercise	  a	  leadership	  role	  in	  developing	  regional	  alliances	  and	  partner	  capabilities.	  	  By	  contrast,	  some	  argue	  that	  the	  most	  important	  priority	  should	  be	  strengthening	  Australia’s	  economy,	  even	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  security.	  
 
	   iii	  
Challenges	  to	  Extended	  Deterrence	  in	  the	  Japan-­‐U.S.	  Alliance:	  From	  Gray	  Zone	  
to	  Nuclear	  Deterrence	  
	   From	  a	  Japanese	  perspective,	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  the	  modern	  security	  environment	  is	  a	  “gray	  zone”	  between	  peace	  and	  war.	  	  Such	  a	  dynamic	  is	  at	  play	  in	  the	  East	  China	  Sea,	  where	  disagreement	  between	  Tokyo	  and	  Beijing	  over	  territorial	  claims	  to	  the	  Senkaku	  Islands	  plays	  out	  in	  the	  diplomatic	  realm	  as	  well	  as	  showdowns	  between	  commercial,	  coast	  guard,	  and	  military	  vessels,	  but	  falls	  short	  of	  armed	  conflict.	  In	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  China’s	  island	  building	  and	  US	  Freedom	  of	  Navigation	  Operations	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  “gray	  zone”	  conflict	  as	  well.	  These	  conflicts	  present	  a	  deterrence	  challenge	  for	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies.	  	  Preventing	  China	  from	  achieving	  a	  fait	  accompli	  change	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  requires	  the	  forward	  deployment	  of	  forces	  to	  deny	  Beijing	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  aggression.	  	  However,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  forward-­‐based	  forces,	  China	  has	  been	  engaging	  in	  “salami	  slicing”	  tactics	  and	  creeping	  expansion,	  which	  can	  be	  reversed	  only	  through	  compellence.	  	  	  Extended	  deterrence	  must	  evolve	  into	  “collective	  deterrence”	  in	  which	  allies	  not	  only	  rely	  on	  the	  U.S.	  for	  deterrence,	  but	  also	  use	  clear	  diplomatic	  and	  military	  signals,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  own	  “gray	  zone”	  deterrence	  including	  paramilitary	  forces.	  	  China’s	  military	  modernization	  has	  justifiably	  heightened	  concerns	  about	  Beijing’s	  development	  of	  anti-­‐access/area	  denial	  (A2/AD)	  capabilities.	  One	  logical	  response	  to	  this	  growing	  threat	  is	  to	  increase	  and	  disperse	  forward-­‐based	  ships	  and	  aircraft.	  	  However,	  a	  light	  and	  dispersed	  presence,	  could	  invite	  China	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  what	  they	  perceive	  to	  be	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  to	  launch	  a	  first	  strike	  on	  Japan.	  	  	  
	   iv	  
In	  order	  to	  strengthen	  deterrence	  and	  limit	  China’s	  first	  strike	  option,	  Japan	  and	  other	  U.S.	  allies	  must	  harden	  their	  bases	  and	  increase	  their	  active	  air	  and	  missile	  defense	  capabilities.	  	  The	  United	  States,	  for	  its	  part,	  needs	  to	  expand	  its	  strike	  capability.	  	  The	  U.S.	  should	  not	  accept	  mutual	  vulnerability	  with	  China,	  as	  it	  could	  lead	  Beijing	  to	  perceive	  that	  it	  could	  take	  actions	  to	  which	  the	  US	  could	  not	  effectively	  respond.	  	  	  If	  North	  Korea	  succeeded	  in	  blackmailing	  Japan,	  it	  would	  destroy	  the	  value	  of	  U.S.	  deterrence	  and	  invite	  further	  provocation	  by	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states.	  	  The	  U.S.	  must	  therefore	  work	  with	  allies	  to	  increase	  and	  maintain	  robust	  deterrence.	  	  
 
American	  Views	  of	  Extended	  Deterrence	  
 U.S.	  policy	  seeks	  to	  protect	  U.S.	  allies	  and	  interests	  through	  a	  robust	  deterrence	  posture.	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  Asia	  has	  remained	  relatively	  constant	  across	  decades	  and	  very	  different	  presidential	  administrations.	  	  	  U.S.	  goals	  in	  the	  Pacific	  include:	  defending	  U.S.	  territory	  against	  attack,	  defending	  allies	  and	  quasi-­‐allies	  like	  Taiwan,	  ensuring	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  goods	  and	  services,	  and	  preventing	  hegemony	  and	  maintaining	  a	  balance	  of	  power.	  	  The	  U.S.	  has	  defended	  these	  interests	  with	  extended	  deterrence,	  including	  nuclear	  deterrence,	  and	  rotational	  deployments	  of	  forces	  to	  reassure	  allies	  and	  deter	  adversaries.	  	  	  Chinese	  A2/AD	  capabilities	  threaten	  to	  hold	  at	  risk	  U.S.	  forces	  like	  carrier	  strike	  groups,	  threatening	  U.S.	  ability	  to	  uphold	  its	  security	  commitment	  and	  defend	  its	  interests	  and	  allies.	  	  As	  China	  continues	  to	  modernize	  its	  nuclear	  and	  missile	  forces,	  the	  increasing	  vulnerability	  of	  tactical	  nuclear	  delivery	  platforms	  could	  lead	  to	  crisis	  instability.	  	  If	  China	  were	  able	  to	  deny	  access	  to	  airfields	  in	  Japan	  and	  Guam,	  
	   v	  
it	  would	  threaten	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  project	  power	  in	  support	  of	  its	  allies	  and	  interests.	  	  Successful	  deterrence	  involves	  risk.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  United	  States	  will	  need	  to	  accept	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  risk	  in	  the	  future,	  including	  risk	  to	  forward-­‐based	  forces,	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  its	  interests	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  	  The	  alternative,	  a	  neo-­‐isolationist	  approach	  that	  narrowly	  defines	  U.S.	  interests	  and	  commitments,	  is	  both	  infeasible	  and	  undesirable.	  	  By	  contrast,	  a	  forward	  leaning	  strategy	  designed	  to	  safeguard	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  an	  increasingly	  risky	  security	  environment	  would	  rest	  upon	  a	  mixture	  of	  forward	  based	  and	  standoff	  capabilities	  bifurcated	  into	  forces	  for	  presence,	  deterrence,	  and	  reassurance,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  warfighting	  on	  the	  other.	  To	  implement	  this	  forward	  leaning	  strategy,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  harden	  and	  diversify	  bases,	  develop	  the	  ability	  to	  threaten	  China	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  long	  war	  on	  multiple	  fronts,	  revive	  the	  defense	  industrial	  base,	  increase	  technology	  and	  information	  sharing	  between	  allies,	  and	  improve	  mobilization	  planning.	  	  Improving	  collective	  security	  will	  include,	  particularly,	  cooperation	  and	  assistance	  with	  allied	  undersea	  warfare	  and	  investment	  in	  expeditionary	  basing	  capability.	  	  	   	  
	   1	  
Chapter 1 
The Changing Security Context in Asia 	   The	  security	  environment	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region	  is	  changing	  rapidly.	  	  China	  and	  India	  are	  exerting	  greater	  strategic	  weight	  within	  the	  region	  and	  beyond.	  	  China	  is	  demonstrating	  growing	  assertiveness	  in	  prosecuting	  its	  territorial	  claims	  in	  the	  East	  China	  Sea	  and	  South	  China	  Sea.	  	  America’s	  allies	  in	  the	  region	  are	  increasingly	  seeking	  reassurance	  and	  support	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  are	  broadening	  and	  deepening	  their	  ties	  to	  one	  another.	  The	  United	  States,	  for	  its	  part,	  has	  pledged	  to	  rebalance	  its	  strategic	  attention	  and	  force	  posture	  to	  place	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  region.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  United	  States	  is	  facing	  a	  period	  where	  the	  resources	  available	  to	  meet	  its	  interests	  are	  decreasing.	  The	  change	  in	  the	  broader	  security	  environment	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  nuclear	  sphere.	  	  Whereas	  the	  United	  States	  is	  reducing	  the	  size	  of	  its	  nuclear	  arsenal,	  China	  is	  modernizing	  and	  expanding	  its	  nuclear	  force,	  giving	  Beijing	  a	  greater	  ability	  to	  coerce	  its	  neighbors,	  deter	  U.S.	  intervention,	  and	  deny	  the	  United	  States	  escalatory	  options	  should	  it	  choose	  to	  intervene.	  	  Russia	  has	  for	  years	  sought	  to	  compensate	  for	  its	  conventional	  military	  weakness	  by	  placing	  increased	  emphasis	  on	  nuclear	  weapons	  for	  tactical,	  operational,	  and	  strategic	  purposes.	  	  North	  Korea,	  for	  its	  part,	  appears	  unlikely	  to	  eliminate	  its	  nuclear	  arsenal	  and	  in	  fact	  appears	  to	  have	  embarked	  on	  a	  policy	  of	  threatening	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Japan	  both	  through	  statements	  and	  its	  weapons'	  testing.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  demand	  for	  extended	  deterrence	  by	  U.S.	  allies	  is	  likely	  to	  grow	  at	  the	  very	  time	  that	  the	  credibility	  and	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capability	  of	  U.S.	  extended	  nuclear	  deterrence	  guarantees	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  called	  into	  question.	  These	  trends	  are	  placing	  U.S.	  alliances	  in	  the	  region	  under	  greater	  stress.	  Japan,	  for	  its	  part,	  has	  already	  relaxed	  constraints	  on	  defense	  cooperation	  and	  is	  exploring	  ways	  to	  revise	  or	  reinterpret	  its	  constitution	  to	  permit	  the	  exercise	  of	  collective	  self-­‐defense.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  Japan	  confronts	  continued	  confrontations	  with	  China	  over	  the	  Senkakus/Diaoyus,	  continued	  collaborative	  discussions	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Japan	  will	  help	  inform	  the	  policy	  communities	  in	  both	  countries	  of	  public	  and	  private	  perceptions	  in	  each	  country.	  Australia	  is	  increasing	  its	  defense	  budget	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  spending	  two	  percent	  of	  its	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  on	  defense	  in	  future	  years.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Australian	  governments	  are	  exploring	  options	  to	  grant	  the	  U.S.	  military	  greater	  access	  to	  facilities	  in	  Australia.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Australia	  enjoy	  a	  strong	  and	  sustained	  bilateral	  strategic	  relationship.	  	  American	  and	  Australian	  soldiers	  have	  fought	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  in	  every	  war	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  fought	  since	  World	  War	  II.	  	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Australia	  have	  an	  intimate	  intelligence	  relationship.	  	  And,	  with	  few	  exceptions,	  both	  countries	  share	  a	  common	  worldview	  and	  have	  successfully	  worked	  together	  to	  maintain	  a	  stable	  strategic	  security	  environment	  in	  Asia,	  the	  Pacific	  and	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  globe.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Japan	  enjoy	  a	  long	  history	  of	  cooperation	  in	  the	  defense	  sphere.	  That	  cooperation	  entered	  new	  realms	  after	  the	  September	  11,	  2001	  terrorist	  attacks,	  as	  Japan	  deployed	  Ground	  Self-­‐Defense	  Force	  units	  to	  southern	  Iraq	  and	  Maritime	  Self-­‐Defense	  Force	  units	  undertook	  counter-­‐piracy	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patrols	  in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aden.	  	  Moreover,	  Operation	  TOMODACHI,	  undertaken	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  2011	  Tohoku	  earthquake	  and	  tsunami,	  highlighted	  alliance	  cooperation.	  The	  rise	  of	  China	  has,	  however,	  meant	  that	  the	  old	  relationships	  are	  insufficient.	  A	  China	  with	  a	  powerful	  navy	  and	  air	  force,	  and	  claims	  on	  ocean	  territory	  recognized	  by	  no	  other	  state,	  yet	  stoutly	  defended	  by	  Beijing,	  poses	  a	  new	  and	  serious	  security	  threat	  in	  the	  Asia	  Pacific.	  Japan,	  in	  particular,	  finds	  its	  own	  territory	  at	  risk	  from	  Chinese	  claims,	  and	  Australia,	  often	  isolated	  in	  the	  Pacific	  region,	  has	  become	  more	  apprehensive	  for	  its	  long-­‐term	  security.	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  all	  the	  more	  important	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  diagnose	  the	  state	  of	  its	  alliances	  with	  Australia	  and	  Japan,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  growing	  relationship	  with	  one	  another.	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  each	  party’s	  views	  of	  the	  evolving	  security	  environment,	  deterrence,	  extended	  deterrence,	  reassurance,	  and	  nonproliferation.	  	  This	  study	  is	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  multi-­‐national	  research	  effort	  to	  examine	  American,	  Australian,	  and	  Japanese	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  security	  environment,	  deterrence	  and	  reassurance,	  and	  proliferation.	  	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  seeks	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  questions:	  
• How	  do	  leaders	  in	  country’s	  government	  and	  security	  community	  view	  the	  security	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  operate?	  
• What	  trends	  do	  they	  believe	  will	  characterize	  it	  over	  the	  next	  two	  decades?	  
• What	  are	  the	  most	  significant	  uncertainties	  the	  country’s	  government	  faces	  in	  planning	  for	  the	  future?	  
• What	  shocks	  or	  discontinuities	  would	  pose	  the	  greatest	  challenge?	  
• What	  threats	  is	  the	  country	  likely	  to	  face?	  
• Given	  the	  above,	  what	  can	  be	  done	  to	  strengthen	  deterrence	  and	  extended	  deterrence?	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Chapter	  2,	  written	  by	  Dr.	  Ross	  Babbage	  of	  Strategic	  Forum,	  explores	  Australian	  views	  of	  the	  changing	  security	  environment	  and	  extended	  deterrence.	  	  It	  is	  based	  upon	  an	  extensive	  set	  of	  interviews	  with	  Australian	  leaders	  and	  national	  security	  thinkers	  as	  well	  as	  a	  review	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Australian	  strategic	  literature.	  Chapter	  3,	  written	  by	  Sugio	  Takahashi	  of	  the	  National	  Institute	  for	  Defense	  Studies	  in	  Tokyo,	  provides	  a	  Japanese	  view	  of	  security	  challenges.	  	  Chapter	  4,	  by	  Prof.	  Thomas	  G.	  Mahnken	  of	  Johns	  Hopkins	  SAIS,	  offers	  an	  American	  view	  of	  both	  challenges	  and	  potential	  solutions.	  	  The	  report’s	  conclusion	  summarizes	  the	  project’s	  findings	  and	  points	  the	  way	  to	  future	  research.	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Chapter	  2	  
Australian	  Views	  of	  the	  Changing	  Security	  Environment	  and	  
Extended	  Deterrence	  	  
Introduction	  One	  of	  the	  challenges	  in	  preparing	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  to	  summarize	  the	  views	  of	  Australians	  on	  their	  changing	  security	  environment.	  This	  is	  not	  straightforward	  because	  there	  is	  inevitably	  a	  diversity	  of	  views	  across	  the	  country.	  	  Nevertheless,	  public	  opinion	  polling	  suggests	  that	  on	  many	  central	  aspects	  of	  their	  security	  most	  Australians	  are	  in	  broad	  agreement.	  Statements	  by	  relevant	  politicians	  and	  senior	  officials	  also	  rarely	  diverge	  markedly	  from	  what	  might	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  ‘mainstream’	  perspectives.	  In	  addition,	  Australian	  defense	  and	  security	  personnel	  have	  a	  culture	  of	  participating	  routinely	  in	  trusted	  closed-­‐door	  discussions	  and	  debates	  with	  external	  security	  specialists	  and	  people	  from	  industry.	  These	  private	  exchanges	  reveal	  a	  similar	  broad	  agreement	  on	  the	  key	  priorities	  for	  Australian	  security	  concern	  and	  national	  security	  investment.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  above,	  in	  preparing	  the	  foundational	  work	  for	  this	  chapter,	  two	  carefully	  tailored	  closed	  workshops	  were	  held	  with	  senior	  officials	  to	  talk	  through	  the	  key	  issues	  at	  some	  length.	  	  This	  chapter	  draws	  on	  all	  of	  these	  sources	  and	  aims	  to	  reflect	  accurately	  the	  views	  of	  the	  Australian	  people	  and	  especially	  those	  of	  the	  country’s	  national	  security	  community.	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Australia’s	  More	  Challenging	  Strategic	  Landscape	  	  During	  the	  last	  decade,	  Australians	  have	  gradually	  come	  to	  realize	  that	  their	  strategic	  outlook	  is	  growing	  	  more	  challenging.	  	  Prominent	  factors	  have	  been	  the	  continued	  rise	  of	  China’s	  economy	  to	  rival	  that	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Chinese	  deployment	  of	  formidable	  military	  capabilities,	  and	  Beijing’s	  assertive	  nationalist	  strategies	  abroad,	  including	  extensive	  cyber	  operations	  against	  Australia	  and	  its	  close	  allies	  and	  partners.	  A	  related	  development	  has	  been	  the	  strengthening	  of	  security	  cooperation	  between	  a	  group	  of	  authoritarian	  states	  that	  includes	  Russia,	  China,	  North	  Korea,	  Iran,	  Syria	  and	  several	  other	  non-­‐democratic	  regimes.	  Further	  complicating	  Australia’s	  security	  outlook	  is	  the	  morphing	  of	  the	  United	  States	  into	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  ally.	  Many	  Americans	  are	  war-­‐weary,	  worried	  by	  the	  failure	  to	  contain	  international	  terrorism,	  concerned	  by	  delays	  in	  restoring	  their	  economy	  and	  frustrated	  by	  the	  fraught	  processes	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  Washington.	  There	  is	  also	  deep	  unease	  in	  the	  United	  States	  about	  the	  assertive	  behavior	  of	  China,	  Russia	  and	  other	  authoritarian	  states	  and	  the	  weakening	  of	  many	  long-­‐standing	  American	  technological	  and	  military	  advantages.	  	  Australians	  are	  watching	  as	  senior	  American	  defense	  and	  foreign	  policy	  specialists	  debate	  whether	  they	  should	  respond	  to	  the	  markedly	  altered	  international	  environment	  by	  sustaining	  strong	  forward	  commitments	  or	  by	  adopting	  more	  restrained	  types	  of	  international	  policy.	  They	  have	  also	  noted	  Washington’s	  evolving	  approach	  to	  U.S.	  allies.	  The	  Obama	  Administration	  has	  helped	  foster	  these	  divergent	  tendencies	  by	  the	  hesitancy	  of	  its	  actions	  in	  Syria,	  the	  
	   7	  
broader	  Middle	  East	  and	  in	  East	  Asia,	  its	  severely	  constrained	  defense	  spending,	  and	  its	  sometimes	  clumsy	  management	  of	  alliance	  relations.	  	  Further	  complicating	  Canberra’s	  strategic	  outlook	  is	  that,	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Australia	  is	  no	  longer	  far	  distant	  from	  the	  center	  of	  major	  power	  tensions.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  country	  finds	  itself	  close	  to	  the	  center	  stage	  of	  global	  strategic	  competition	  and	  a	  likely	  theatre	  of	  any	  future	  major	  war.	  The	  U.S.,	  China	  and	  a	  range	  of	  other	  major	  powers	  are	  already	  maneuvering	  to	  exploit	  Australia’s	  enhanced	  strategic	  significance.	  	  Given	  these	  markedly	  altered	  circumstances,	  Australia’s	  strategic	  thinkers	  are	  quietly	  debating	  how	  best	  to	  secure	  the	  country’s	  vital	  interests	  in	  the	  more	  challenging	  security	  environment	  now	  developing.	  There	  is	  an	  emerging	  consensus	  that	  the	  time	  has	  come	  to	  take	  stock	  of	  the	  substantially	  altered	  strategic	  environment	  and	  consider	  new	  options	  for	  enhancing	  the	  country’s	  security.	  	  	  
	  
Primary	  Strategic	  Changes	  to	  Australia’s	  Security	  Environment	  When	   Australians	   consider	   the	   major	   changes	   underway	   in	   their	   strategic	  environment,	  nine	  developments	  are	  especially	  prominent.	  
	  
1. Altering	  economic	  balance	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  Australian	  policy	  makers	  are	  acutely	  aware	  that	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  close	  allies	  no	  longer	  dominate	  economic	  activity	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	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In	  real,	  or	  purchasing	  power	  parity,	  terms	  China’s	  economy	  is	  already	  about	  the	  same	  size	  as	  that	  of	  the	  U.S.	  	  China	  certainly	  faces	  major	  challenges	  in	  coming	  years,	  especially	  in	  shifting	  its	  economy	  from	  export-­‐led	  growth	  to	  that	  driven	  more	  by	  domestic	  consumption	  and	  services.	  This,	  together	  with	  the	  maturing	  of	  industrialization	  and	  an	  ageing	  of	  the	  population,	  means	  average	  economic	  growth	  rates	  in	  China	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  lower	  and	  periodically	  fluctuate.	  The	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Australian	  Treasury,	  John	  Fraser,	  has	  spoken	  publicly	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  perturbations	  for	  Australia.1	  Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  a	  general	  consensus	  in	  Australia	  that	  for	  the	  next	  three	  decades	  the	  pace	  of	  economic	  growth	  in	  China	  is	  still	  likely	  to	  be	  faster	  than	  that	  in	  North	  America.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  China	  is	  developing	  a	  high	  level	  of	  economic	  integration	  with	  its	  Western	  Pacific	  neighbors.	  China	  is	  already	  the	  largest	  trading	  partner	  of	  Australia,	  Japan,	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  and	  by	  2020	  will	  probably	  be	  the	  largest	  trading	  partner	  of	  almost	  every	  western	  Pacific	  Rim	  nation.	  	  For	  Australia,	  the	  strategic	  implications	  of	  China’s	  growth	  are	  complex.	  Some	  commentators	  conclude	  that	  the	  country’s	  stronger	  economic	  links	  with	  Asia	  are	  inexorably	  drawing	  Australia	  into	  China’s	  strategic	  orbit.	  A	  few	  argue	  Australia	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “The	  rise	  of	  Asia,	  the	  ageing	  of	  the	  population	  and	  the	  transition	  away	  from	  resource-­‐led	  growth	  will	  require	  significant	  adjustment.”	  John	  Fraser	  –	  CEDA	  speech.	  For	  details	  of	  John	  Fraser’s	  speech	  to	  the	  Committee	  for	  Economic	  Development	  Australia	  (CEDA)	  on	  27	  February	  2015,	  see:	  http://www.themandarin.com.au/24143-­‐john-­‐fraser-­‐fiscal-­‐repair-­‐structural-­‐reform-­‐needed-­‐budget/?pgnc=1	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should,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  distance	  itself	  from	  the	  U.S.2	  This	  line	  of	  thinking	  oversimplifies	  the	  developing	  situation	  and,	  in	  particular,	  overlooks	  the	  qualitative	  aspects	  of	  Australia’s	  relationships	  with	  its	  economic	  partners.	  Although	  China	  is	  easily	  Australia’s	  largest	  trading	  partner,	  the	  figures	  for	  merchandise	  trade,	  on	  their	  own,	  convey	  a	  misleading	  picture	  of	  the	  economic	  relationship.	  China	  and	  Australia	  sell	  each	  other	  large	  quantities	  of	  goods,	  but	  they	  trade	  much	  lower	  quantities	  of	  services.	  Indeed,	  Australia	  and	  the	  U.S.	  trade	  more	  than	  double	  the	  value	  of	  services	  Australia	  and	  China	  exchange.	  	  Perhaps	  even	  more	  revealing,	  China	  is	  only	  the	  seventh	  largest	  investor	  in	  Australia,	  far	  behind	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  UK,	  Japan	  and	  several	  other	  European	  and	  Asian	  countries.	  China,	  meanwhile,	  attracts	  only	  1.1	  per	  cent	  of	  Australia’s	  investment	  abroad,	  compared	  to	  29.8	  per	  cent	  going	  to	  European	  Union	  countries	  and	  28.5	  per	  cent	  going	  to	  the	  U.S.3	  There	  are	  also	  major	  differences	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  Chinese	  investments	  in	  Australia	  compared	  to	  those	  from	  other	  advanced	  economies.	  Many	  American,	  European	  and	  Japanese	  investments	  comprise	  medium-­‐	  and	  high-­‐technology	  footprints	  that	  contribute	  to	  Australia’s	  and	  the	  globe’s	  longer-­‐term	  development	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  these	  and	  related	  issues	  see:	  Hugh	  White	  Power	  Shift:	  
Australia’s	  Future	  Between	  Washington	  and	  Beijing	  (Quarterly	  Essay,	  Issue	  39,	  2010).	  	  3	  See	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  Which	  Countries	  Invest	  in	  Australia?	  and	  also	  Where	  Does	  Australia	  Invest?	  Accessed	  at:	  http://dfat.gov.au/trade/topics/investment/Pages/which-­‐countries-­‐invest-­‐in-­‐australia.aspx	  on	  24	  September	  2015.	  
	   10	  
and	  production	  of	  cutting-­‐edge	  systems.4	  By	  contrast,	  China’s	  much	  smaller	  scale	  investments	  in	  Australia	  involve	  very	  little	  advanced	  technology	  transfer	  and	  focus	  heavily	  on	  mineral	  developments	  and	  associated	  infrastructure	  together	  with	  some	  residential	  and	  agricultural	  property.	  This	  more	  complete	  picture	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  many	  respects	  the	  Australia-­‐China	  economic	  relationship	  is	  conducted	  at	  arms-­‐length.	  The	  two	  countries	  are	  reluctant	  to	  engage	  intimately	  in	  each	  other’s	  economies	  by	  operating	  extensively	  in	  their	  partner’s	  services	  sectors	  and	  investing	  in	  advanced	  systems.	  To	  some	  extent,	  this	  reflects	  a	  failure	  to	  identify	  attractive	  investment	  opportunities.	  However,	  other	  factors	  include	  difficulties	  in	  bridging	  cultural	  differences,	  concerns	  about	  each	  other’s	  regulatory,	  legal	  and	  political	  frameworks,	  and	  limited	  levels	  of	  trust.	   Australia’s	  leaders	  recognize	  the	  strategic	  challenges	  posed	  by	  this	  developing	  situation.	  Prime	  Minister	  Malcolm	  Turnbull	  addressed	  these	  issues	  directly	  in	  January	  2015:	  	  Obviously	  the	  questions	  posed	  by	  emerging	  Asia’s	  rise	  are	  pivotal	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific:	  	  
●	  	  	  How	  quickly	  will	  these	  economies	  expand	  in	  the	  next	  few	  years,	  and	  what	  reforms	  are	  required	  to	  rekindle	  the	  rapid	  catch-­‐up	  growth	  of	  the	  early	  21st	  century?	  (and	  by	  catch-­‐up	  growth	  I	  mean	  the	  process	  by	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  For	  instance,	  Boeing’s	  operations	  in	  Australia	  are	  only	  second	  in	  scale	  to	  those	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Similarly,	  BAE	  Systems,	  Thales,	  Saab	  and	  other	  global	  companies	  in	  Australia	  develop	  and	  produce	  advanced	  technologies	  and	  systems	  to	  meet	  worldwide	  demands.	  There	  are	  other	  cutting-­‐edge	  Western	  investments	  in	  Australia’s	  information	  technology,	  telecommunications,	  pharmaceutical	  industries	  and	  other	  sectors.	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developing	  economies	  converge	  with	  the	  productivity	  of	  developed	  economies).	  	  
●	  	  	  What	  will	  the	  global	  distribution	  of	  economic	  production	  look	  like	  when	  the	  most	  rapid	  phase	  of	  catch-­‐up	  growth	  has	  run	  its	  course	  in	  China,	  India	  and	  Indonesia?	  	  
●	  	  	  How	  will	  tensions	  along	  the	  way	  be	  handled,	  including	  those	  arising	  from	  the	  inevitable	  translation	  of	  enlarged	  economic	  resources	  into	  enhanced	  military	  power?	  	  
●	  	  	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  environment,	  and	  for	  supply	  and	  demand	  for	  natural	  resources?	  	  
●	  	  And	  how	  ready	  are	  Western	  nations	  and	  Western-­‐dominated	  multilateral	  institutions	  to	  adapt	  to	  a	  very	  different	  distribution	  of	  global	  power	  than	  that	  which	  they’ve	  been	  used	  to?5	  	  From	  Australia’s	  perspective,	  China	  is	  certainly	  rising	  to	  be	  a	  major	  economic	  power.	  However,	  because	  China’s	  economic	  relationships	  with	  Australia	  and	  a	  range	  of	  other	  regional	  countries	  largely	  comprise	  the	  simple	  trade	  of	  commodities	  and	  medium-­‐technology	  manufactured	  goods,	  Beijing’s	  strategic	  influence	  is	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  many	  assume.	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  next	  two	  decades	  trade	  with	  other	  Asian	  developing	  economies	  is	  likely	  to	  grow	  more	  rapidly	  than	  with	  the	  maturing	  and	  slowing	  /Chinese	  economy.	  Indeed,	  within	  two	  decades	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Australia’s	  trade	  with	  India	  might	  rival	  that	  with	  China	  and	  trade	  with	  Indonesia	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  rapidly	  rising	  Asian	  countries	  will	  probably	  gain	  new	  prominence.	  In	  that	  timeframe	  Australia’s	  trade	  and	  investment	  links	  across	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  will	  almost	  certainly	  diversify	  and	  deepen	  greatly.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Malcolm	  Turnbull	  MP,	  “Assessing	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific”	  (An	  address	  delivered	  at	  the	  US/Australia	  Dialogue,	  31	  January	  2015)	  Accessed	  at	  http://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/future-­‐of-­‐the-­‐asia-­‐pacific	  on	  23	  September,	  2015.	  
	   12	  
Peter	  Varghese,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  highlighted	  the	  strategic	  uncertainties	  generated	  by	  these	  shifts	  in	  economic	  power:	  	  This	  idea	  of	  an	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  region	  is	  particularly	  important	  because	  we	  are	  living	  at	  a	  time	  of	  profound	  transition	  in	  the	  economic	  and	  strategic	  environment	  of	  Asia.	  A	  key	  question	  for	  Australian	  policy	  makers	  is	  how	  will	  the	  shift	  in	  economic	  weight	  in	  our	  region	  affect	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  and	  what	  will	  it	  mean	  for	  Australia’s	  national	  interests?6	  	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  consensus	  amongst	  Australian	  policy	  makers	  that	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  geo-­‐economic	  changes	  underway	  are	  profound.	  However,	  what	  should	  be	  done	  about	  these	  changes	  remains	  the	  subject	  of	  intense	  debate.	  
	  
2. The	  rise	  of	  powerful	  authoritarian	  states	  For	  Australia,	  the	  most	  concerning	  aspect	  of	  China’s	  re-­‐emergence	  as	  a	  major	  power	  springs	  not	  from	  the	  growing	  strength	  of	  its	  economy,	  geographic	  size,	  vast	  population,	  or	  even	  from	  its	  rising	  military	  capabilities.	  Rather,	  it	  springs	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  China’s	  authoritarian	  regime,	  its	  Leninist	  ideology	  and,	  most	  of	  all,	  from	  its	  assertive	  and	  highly	  revisionist	  international	  strategy.	  China	  is	  ruled	  by	  a	  regime	  that	  seeks	  to	  overthrow	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  rules-­‐based	  international	  order,	  created	  and	  long	  nurtured	  by	  the	  Western	  powers.	  The	  consensus	  amongst	  Australian	  strategic	  thinkers	  is	  that	  the	  Chinese	  regime’s	  primary	  goal	  is	  to	  reinforce	  the	  strength	  and	  longevity	  of	  the	  ruling	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China	  (CPC).	  That	  goal	  is	  central	  to	  the	  regime’s	  elaborate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Peter	  Varghese,	  “An	  Australian	  World	  View:	  A	  Practitioner’s	  Perspective”	  (A	  speech	  delivered	  at	  the	  Lowy	  Institute,	  20	  August,	  2015)	  Accessed	  at:	  http://dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/an-­‐australian-­‐world-­‐view-­‐a-­‐practitioners-­‐perspective.aspx	  on	  23	  September,	  2015.	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mechanisms	  to	  ensure	  domestic	  stability,	  economic	  growth	  and	  restoration	  of	  Chinese	  pre-­‐eminence	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific.	  	  	  The	  Chinese	  leadership’s	  strategy	  is	  generally	  considered	  to	  have	  four	  major	  sub-­‐goals.	  First,	  China	  wishes	  to	  control	  information	  flows	  to	  maintain	  internal	  cohesion	  and	  undermine	  potential	  domestic	  and	  international	  opponents.	  Specific	  measures	  include	  propaganda	  campaigns	  to	  underline	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  CPC.	  Domestic	  intelligence	  and	  cyber	  operations	  are	  conducted	  to	  suppress	  potentially	  subversive	  information	  flows	  and	  to	  identify,	  monitor,	  coerce	  and,	  when	  appropriate,	  arrest	  dissidents	  and	  troublesome	  minorities.	  Programs	  to	  control	  information	  from	  international	  sources	  include	  very	  active	  diplomacy,	  sophisticated	  propaganda	  programs	  and	  foreign	  intelligence	  operations	  to,	  among	  other	  purposes,	  cultivate	  agents	  of	  influence	  and	  spread	  disinformation.	  These	  programs	  also	  include	  the	  propagation	  of	  highly	  assertive	  legal	  positions	  in	  so-­‐called	  “lawfare”	  operations	  to	  bolster	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  Chinese	  claims.	  Chinese	  students	  and	  other	  citizens	  abroad,	  together	  with	  Confucius	  Institutes	  and	  similar	  organizations,	  are	  periodically	  marshaled	  to	  support	  Beijing’s	  international	  operations.7	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Confucius	  Institutes	  have	  been	  established	  in	  many	  Western	  universities,	  including	  nine	  in	  Australia.	  These	  organizations	  are	  funded	  by,	  and	  closely	  affiliated	  with,	  the	  Chinese	  Ministry	  of	  Education.	  The	  publicly	  stated	  purpose	  of	  these	  Confucius	  Institutes	  is	  “to	  promote	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  Chinese	  culture.”	  However	  the	  executives	  of	  the	  central	  headquarters	  of	  the	  organization	  in	  Beijing	  are	  all	  Chinese	  Government	  officials	  and	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  appear	  to	  be	  members	  of	  the	  CPC.	  Serious	  allegations	  have	  been	  made	  about	  the	  involvement	  of	  Confucius	  Institutes	  in	  espionage	  and	  other	  intelligence-­‐related	  activities.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  “Former	  Canadian	  Intelligence	  Agent:	  The	  Confucius	  Institute	  Is	  an	  Espionage	  Institution”	  (NTD.TV,	  2	  November	  2014)	  http://www.ntd.tv/en/programs/news-­‐
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   A	  second	  core	  goal	  of	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  is	  to	  sustain	  economic	  growth	  and	  modernization.	  Economic	  prosperity	  certainly	  reinforces	  the	  domestic	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Party.	  But	  sometimes	  Chinese	  financial	  institutions	  and	  corporations	  are	  encouraged	  to	  operate	  in	  locations	  and	  for	  purposes	  that	  are	  driven	  more	  by	  the	  CPC’s	  strategic	  goals	  than	  by	  intrinsic	  economic	  value.	  China’s	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  are	  used	  in	  some	  environments	  to	  directly	  serve	  Party	  and	  national	  interests	  by	  engaging	  in	  intelligence	  and	  other	  types	  of	  strategic	  operations.	  China’s	  intelligence	  organizations	  are	  heavily	  engaged	  in	  industrial	  espionage	  to	  steal	  the	  intellectual	  property	  required	  to	  produce	  advanced	  products	  and	  services.	  These	  operations	  facilitate	  Chinese	  industrial	  shortcuts	  and	  strengthen	  competitive	  advantages.8	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  politics/china-­‐forbidden-­‐news/20141029/242027-­‐-­‐former-­‐canadian-­‐intelligence-­‐agent-­‐the-­‐confucius-­‐institute-­‐is-­‐an-­‐espionage-­‐institution-­‐.html#sthash.IeNtZsnk.dpuf	  :	  http://www.ntd.tv/en/programs/news-­‐politics/china-­‐forbidden-­‐news/20141029/242027-­‐-­‐former-­‐canadian-­‐intelligence-­‐agent-­‐the-­‐confucius-­‐institute-­‐is-­‐an-­‐espionage-­‐institution-­‐.html	  	  (Accessed	  on	  7	  May	  2015)	  	  For	  a	  critical	  report	  on	  the	  political	  role	  of	  Confucius	  Institutes	  see:	  Peter	  Foster	  “U.S.	  professors	  urge	  Western	  universities	  to	  end	  ties	  to	  China's	  Confucius	  Institutes,”	  The	  Telegraph	  (7	  May	  2015)	  	  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10907971/US-­‐professors-­‐urge-­‐Western-­‐universities-­‐to-­‐end-­‐ties-­‐to-­‐Chinas-­‐Confucius-­‐Institutes.html	  (Accessed	  on	  7	  May	  2015).	  8	  It	  is	  interesting	  in	  this	  context	  to	  note	  the	  agreement	  reached	  between	  Presidents	  Barak	  Obama	  and	  Xi	  Jinping	  in	  September	  2015	  prohibits	  each	  side	  from	  spying	  on	  each	  country’s	  intellectual	  property	  for	  commercial	  gain,	  consultation	  and	  cooperation	  between	  relevant	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  work	  together	  to	  "an	  architecture	  to	  govern	  behavior"	  that	  is	  enforceable	  and	  clear.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  notable	  that	  the	  Director	  of	  National	  Intelligence,	  James	  Clapper	  and	  other	  senior	  U.S.	  intelligence	  officials	  have	  repeatedly	  expressed	  skepticism	  that	  this	  agreement	  will	  significantly	  modify	  Chinese	  behavior.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Andrea	  Shalel,	  “Top	  U.S.	  Spy	  Says	  Sceptical	  About	  U.S.-­‐China	  Cyber	  Agreement,”	  Reuters	  30	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A	  third	  important	  sub-­‐goal	  of	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  is	  to	  build	  strong	  military	  capabilities.	  Australia’s	  strategic	  planners	  realize	  that	  these	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  match	  those	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies’	  ship-­‐for-­‐ship,	  aircraft-­‐for-­‐aircraft	  or	  tank-­‐for-­‐tank.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  structured	  asymmetrically	  to	  conduct	  surprise,	  very	  fast-­‐paced	  operations	  to	  blind	  and	  destroy	  most	  traditionally-­‐structured	  enemy	  forces	  that	  are	  forward-­‐based	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific,	  while	  deterring	  nuclear	  escalation.	  To	  support	  this	  development	  of	  modern	  military	  capabilities,	  China’s	  intelligence,	  cyber	  and	  military	  industries	  are	  tasked	  with	  gathering,	  assessing	  and	  exploiting	  advanced	  technologies	  and	  military	  systems	  so	  China	  can	  outflank	  or	  surpass	  Western	  capabilities	  in	  priority	  fields.	  	  A	  fourth	  key	  sub-­‐goal	  of	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  is	  assertive	  multi-­‐dimensional	  operations	  that	  lay	  claim	  to	  territory,	  seabed,	  airspace	  and	  parts	  of	  outer	  space	  that	  are	  either	  poorly	  defended	  or	  difficult	  for	  opposing	  forces	  to	  occupy	  or	  protect.	  Through	  a	  series	  of	  incremental	  steps	  by	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  civilian	  and	  military	  agencies,	  China	  seeks	  to	  create	  new	  “facts”	  and	  new	  “realities”	  that	  are	  hard	  for	  opposing	  forces	  to	  contest.	  In	  some	  cases,	  such	  as	  Chinese	  operations	  to	  undermine	  Philippine	  and	  Vietnamese	  holdings	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  China	  has	  been	  prepared	  to	  deploy	  overwhelming	  force	  to	  coerce	  acquiescence.	  In	  others,	  such	  as	  the	  harassment	  of	  U.S.	  and	  Japanese	  ships	  and	  aircraft	  in	  the	  East	  and	  South	  China	  seas,	  Beijing	  has	  modulated	  its	  assertive	  actions	  so	  that	  they	  always	  fall	  below	  the	  threshold	  for	  triggering	  forceful	  allied	  responses.	  The	  end	  result	  is	  a	  form	  of	  flexible	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  September,	  2015.	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/30/us-­‐usa-­‐cybersecurity-­‐idKCN0RT1Q820150930#Humv0cjAkUzGpYCj.97	  	  (accessed	  on	  21	  November	  2015).	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“salami-­‐slicing”	  strategy	  that	  has	  gradually	  expanded	  China’s	  presence	  in	  internationally	  contested	  areas	  and	  strengthened	  Beijing’s	  assertion	  of	  regional	  pre-­‐eminence.	  	  The	  success	  of	  these	  carefully	  tailored	  actions	  has	  deepened	  Australian	  and	  regional	  concerns	  about	  China’s	  future	  goals	  and	  it	  has	  also	  undermined	  regional	  confidence	  in	  the	  deterrence	  and	  defensive	  value	  of	  security	  partnerships	  with	  the	  U.S..	  	   Of	  key	  importance	  to	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  leadership	  is	  that	  these	  assertive	  international	  operations	  are	  warmly	  welcomed	  at	  home.	  They	  reinforce	  deep-­‐seated	  nationalist	  sentiments	  and	  signify	  progress	  towards	  China	  returning	  to	  its	  “rightful	  place”	  as	  a	  leading	  global	  power.	  Australian	  strategic	  planners	  realize	  that	  there	  is	  broad	  support	  in	  the	  CPC	  for	  the	  four	  main	  themes	  in	  Chinese	  strategy,	  but	  they	  have	  also	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  signs	  of	  disenchantment	  concerning	  some	  stances	  taken	  by	  the	  Party	  leadership	  in	  recent	  years.	  In	  particular,	  there	  are	  concerns	  in	  the	  Party	  about	  corrupt	  behavior	  and	  worries	  about	  excesses	  in	  some	  counter-­‐corruption	  campaigns.	  Many	  Party	  members	  in	  business	  also	  worry	  about	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  difficulties	  in	  maintaining	  economic	  momentum	  and	  social	  harmony.	  When	  considering	  the	  future	  of	  China	  in	  the	  coming	  30	  years,	  Australian	  security	  planners	  usually	  focus	  on	  three	  categories	  of	  scenario:	  •	   First,	  the	  CPC	  leadership	  may	  maintain	  a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  economic,	  social	  and	  security	  stability,	  permitting	  China	  to	  continue	  its	  military	  modernization	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and	  assertive	  strategic	  operations.	  This	  is	  generally	  assessed	  as	  the	  most	  likely	  future.	  	  •	   Second,	  the	  CPC	  leadership	  may	  fear	  it	  is	  losing	  control	  of	  the	  Party	  and	  the	  country	  and	  decide	  to	  reinforce	  its	  legitimacy	  and	  authority	  by	  adopting	  a	  more	  nationalist	  stance.	  This	  might	  lead	  to	  more	  aggressive	  international	  operations	  to	  rally	  the	  population	  and	  strengthen	  national	  cohesion.	  	  •	   Third,	  worsening	  economic	  conditions	  combined	  with	  serious	  corruption	  scandals	  and	  other	  problems	  could	  trigger	  mass	  demonstrations	  and	  a	  strong	  move	  within	  the	  Party	  to	  liberalize	  China’s	  political	  system.	  If	  sustained,	  such	  a	  change	  could	  effectively	  amount	  to	  a	  new	  Chinese	  revolution.	  New	  political	  parties	  might	  be	  legalized	  and	  permitted	  to	  stand	  against	  the	  CPC	  in	  elections.	  While	  developments	  of	  this	  kind	  may	  improve	  the	  prospects	  for	  more	  moderate	  international	  policies	  and	  actions	  in	  the	  longer	  term,	  in	  the	  short	  term	  they	  would	  probably	  be	  combined	  with	  strong	  nationalist	  appeals	  in	  order	  to	  help	  hold	  the	  country	  together.	  While	  this	  scenario	  is	  possible,	  it	  is	  probably	  the	  least	  likely	  during	  the	  coming	  three	  decades.	  The	  bottom	  line	  for	  Canberra	  is	  that	  any	  of	  these	  broad	  scenarios	  may	  exacerbate	  Australia’s	  security	  challenges.	  	  For	  the	  medium	  term	  at	  least,	  China	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  powerful	  revisionist	  state,	  prepared	  to	  contest	  long-­‐standing	  international	  norms.	  This	  outlook	  raises	  important	  issues	  for	  Australia’s	  immediate	  strategy	  but	  even	  more	  serious	  questions	  for	  the	  type	  of	  strategy	  Australia	  may	  need	  in	  2020-­‐2040.	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3. China’s	  stronger	  military	  forces	  and	  assertive	  strategies	  	  	  While	  most	  countries	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  are	  taking	  steps	  to	  modernize	  their	  military	  capabilities,	  it	  is	  the	  scale,	  breadth	  and	  speed	  of	  China’s	  military	  expansion	  that	  is	  generating	  the	  most	  concern	  amongst	  Australian	  strategic	  thinkers.	  	  For	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  close	  Western	  allies	  can	  no	  longer	  assume	  operational	  dominance	  in	  this	  theatre.	  Australian	  defense	  planners	  have	  noted	  that	  during	  the	  last	  ten	  years	  China’s	  defense	  spending	  has	  quadrupled	  while	  defense	  spending	  in	  the	  U.S.	  has	  grown	  by	  a	  total	  of	  only	  12	  per	  cent.9	  Australian	  concerns	  about	  Chinese	  military	  developments	  focus	  primarily	  on	  ten	  key	  Peoples’	  Liberation	  Army	  (PLA)	  capabilities	  whose	  rapid	  development	  and	  deployment	  is	  transforming	  the	  military	  balance	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	  First,	  China	  is	  deploying	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  strategic	  nuclear	  forces	  that	  are	  more	  capable	  and	  survivable.	  The	  new	  DF-­‐31,	  DF-­‐31A,	  and	  DF-­‐41	  inter-­‐continental	  ballistic	  missiles	  (ICBMs)	  are	  carried	  on	  road	  and	  rail-­‐mobile	  transporters	  that	  are	  shuffled	  through	  an	  extensive	  network	  of	  deep	  underground	  tunnels	  and	  associated	  alternative	  launch	  sites.	  There	  are	  also	  four	  new	  nuclear-­‐powered	  ballistic	  missile-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  For	  details	  see	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget,	  Historical	  Tables:	  Budget	  of	  the	  
U.S.	  Government	  (Washington	  DC,	  Fiscal	  Year	  2013),	  54,55.	  See	  also	  “Trends	  in	  World	  Military	  Expenditure,	  2013”	  SIPRI	  Fact	  Sheet	  Accessed	  at:	  http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=476	  	  on	  9	  May	  2015.	  Please	  note	  that	  many	  categories	  of	  defense	  related	  expenditure	  are	  omitted	  from	  official	  Chinese	  budget	  statements	  and	  seriously	  underestimate	  the	  reality.	  Amongst	  the	  excluded	  categories	  are	  the	  costs	  of	  purchasing	  foreign	  weapons	  and	  equipment	  and	  defense	  research	  and	  development.	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firing	  submarines	  (SSBNs)	  in	  service	  with	  more	  under	  construction.	  Bomber	  aircraft	  armed	  with	  long-­‐range	  cruise	  missiles	  supplement	  this	  growing	  strategic	  arsenal.10	  	  	  Second,	  the	  PLA	  has	  invested	  heavily	  in	  overlapping	  surveillance	  systems	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  provide	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  China’s	  maritime	  approaches.	  This	  surveillance	  network	  includes	  satellite	  systems,	  surface-­‐	  and	  sky-­‐wave	  over-­‐the-­‐horizon	  radars,	  a	  sophisticated	  system	  of	  electronic	  emissions	  monitoring,	  high-­‐altitude,	  long-­‐endurance	  uninhabited	  aerial	  vehicles	  (UAVs)	  and	  a	  developing	  network	  of	  medium	  and	  long-­‐range	  undersea	  sonar	  arrays.	  This	  means	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  previous	  decades,	  allied	  aircraft,	  ships	  and	  submarines	  operating	  in	  much	  of	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  will	  in	  many	  circumstances	  be	  detected,	  tracked	  and	  potentially	  targeted.	  Third,	  China	  is	  fielding	  a	  very	  large	  force	  of	  cruise	  and	  ballistic	  missiles	  with	  the	  capability	  to	  accurately	  strike	  targets	  out	  to	  3,000km	  whether	  they	  are	  fixed	  bases	  or	  ships	  at	  sea.	  These	  systems	  provide	  a	  strong	  capability	  to	  attack	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  bases	  in	  the	  region	  with	  little	  warning,	  potentially	  destroying	  most	  forward-­‐based	  military	  capabilities	  in	  the	  first	  few	  hours	  of	  a	  major	  conflict.	  The	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies	  have	  no	  comparable	  theatre	  missile	  capabilities	  and	  are	  not	  well	  placed	  to	  balance	  this	  formidable	  PLA	  force.	  	  A	  notable	  feature	  of	  Figure	  1	  is	  that	  all	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Second	  Island	  Chain	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific,	  including	  the	  critical	  U.S.	  base	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  primary	  sources	  for	  the	  details	  of	  China’s	  developing	  military	  capabilities	  used	  in	  this	  chapter	  are:	  Military	  and	  Security	  Developments	  Involving	  the	  People’s	  
Republic	  of	  China	  2014	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  2014)	  and	  Military	  and	  Security	  Developments	  Involving	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  2015	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  2015)	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facilities	  in	  Japan	  and	  Guam,	  are	  within	  range	  of	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  Chinese	  theatre	  ballistic	  and	  cruise	  missile	  systems.	  	  	  
Figure	  1:	  	  Range	  Capabilities	  of	  China’s	  Land-­‐Based	  Conventionally-­‐Armed	  
Missiles	  and	  the	  First	  and	  Second	  Island	  Chains	  
	  	  
	  	  Source:	   	  Military	  and	  Security	  Developments	  Involving	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  
2014	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  2014),	  85	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For	  Australia,	  this	  means	  the	  forward-­‐deployed	  forces	  of	  its	  closest	  ally	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  are	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  surprise	  attack	  than	  at	  any	  time	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  This	  brittleness	  in	  the	  allied	  force	  posture	  is	  encouraging	  revisions	  to	  American	  basing,	  to	  patterns	  of	  operational	  deployment,	  to	  cooperation	  with	  regional	  allies	  and	  friends,	  to	  priorities	  for	  U.S.	  force	  modernization	  and	  to	  allied	  theatre	  strategy.	  However,	  some	  Australians	  worry	  that	  these	  American	  and	  allied	  counters	  have	  so	  far	  been	  modest	  in	  scale,	  uncoordinated	  and	  slow	  in	  implementation.11	  A	  fourth	  major	  change	  in	  China’s	  military	  capability	  is	  the	  commissioning	  of	  fleets	  of	  modern	  nuclear	  and	  diesel-­‐electric	  powered	  submarines.	  The	  currently	  deployed	  force	  comprises	  five	  nuclear	  attack	  submarines	  (capable	  of	  launching	  torpedoes,	  cruise	  missiles	  and	  mines),	  four	  nuclear	  powered	  ballistic	  missile-­‐firing	  submarines	  (SSBN’s)	  and	  57	  diesel	  attack	  submarines	  most	  of	  which	  carry	  modern	  torpedoes	  and	  anti-­‐ship	  missiles.	  China	  now	  operates	  more	  submarines	  than	  the	  U.S.	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  between	  85	  and	  100	  modern	  boats	  in	  2030.12	  	  A	  fifth	  major	  development	  is	  the	  design,	  testing	  and	  production	  of	  several	  classes	  of	  modern	  warships.	  In	  each	  of	  the	  last	  few	  years	  China	  has	  laid	  down,	  launched	  or	  commissioned	  over	  50	  naval	  vessels	  and	  now	  routinely	  launches	  each	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues,	  see	  Ross	  Babbage,	  Game	  Plan:	  The	  
Case	  for	  a	  New	  Australian	  Grand	  Strategy	  (Ballarat:	  Menzies	  Research	  Centre	  and	  Connor	  Court,	  2015),	  especially	  pp.	  20-­‐37.	  12	  See:	  Ronald	  O’Rourke,	  China	  Naval	  Modernization:	  Implications	  for	  U.S.	  Navy	  
Capabilities	  Background	  and	  Issues	  for	  Congress	  (Washington	  DC:	  Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  2014),	  39-­‐40.	  This	  is	  also	  argued	  in	  Babbage,	  Game	  Plan,	  24.	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year	  more	  warships	  than	  any	  other	  country.13	  Most	  of	  the	  new	  surface	  combatants	  are	  multi-­‐purpose	  and	  feature	  wide-­‐area	  airspace	  surveillance	  and	  control	  systems,	  surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missiles,	  and	  long-­‐range	  anti-­‐ship	  missiles.	  In	  most	  respects	  they	  are	  comparable	  to	  modern	  Western	  warships.	  	  	  A	  sixth	  major	  change	  is	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  China’s	  modern	  fighter-­‐bomber	  force.	  Over	  600	  fourth-­‐generation	  aircraft	  (broadly	  equivalent	  to	  Western	  F-­‐16s	  and	  F/A18s)	  are	  in	  service	  with	  several	  fifth-­‐generation	  combat	  aircraft	  in	  advanced	  development	  (approaching	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  most	  modern	  American	  air-­‐superiority	  fighters	  and	  fighter-­‐bombers,	  the	  F-­‐22	  and	  F35).14	  When	  operating	  within	  China’s	  wide-­‐area	  surveillance	  system	  and	  supported	  by	  tanker	  and	  airborne	  early	  warning	  and	  control	  aircraft,	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  posing	  a	  threat	  to	  allied	  maritime	  and	  air	  forces	  anywhere	  in	  the	  Pacific	  west	  of	  the	  Second	  Island	  Chain.	  A	  seventh	  major	  change	  is	  the	  strengthening	  of	  China’s	  air	  defenses.	  Chinese	  surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missile	  systems	  now	  form	  a	  dense	  network	  along	  most	  of	  the	  eastern	  coast	  and	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  high	  priority	  facilities	  inland.	  This	  modern	  and	  well-­‐protected	  air	  defense	  system	  poses	  a	  major	  challenge	  to	  Western	  operations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  details	  see:	  U.S.-­‐China	  Economic	  and	  Security	  Review	  Commission,	  2014	  
Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress	  (Washington	  DC,	  2014),	  290.	  Accessed	  at:	  http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%202%20Military%20and%20Security%20Issues%20Involving%20China.pdf	  on	  12	  November	  2015.	  	  14	  See:	  Michael	  S.	  Chase,	  Jeffrey	  Engstrom,	  Tai	  Ming	  Cheung,	  Kristen	  A.	  Gunness,	  Scott	  Warren	  Harold,	  Susan	  Puska,	  Samuel	  K.	  Berkowitz,	  China’s	  Incomplete	  Military	  
Transformation:	  Assessing	  the	  Weaknesses	  of	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  (PLA)	  (Rand	  Corporation,	  Santa	  Monica,	  2015),	  102.	  	  See	  also	  International	  Institute	  for	  Strategic	  Studies,	  The	  Military	  Balance	  2015	  (Routledge	  and	  IISS,	  London,	  2015),	  242.	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An	  eighth	  major	  change	  is	  China’s	  development	  of	  sophisticated	  capabilities	  for	  space	  warfare.	  The	  Chinese	  high	  command	  views	  the	  West’s	  heavy	  dependence	  on	  space-­‐based	  systems	  as	  a	  major	  vulnerability.	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  deploying	  capabilities	  to	  interfere	  with,	  damage	  and	  destroy	  space-­‐based	  systems	  so	  that	  by	  2020	  the	  PLA	  will	  be	  able	  to	  attack	  spacecraft	  in	  all	  normally	  employed	  orbits	  through	  both	  missile	  and	  unconventional	  means.	  15	  A	  ninth	  important	  Chinese	  military	  advance	  is	  its	  development	  of	  strong	  cyber	  capabilities.	  The	  Chinese	  military	  appreciates	  the	  Western	  allies	  depend	  heavily	  on	  secure	  near-­‐real-­‐time	  transmission,	  interpretation	  and	  display	  of	  vast	  streams	  of	  digital	  data	  sourced	  from	  numerous	  sensors.	  The	  Chinese	  realize	  that	  if,	  in	  a	  crisis,	  they	  can	  cut	  or	  severely	  cripple	  these	  information	  flows,	  the	  Western	  military	  machine	  would	  lose	  much	  of	  its	  strength.	  Relevant	  Australian	  and	  allied	  agencies	  have	  in	  recent	  years	  reported	  extensive	  Chinese	  probing,	  intelligence	  gathering	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  attacks	  on	  sensitive	  information	  and	  computer	  networks.16	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  For	  recent	  testing	  of	  these	  capabilities	  see	  Military	  and	  Security	  Developments	  
Involving	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  2015,	  35.	  16	  See,	  for	  example,	  Duncan	  Lewis,	  Australia's	  Current	  Security	  and	  Intelligence	  
Operating	  Environment	  (ASIO	  Director-­‐General's	  speech:	  Address	  to	  the	  Security	  in	  Government	  Conference,	  1	  September,	  2015)	  accessed	  at:	  http://www.asio.gov.au/Publications/Speeches-­‐and-­‐Statements/Speeches-­‐and-­‐Statements.html	  on	  12	  November	  2015.	  Australian	  Cyber	  Security	  Centre	  Threat	  
Report	  (Canberra,	  2015)	  accessed	  at:	  https://www.acsc.gov.au/publications/ACSC_Threat_Report_2015.pdf	  	  on	  12	  November	  2015.	  Also	  	  APT1:	  Exposing	  One	  of	  China’s	  Cyber	  Espionage	  Units	  (Mandiant,	  Milpitas	  California,	  2014)	  Accessed	  at:	  https://www.fireeye.com/current-­‐threats/threat-­‐intelligence-­‐reports.html	  on	  12	  November	  2015.	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A	  tenth	  major	  change	  is	  development	  of	  a	  highly	  assertive	  Chinese	  strategy	  for	  coercion	  and	  major	  conflict	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific.17	  	  China’s	  new	  military	  capabilities	  have	  already	  had	  a	  marked	  impact	  on	  Australia’s	  strategic	  environment	  and	  Australian	  defense	  planning.	  During	  the	  coming	  25	  years,	  China’s	  anti-­‐access	  and	  area	  denial	  capabilities	  are	  projected	  to	  grow	  stronger,	  reach	  out	  further	  and	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  new	  ways.	  Moreover	  China,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  can	  afford	  to	  concentrate	  almost	  all	  of	  its	  military	  investments	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  and	  optimize	  its	  coercive	  power	  and	  leverage	  in	  this	  theatre.	  A	  key	  effect	  is	  to	  magnify	  Beijing’s	  strategic	  influence	  and	  its	  power	  to	  manage	  future	  crises	  in	  Australia’s	  approaches.	  The	  Australian	  public	  generally	  shares	  the	  concerns	  of	  Australian	  security	  planners.	  The	  latest	  Lowy	  Poll	  found	  that	  almost	  half	  of	  the	  Australian	  population	  (48	  percent)	  thinks	  it	  “likely”	  that	  China	  will	  become	  a	  military	  threat	  to	  Australia	  in	  the	  next	  20	  years.18	  The	  bottom	  line	  for	  Australia	  is	  that	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  the	  PLA	  to	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  close	  allies	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  serious	  the	  country	  has	  faced	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Many	  of	  the	  assumptions	  that	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  See	  discussions	  of	  these	  matters	  in,	  for	  example,	  Richard	  D.	  Fisher	  Jr.,	  China’s	  
Military	  Modernisation:	  Building	  for	  Regional	  and	  Global	  Reach	  (Stanford,	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  124-­‐212;	  Evan	  B.	  Montgomery,	  Managing	  China’s	  
Missile	  Threat:	  Future	  Options	  to	  Preserve	  Forward	  Defense	  (Testimony	  before	  the	  U.S.-­‐China	  Economic	  and	  Security	  Review	  Commission,	  U.S.	  Congress,	  1	  April	  2015)	  Accessed	  at:	  http://csbaonline.org/publications/page/3/	  on	  6	  October,	  2015;	  and	  Ross	  Babbage,	  Game	  Plan,	  26-­‐28.	  18	  Alex	  Oliver,	  The	  Lowy	  Institute	  Poll	  2014	  (Sydney:	  Lowy	  Institute	  for	  International	  Policy,	  2014),	  5.	  Accessed	  at:	  http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lowy-­‐institute-­‐poll-­‐2014	  	  on	  6	  October	  2015.	  
	   25	  
underpinned	  Australian	  security	  planning	  during	  the	  last	  70	  years	  are	  now	  doubtful.	  For	  example,	  it	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  assumed	  that	  in	  this	  theatre	  the	  allies	  will	  enjoy	  an	  operational	  sanctuary	  in	  space,	  that	  their	  surveillance	  and	  information	  networks	  will	  remain	  inviolate,	  that	  their	  operational	  bases	  will	  have	  high	  levels	  of	  security	  or	  that	  their	  air,	  surface	  and	  sub-­‐surface	  forces	  will	  possess	  uncontested	  access	  to	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	  These	  developments	  in	  Chinese	  military	  strategy	  and	  capabilities	  have	  fundamental	  implications	  for	  Australia’s	  defense	  planning.	  	  	  
4. Broader	  military	  developments	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  Partly	  in	  response	  to	  China’s	  surging	  strategic	  capabilities	  and	  its	  assertive	  international	  behavior,	  Australian	  security	  analysts	  are	  well	  aware	  that	  India,	  Russia	  and	  Indonesia,	  along	  with	  many	  other	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  countries,	  are	  modernizing	  and	  expanding	  their	  armed	  forces.	  	   	  	  
India	   While	  Delhi	  remains	  concerned	  to	  effectively	  deter	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  defeat	  Pakistan,	  its	  military	  development	  is	  now	  driven	  more	  strongly	  by	  the	  need	  to	  counter	  the	  rising	  military	  power	  of	  China.	  India	  has	  deployed	  120	  medium	  range	  ballistic	  missiles	  and	  some	  30	  short-­‐range	  ballistic	  missiles	  with	  more	  anticipated.	  It	  is	  also	  testing	  the	  country’s	  first	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile,	  its	  first	  submarine-­‐launched	  ballistic	  missile	  and	  its	  first	  land	  attack	  cruise	  missile.	  All	  of	  these	  systems	  will	  be	  capable	  of	  delivering	  nuclear	  weapons.	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The	  Indian	  Navy	  has	  ordered	  two	  locally	  built	  aircraft	  carriers,	  has	  active	  programs	  to	  construct	  both	  nuclear	  and	  conventionally	  powered	  submarines,	  and	  is	  also	  building	  several	  classes	  of	  destroyers	  and	  frigates.	  	  The	  Indian	  Air	  Force	  plans	  to	  upgrade	  or	  replace	  the	  bulk	  of	  its	  combat	  aircraft	  during	  the	  coming	  decade.	  	  The	  Indian	  Army	  is	  modernizing	  its	  armor,	  air	  defense	  and	  other	  systems	  for	  high	  intensity	  warfare	  while	  simultaneously	  deploying	  units	  to	  contain	  low-­‐level	  insurgencies	  in	  several	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  Although	  India’s	  program	  of	  military	  modernization	  is	  impressive,	  most	  projects	  are	  delayed	  and	  there	  are	  cost	  over-­‐runs.	  Ponderous	  decision-­‐making	  and	  industrial	  inefficiencies	  mean	  that	  not	  all	  of	  the	  capabilities	  ordered	  will	  be	  in	  service	  until	  the	  late	  2020s.	  	  
Russia	  Russia	  is	  also	  replacing	  many	  of	  its	  Cold	  War	  military	  systems.	  Defense	  expenditure	  has	  risen	  to	  around	  4	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP,19	  breathing	  new	  life	  into	  some	  of	  the	  country’s	  defense	  industries.	  	  	  Moscow	  plans	  to	  replace	  almost	  all	  its	  land	  and	  sea-­‐based	  strategic	  missile	  forces	  by	  2021.20	  The	  Russian	  Navy	  is	  working	  to	  modernize	  its	  shore-­‐based	  infrastructure	  while	  simultaneously	  introducing	  into	  service	  new	  classes	  of	  nuclear-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  International	  Institute	  for	  Strategic	  Studies,	  The	  Military	  Balance	  2015	  (London:	  Routledge	  and	  IISS,	  2015),	  164.	  20	  For	  details	  see:	  Hans	  M.	  Kristensen	  and	  Robert	  S.	  Norris,	  Russian	  Nuclear	  Forces,	  
2015	  (Bulletin	  of	  Atomic	  Scientists)	  Accessed	  at:	  http://thebulletin.org/2015/may/russian-­‐nuclear-­‐forces-­‐20158299#sthash.sioM8NRo.dpuf	  on	  12	  November	  2015.	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powered	  submarines	  and	  warships.	  The	  Russian	  Air	  Force	  is	  focusing	  on	  modernizing	  its	  command	  and	  control	  systems,	  improving	  its	  combat	  aircraft	  fleet	  and	  acquiring	  new	  types	  of	  air-­‐launched	  weaponry.	  The	  Russian	  Army	  has	  been	  reorganized	  to	  provide	  more	  high-­‐readiness	  units	  and	  is	  receiving	  some	  new	  equipment.	  Australian	  security	  planners	  realize	  that	  Russia	  remains	  a	  major	  strategic	  player	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  with	  some	  22	  submarines	  and	  nine	  cruisers	  and	  destroyers,	  significant	  numbers	  of	  combat	  and	  reconnaissance	  aircraft	  and	  four	  army	  groups	  deployed	  to	  this	  theatre.21	  	  	  
Indonesia	  Indonesia	  is	  showing	  early	  signs	  of	  becoming	  a	  more	  significant	  player	  in	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  security.	  	  President	  Joko	  Widodo	  has	  talked	  repeatedly	  about	  Indonesia’s	  future	  maritime	  role	  and	  his	  desire	  for	  the	  country	  to	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  ‘global	  maritime	  axis’,	  with	  greatly	  strengthened	  civil	  and	  military	  maritime	  capabilities	  in	  both	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  the	  Indian	  Ocean.	  President	  Widodo	  also	  proposed	  expanding	  national	  defense	  spending	  from	  0.9	  per	  cent	  to	  1.5	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP.22	  	  Indonesian	  officials	  not	  only	  appreciate	  the	  strategic	  importance	  of	  the	  archipelago’s	  international	  straits,	  they	  are	  also	  deeply	  concerned	  about	  China’s	  assertion	  of	  sovereignty	  over	  at	  least	  some	  of	  Indonesia’s	  Natuna	  Islands,	  towards	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  Military	  Balance	  2015,	  195.	  22	  For	  details	  see	  Natalie	  Sambhi,	  “Jokowi’s	  ‘Global	  Maritime	  Axis’:	  Smooth	  Sailing	  or	  Rocky	  Seas	  Ahead?”	  Security	  Challenges	  11/2	  (2015),	  39-­‐56.	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the	  southern	  end	  of	  the	  South	  China	  Sea.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  country’s	  territorial	  integrity	  and	  further	  its	  broader	  strategic	  aspirations,	  modernized	  maritime	  capabilities	  deserve	  priority.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  the	  more	  challenging	  strategic	  environment,	  Japan,	  South	  Korea	  and	  many	  of	  the	  ASEAN	  countries	  are	  also	  upgrading	  their	  military	  capabilities.	  In	  most	  cases	  they	  are	  placing	  a	  high	  priority	  on	  bolstering	  maritime	  and	  air	  defenses	  with	  some,	  such	  as	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea,	  also	  developing	  defenses	  against	  ballistic	  missile	  attack.	  
	  
5. Australia	  now	  close	  to	  center	  stage	  For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  70	  years,	  Australia	  now	  finds	  itself	  located	  near	  the	  center	  of	  major	  power	  competition.	  During	  the	  Cold	  War	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  superpower	  tensions	  was	  Central	  Europe.	  This	  meant	  that	  when	  the	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand,	  U.S.	  alliance	  (ANZUS)	  was	  developing	  its	  substantive	  form,	  Australia	  was	  located	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  world	  from	  the	  main	  action.	  Australia	  was	  in	  a	  backwater,	  able	  to	  assist	  in	  some	  marginal	  ways	  but	  never	  required	  or	  able	  to	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  Western	  strategy.	  However,	  for	  Australia	  the	  long	  era	  of	  comfortable	  detachment	  from	  the	  center	  of	  global	  competition	  is	  now	  over.	  China	  appears	  intent	  on	  pushing	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  influence	  out	  of	  East	  and	  Southeast	  Asia	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  the	  regional	  predominance	  that	  most	  Chinese	  see	  as	  their	  manifest	  destiny.	  China’s	  assertive	  stance	  has	  triggered	  the	  U.S.	  to	  respond	  by	  rebalancing	  its	  global	  posture	  so	  that	  some	  60	  per	  cent	  of	  U.S.	  Navy,	  Marine	  and	  Air	  Force	  units	  and	  over	  100,000	  U.S.	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Army	  troops	  will	  be	  deployed	  to	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  by	  2020.23	  For	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  Australia’s	  approaches	  may	  be	  the	  most	  likely	  focus	  of	  hostilities	  at	  the	  outbreak	  of	  conflict	  between	  the	  major	  powers.	  	  This	  geo-­‐strategic	  switch	  has	  many	  consequences	  for	  Australia’s	  strategy.	  Australia	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  marginal	  player	  in	  superpower	  contingency	  planning.	  In	  U.S.	  assessments	  Australia	  now	  looms	  as	  a	  geographically	  large,	  strategically	  located	  and	  militarily	  capable	  close	  ally	  near	  the	  center	  of	  future	  major	  power	  hostilities.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  American	  defense	  planners	  are	  starting	  to	  view	  Australia	  in	  a	  different	  light,	  reminiscent	  in	  some	  respects	  of	  the	  critical	  phases	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.24	  	  	  
6. A	  different	  USA	  behaving	  in	  non-­‐traditional	  ways	  Another	  driver	  for	  change	  in	  Australian	  security	  strategy	  is	  that	  the	  country’s	  closest	  ally,	  the	  U.S.,	  is	  morphing	  into	  a	  different	  sort	  of	  superpower.	  It	  is	  entirely	  possible	  that	  the	  U.S.	  may	  emerge	  in	  the	  coming	  two	  decades	  to	  not	  possess	  the	  largest	  global	  economy,	  its	  military	  forces	  may	  not	  be	  so	  dominant	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  and	  it	  may	  choose	  to	  be	  more	  detached	  from	  international	  security	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See:	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  Work	  on	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  Rebalance:	  A	  
Conversation	  with	  Robert	  Work	  (Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  Washington	  DC,	  30	  September	  2014),	  8,	  accessed	  at	  http://www.cfr.org/defense-­‐and-­‐security-­‐/deputy-­‐secretary-­‐defense-­‐robert-­‐work-­‐asis-­‐pacific	  on	  20	  February	  2015.	  24	  See,	  for	  example:	  Jim	  Thomas,	  Zack	  Cooper	  and	  Iskander	  Rehman	  Gateway	  to	  the	  
Indo-­‐Pacific:	  Australian	  Defense	  Strategy	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  Australia-­‐U.S.	  Alliance	   	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  and	  Budgetary	  Assessments,	  2013).	  Accessed	  at:	  http://csbaonline.org/publications/2013/11/gateway-­‐to-­‐the-­‐indo-­‐pacific-­‐australian-­‐defense-­‐strategy-­‐and-­‐the-­‐future-­‐of-­‐the-­‐australia-­‐u-­‐s-­‐alliance-­‐2/	  on	  6	  October,	  2015.	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engagements.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  U.S.	  with	  these	  characteristics	  would	  be	  a	  very	  significant	  departure	  from	  Australia’s	  experience	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  require	  a	  thorough	  rethinking	  of	  Australian	  security	  priorities	  and	  strategies.	  With	  many	  Americans	  feeling	  war-­‐weary	  after	  extended	  military	  commitments	  to	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,	  with	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  international	  terrorism	  not	  contained,	  with	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  emerging	  only	  slowly	  from	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  and	  with	  the	  processes	  of	  political	  decision-­‐making	  in	  Washington	  fraught,	  serious	  debates	  are	  underway	  about	  the	  country’s	  future	  goals	  and	  strategies.	  	  As	  Tom	  Switzer	  of	  Sydney	  University’s	  United	  States	  Studies	  Centre	  has	  argued:	  	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  Americans	  today	  appear	  less	  concerned	  about	  foreign	  policy	  than	  at	  any	  time	  since	  the	  heyday	  of	  isolationism	  between	  the	  world	  wars.	  In	  a	  polity	  that	  is	  acutely	  sensitive	  to	  public	  opinion,	  veritably	  driven	  by	  polls,	  focus	  groups	  and	  the	  relentless	  24/7	  news	  and	  internet	  environment,	  this	  means	  that	  foreign	  policy	  is	  severely	  downgraded	  in	  the	  calculations	  of	  politicians…	  	  But	  the	  point	  here	  is	  that	  America	  no	  longer	  has	  the	  will,	  wallet	  or	  influence	  to	  impose	  an	  ambitious	  global	  leadership	  across	  the	  world.25	  	   One	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  America’s	  deep	  questioning	  of	  its	  international	  policy	  is	  the	  scale	  of	  demographic	  change	  in	  the	  U.S.	  With	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  generation,	  the	  influx	  of	  Hispanic	  migrants	  and	  substantial	  shifts	  in	  social	  values,	  the	  priorities	  of	  many	  Americans	  are	  changing	  and	  the	  burden	  of	  international	  activism	  is	  being	  more	  acutely	  felt.	  In	  effect,	  the	  “liberal	  hegemonic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Tom	  Switzer,	  America’s	  Sense	  of	  Special	  Role	  in	  World	  Affairs	  is	  Faltering	  published	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Studies	  Centre,	  University	  of	  Sydney,	  14	  September	  2013.	  http://ussc.edu.au/news-­‐room/Americas-­‐sense-­‐of-­‐a-­‐special-­‐role-­‐in-­‐global-­‐affairs-­‐is-­‐faltering	  accessed	  on	  21	  September,	  2015.	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order”	  that	  G.	  John	  Ikenberry	  argues	  the	  U.S.	  has	  striven	  to	  establish	  since	  1945,	  and	  which	  has	  largely	  driven	  U.S.	  grand	  strategy	  in	  the	  decades	  since,	  is	  now	  under	  serious	  challenge.	  	  	  Those	  arguing	  for	  much	  more	  selective	  U.S.	  international	  engagement	  state	  that	  the	  high-­‐tempo	  international	  activism	  of	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  was	  unnecessary	  and	  unsustainable.	  	  Part	  of	  the	  pressure	  for	  change	  comes	  from	  a	  sense	  that	  global	  security	  leadership	  is	  getting	  much	  harder.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  military	  technological	  lead	  that	  American	  forces	  have	  enjoyed	  for	  over	  70	  years	  is	  eroding.	  In	  January	  2015,	  Bob	  Work,	  the	  U.S.	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  delivered	  an	  informal	  conversational	  presentation	  in	  Washington	  in	  which	  he	  explained	  this	  view	  in	  greater	  detail:	  	  But	  now	  to	  what	  I	  really	  want	  to	  talk	  about,	  and	  that	  it's	  become	  very	  clear	  to	  us	  that	  our	  military's	  long	  comfortable	  technological	  edge	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  United	  States	  has	  relied	  on	  a	  technological	  edge	  ever	  since,	  well	  even	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  We've	  relied	  upon	  it	  for	  so	  long,	  it's	  steadily	  eroding.	  	  Our	  perceived	  inability	  to	  achieve	  a	  power	  projection	  over-­‐match,	  or	  an	  over-­‐match	  in	  operations,	  clearly	  undermines,	  we	  think,	  our	  ability	  to	  deter	  potential	  adversaries.	  And	  we	  simply	  cannot	  allow	  that	  to	  happen.26	  	  	  	  	   Some	  Americans	  argue	  that	  striving	  to	  restore	  a	  clear	  over-­‐match	  is	  unnecessary	  because	  U.S.	  security	  is	  underpinned	  by	  distance	  from	  other	  major	  powers,	  with	  oceanic	  expanses	  effectively	  protecting	  it	  from	  many	  forms	  of	  attack.	  America	  continues	  to	  be	  exceptionally	  wealthy	  and	  its	  economy	  is	  relatively	  self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  “The	  Third	  U.S.	  Offset	  Strategy	  and	  its	  Implications	  for	  Partners	  and	  Allies”(A	  speech	  delivered	  by	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Bob	  Work,	  on	  28	  January	  2015).	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sufficient.	  In	  addition,	  the	  U.S.	  continues	  to	  field	  the	  most	  capable	  conventional	  forces	  on	  the	  planet	  and	  it	  retains	  a	  powerful	  nuclear	  deterrent.	  	   	  Amongst	  the	  downsides	  of	  maintaining	  a	  liberal	  hegemonic	  grand	  strategy,	  the	  critics	  argue,	  is	  that	  the	  allies	  and	  friends	  of	  the	  U.S.	  gain	  more	  from	  the	  strategy	  than	  does	  the	  U.S.	  itself.	  Allies	  tend	  to	  free	  ride	  on	  the	  generous	  military	  investments	  and	  activities	  of	  the	  U.S.	  by	  reducing	  their	  own	  defense	  spending	  and	  focusing	  national	  security	  attention	  on	  narrow	  self-­‐defense.	  	  By	  claiming	  security	  guarantees	  from	  the	  U.S.,	  allies	  effectively	  hold	  American	  security	  prerogatives	  hostage.	  	  The	  better	  approach	  to	  U.S.	  grand	  strategy,	  argue	  Barry	  Posen	  and	  other	  critics	  of	  liberal	  hegemonic	  strategy,	  is	  to	  reduce	  markedly	  American	  force	  commitments	  in	  forward	  theatres,	  add	  major	  conditions	  to	  alliance	  obligations	  where	  allies	  are	  not	  pulling	  their	  weight	  and	  tolerate,	  even	  possibly	  encourage,	  the	  development	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  by	  allies	  and	  friendly	  states	  to	  reinforce	  their	  own	  security	  and	  reduce	  the	  extended	  deterrence	  burden	  on	  Washington.	  This	  alternative	  grand	  strategy,	  which	  Posen	  labels	  Restraint,	  would	  also	  facilitate	  reform	  of	  the	  U.S.	  armed	  forces	  into	  a	  more	  compact	  and	  modern	  structure	  designed	  primarily	  to	  dominate	  the	  maritime	  commons.	  Posen	  believes	  these	  changes	  would	  permit	  the	  U.S.	  to	  cut	  its	  defense	  spending	  from	  4.5	  per	  cent	  to	  2.5	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP.27	  For	  Australians,	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  future	  direction	  of	  American	  grand	  strategy	  introduces	  a	  substantial	  element	  of	  risk.	  The	  prospect	  of	  the	  long-­‐running	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Barry	  R.	  Posen,	  Restraint:	  A	  New	  Foundation	  for	  U.S.	  Grand	  Strategy	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  163.	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liberal	  hegemonic	  strategy	  being	  replaced	  by	  Posen’s	  proposed	  strategy	  of	  Restraint	  is	  probably	  remote.	  However,	  some	  features	  of	  this	  type	  of	  strategy	  are	  evident	  in	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  approach	  in	  recent	  years.	  His	  administration’s	  track	  record	  shows	  far	  greater	  hesitancy	  to	  commit	  forces	  overseas	  or	  to	  use	  force	  against	  state	  actors,	  such	  as	  Syria	  and	  Iran.	  There	  have	  also	  been	  significant	  force	  and	  facility	  reductions	  in	  Europe	  and	  severe	  restraints	  imposed	  on	  U.S.	  defense	  investments	  and	  spending.	  	  Michael	  Fullilove,	  Executive	  Director	  of	  the	  Lowy	  Institute	  for	  International	  Policy,	  delivered	  a	  mainstream	  Australian	  assessment	  of	  the	  changing	  American	  situation:	  I	  think	  our	  great	  and	  powerful	  friends	  are	  becoming	  less	  great	  and	  powerful…	  	  The	  U.S.	  retains	  enormous	  power,	  the	  only	  country	  in	  the	  world	  to	  run	  a	  truly	  global	  foreign	  policy.	  But	  the	  changeability	  and	  missteps	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  the	  last	  15	  years	  are	  really	  striking.	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  what	  you	  expect	  of	  a	  hegemon.	  So	  that	  creates	  a	  sense	  of	  unreliability	  or,	  at	  least,	  a	  question	  mark	  over	  the	  role	  the	  U.S.	  wants	  to	  play	  in	  the	  future.28	  	   Australians	  have	  noted	  that	  the	  Obama	  Administration’s	  approach	  to	  alliances	  has	  also	  changed.	  Allies	  of	  the	  U.S.	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  active	  and	  substantial	  contributors	  to	  global	  security,	  not	  passive	  consumers.	  	  Former	  Prime	  Minister	  Tony	  Abbott	  said	  the	  U.S.	  strategic	  pivot	  to	  Asia	  had	  firm	  bipartisan	  support	  in	  Australia.	  “I	  see	  the	  greater	  presence	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  our	  part	  of	  the	  world	  as	  a	  force	  for	  stability,”	  he	  said.	  “Australia’s	  alliance	  with	  the	  U.S.	  is	  a	  force	  for	  stability.	  Our	  alliance	  is	  not	  aimed	  at	  anyone.	  It	  is	  incumbent	  on	  close	  allies	  to	  demonstrate	  regularly	  that	  they	  make	  a	  significant	  difference	  to	  the	  U.S.-­‐led	  alliance	  in	  the	  scale	  and	  pattern	  of	  their	  defense	  spending,	  their	  military	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Quoted	  in	  Paul	  Kelly,	  “A	  New	  World	  of	  Disorder,”	  The	  Australian,	  21	  September	  2015,	  11.	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commitments	  to	  trouble	  spots,	  their	  active	  diplomacy	  in	  support	  of	  allied	  interests	  and	  by	  other	  means.29	  	  	  	   There	  are	  important	  implications	  for	  Australia.	  The	  country’s	  future	  strategy	  needs	  to	  be	  crafted	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  workable	  when	  the	  country’s	  major	  power	  ally	  shifts	  its	  own	  security	  approach.	  There	  may	  be	  times	  in	  coming	  decades	  when	  American	  administrations	  appear	  to	  be	  reverting	  to	  a	  form	  of	  activist	  liberal	  hegemonic	  strategy.	  But,	  equally,	  there	  may	  be	  times	  when	  the	  U.S.	  behaves	  more	  like	  a	  weary	  titan	  and	  chooses	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  more	  detached,	  hesitant	  and	  even	  isolationist	  mode.	  	  In	  recent	  years	  Australians	  have	  debated	  alternative	  options	  to	  maintain	  their	  security	  in	  this	  substantially	  changed	  strategic	  environment.	  For	  instance,	  Hugh	  White	  has	  argued	  that	  Australia	  should	  respond	  to	  the	  changing	  major	  power	  balance	  by	  moving	  more	  energetically	  to	  accommodate	  China’s	  international	  aspirations.	  While	  this	  view	  has	  received	  some	  attention	  in	  academic	  circles	  it	  has	  received	  very	  little	  support	  in	  the	  official	  community	  or	  on	  either	  side	  of	  politics.30	  I	  have	  also	  argued	  elsewhere	  the	  merits	  of	  five	  alternative	  strategies	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  	  John	  Garnaut	  and	  David	  Wroe,	  “U.S.	  Official	  Misspoke	  on	  B-­‐1	  Bombers	  Being	  Based	  in	  Australia:	  Tony	  Abbott,”	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  15	  May,	  2015.	  Accessed	  at:	  http://www.smh.com.au/federal-­‐politics/political-­‐news/us-­‐official-­‐misspoke-­‐on-­‐b1-­‐bombers-­‐being-­‐based-­‐in-­‐australia-­‐tony-­‐abbott-­‐20150515-­‐gh28ox.html	  on	  7	  October	  2015.	  30	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  these	  and	  related	  issues	  see	  Hugh	  White,	  Power	  Shift:	  
Australia’s	  Future	  Between	  Washington	  and	  Beijing	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new	  security	  environment	  and	  recommend	  a	  new	  Australian	  grand	  strategy	  of	  partnership	  and	  leverage.31	  	  	  One	  tentative	  conclusion	  from	  this	  discussion	  is	  that	  if	  Australians	  wish	  to	  retain	  the	  status	  and	  comfort	  of	  an	  especially	  close	  ally	  they	  will	  need	  to	  demonstrate	  clearly	  and	  repeatedly	  to	  American	  administrations	  of	  different	  types	  why	  the	  country	  deserves	  special	  treatment.	  It	  will	  be	  necessary	  for	  Australia	  to	  demonstrate	  exceptional	  value	  to	  the	  U.S.	  and,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  lift	  its	  defense	  spending	  to	  a	  level	  that,	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP,	  is	  closer	  to	  that	  of	  its	  major	  power	  protector.	  	  
	  
7. Rising	  potential	  for	  misperception,	  miscalculation	  and	  escalation	  
	   	   Another	  major	  change	  in	  Australia’s	  strategic	  environment	  is	  the	  significantly	  increased	  risk	  of	  security	  miscalculation	  and	  conflict	  escalation	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific.	  	   	   There	  are	  two	  potential	  causes	  of	  miscalculation.	  First,	  there	  is	  scope	  for	  key	  personnel	  on	  each	  side	  to	  misperceive	  the	  other	  side’s	  intentions,	  plans	  and	  actions.	  This	  is	  partly	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  transparency,	  limited	  opportunities	  for	  meaningful	  interaction	  between	  key	  personalities	  and	  shallow	  levels	  of	  mutual	  understanding.	  Consequently,	  there	  is	  scope	  for	  serious	  misperceptions	  to	  develop	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  dangerous	  decisions	  in	  crises.	  	  	   	   A	  second	  potential	  cause	  of	  miscalculation	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  is	  sudden	  aggressive	  behavior	  by	  operating	  units.	  This	  is	  intrinsically	  dangerous	  and	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  portending	  more	  serious	  offensive	  action.	  Australian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues,	  see	  Babbage,	  Game	  Plan,	  63-­‐71.	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strategic	  analysts	  have	  noted	  that	  China’s	  leadership	  can	  readily	  turn	  up	  the	  “fervor	  dial”	  via	  the	  Party-­‐controlled	  media	  and	  directives	  to	  deployed	  PLA	  units	  to	  react	  strongly	  whenever	  they	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  maneuver	  close	  to	  U.S.,	  Japanese	  or	  other	  allied	  forces.	  Notable	  recent	  examples	  of	  this	  type	  of	  behavior	  include	  exceptionally	  close	  aircraft	  man	  oeuvres,	  ships	  cutting	  across	  the	  bows	  of	  rivals	  to	  force	  emergency	  defensive	  measures	  and	  ‘lighting	  up’	  ship	  or	  aircraft	  fire	  control	  radar	  systems	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  usually	  precedes	  the	  firing	  of	  major	  weaponry.	  	  This	  type	  of	  activity	  can	  test	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  other	  side’s	  tolerance.	  It	  can	  also	  trigger	  major	  international	  incidents	  and	  potentially	  stimulate	  serious	  retaliatory	  action.	  	   	   One	  of	  the	  primary	  reasons	  why	  these	  dangerous	  and	  often	  provocative	  actions	  occur	  is	  that	  limited	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  in	  concluding	  agreements	  that	  define	  the	  boundaries	  of	  acceptable	  behavior.	  During	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  there	  were	  numerous	  similar	  incidents	  between	  the	  two	  sides’	  aircraft,	  ships	  and	  other	  assets	  and	  it	  took	  some	  years	  before	  agreements	  could	  be	  negotiated	  to	  codify	  acceptable	  behavior	  when	  units	  operate	  in	  close	  proximity.	  While	  presidents	  Obama	  and	  Xi	  Jinping	  agreed	  in	  November	  2014	  to	  negotiate	  similar	  protocols	  to	  avoid	  dangerous	  incidents	  between	  their	  respective	  forces,	  it	  is	  taking	  time	  for	  the	  details	  to	  be	  settled	  and	  applied	  routinely	  by	  forces	  on	  operations.	  	  	  	   	   A	  closely	  related	  characteristic	  of	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  security	  environment	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  minor	  exchange	  of	  fire	  or	  other	  provocation	  to	  escalate	  rapidly	  into	  major	  war.	  This	  disturbing	  situation	  results	  from	  the	  exceptionally	  strong	  missile	  and	  other	  offensive	  capabilities	  of	  the	  new	  PLA	  and	  the	  concentration	  and	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unprotected	  nature,	  and	  hence	  vulnerability,	  of	  key	  elements	  of	  both	  sides’	  operating	  infrastructures.	  This	  mutual	  vulnerability	  gives	  both	  sides	  strong	  incentives	  to	  strike	  first	  and	  with	  great	  force.	  	  	   	   In	  effect,	  if	  one	  side	  believes	  major	  conflict	  is	  inevitable	  and	  imminent,	  it	  will	  also	  know	  that	  by	  striking	  immediately	  it	  will	  almost	  certainly	  win	  the	  first	  major	  battles	  decisively.	  	   	   This	  danger	  can	  be	  illustrated	  most	  clearly	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  there	  are	  very	  few	  major	  U.S.	  military	  bases	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	  In	  normal	  circumstances	  the	  primary	  American	  naval	  and	  air	  assets	  in	  theatre	  are	  concentrated	  at	  a	  small	  number	  of	  facilities	  in	  Japan	  and	  in	  Guam.	  Worse	  still,	  very	  few	  have	  hardened	  structures	  that	  would	  protect	  allied	  aircraft	  and	  ships	  from	  surprise	  missile	  or	  aircraft	  attack.	  	  	   	   If	  the	  Chinese	  high	  command	  concludes	  major	  war	  is	  imminent,	  it	  has	  the	  power	  to	  destroy	  or	  seriously	  damage	  most	  American	  combat	  forces	  in	  the	  theatre	  within	  hours.	  This	  would	  inevitably	  cause	  extensive	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  casualties,	  limit	  allied	  options	  for	  early	  retaliation	  and,	  for	  at	  least	  some	  months,	  give	  Chinese	  forces	  a	  predominant	  position	  in	  the	  theatre.	  	   	   The	  dangers	  of	  permitting	  this	  strategically	  unstable	  situation	  to	  continue	  are	  obvious.	  However,	  discussions	  with	  senior	  defense	  planners	  make	  clear	  	  that	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  Australian	  Government	  has	  the	  power	  to	  significantly	  reduce	  the	  risks	  of	  misperception,	  miscalculation	  and	  escalation	  in	  this	  theatre.	  New	  initiatives	  could	  be	  taken	  to	  enhance	  operational	  understanding	  between	  regional	  defense	  forces.	  	  Australia	  could	  also	  assist	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  other	  close	  allies	  to	  disperse	  their	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forces	  by	  providing	  appropriate	  alternative	  bases	  and	  other	  facilities,	  hardening	  key	  installations	  and	  strengthening	  logistic	  and	  other	  support	  resilience	  in	  the	  theatre.	  
	  
8. The	  diffusion	  of	  new	  technologies	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  Many	  technologies	  and	  systems	  that	  just	  a	  few	  years	  ago	  were	  the	  exclusive	  preserve	  of	  a	  few	  nation	  states	  are	  now	  readily	  accessible	  to	  terrorist	  groups,	  criminal	  syndicates	  and	  commercial	  enterprises.	  Systems	  now	  operated	  by	  many	  non-­‐state	  actors	  include	  advanced	  surveillance	  sensors,	  secure	  communications	  networks	  and	  numerous	  types	  of	  advanced	  weapons	  systems.	  Technology	  proliferation	  is	  also	  enabling	  relatively	  small	  nation	  states	  to	  acquire	  carefully	  selected	  military	  capabilities	  so	  as	  to	  disrupt	  seriously	  the	  normal	  operations	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  of	  advanced	  countries.	  Amongst	  these	  systems	  are	  precision	  strike	  munitions,	  robotic	  surveillance	  and	  weapon	  systems,	  counter-­‐space	  systems	  and	  nuclear,	  chemical	  and	  biological	  weapons.	  The	  acquisition	  of	  tailored	  mixes	  of	  these	  systems	  can	  make	  some	  regions	  of	  the	  world	  dangerous	  for	  even	  major	  power	  forces	  to	  enter	  and	  they	  can	  be	  very	  expensive	  to	  counter.	  Terrorist	  groups,	  transnational	  criminal	  organizations	  and	  other	  non-­‐state	  actors	  have	  also	  proven	  to	  be	  highly	  innovative	  in	  their	  ideological	  focus,	  their	  organizational	  and	  operational	  modes,	  their	  geographic	  footprints	  and	  in	  their	  development	  of	  partnerships	  and	  alliances.	  They	  have	  proven	  especially	  adept	  at	  exploiting	  ungoverned	  or	  weakly	  governed	  spaces	  and	  in	  coercing	  isolated	  populations	  into	  acquiescence	  or	  active	  support.	  For	  Australia	  and	  its	  allies	  these	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non-­‐state	  challenges	  pose	  particular	  difficulties	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  parts	  of	  Africa	  and	  also	  in	  sections	  of	  Central	  and	  Southeast	  Asia.	  	  Some	  criminal	  and	  terrorist	  organizations	  have,	  in	  addition,	  shown	  that	  they	  can	  reach	  into	  the	  homelands	  of	  Australia	  and	  its	  close	  allies.	  Although	  these	  organizations	  don’t	  pose	  an	  existential	  challenge	  to	  Australia,	  they	  are	  certainly	  serious	  distractions	  for	  Australian	  defense	  and	  broader	  security	  planners.	  	  
9. Rise	  of	  a	  New	  World	  Order	  The	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  international	  environment	  highlighted	  above	  suggest	  that	  we	  are	  witnessing	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  world	  order.	  This	  global	  order	  is	  characterized	  by	  new	  power	  centers	  and	  norms	  of	  international	  behavior,	  including	  abandonment	  of	  the	  use	  of	  force	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  and	  disregard	  for	  the	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea.	  The	  new	  global	  order	  is	  also	  characterized	  by	  areas	  of	  major	  power	  friction	  that	  are	  markedly	  different	  from	  those	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  or	  of	  the	  subsequent	  “unipolar	  moment.”	  Professor	  Alan	  Dupont	  provided	  a	  well-­‐informed	  Australian	  perspective:	  Future	  historians	  may	  well	  come	  to	  see	  2014	  as	  a	  bellwether	  year	  in	  world	  affairs,	  marking	  an	  epochal	  shift	  to	  a	  new,	  more	  turbulent	  world	  no	  longer	  dominated	  by	  the	  values	  or	  power	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  Western	  allies….	  	  But	  if	  2014	  lacks	  the	  end	  of	  an	  era	  feel	  of	  earlier	  tipping-­‐point	  years,	  in	  retrospect	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  year	  in	  which	  a	  fraying	  Pax	  Americana	  (literally,	  American	  peace)	  finally	  unraveled	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  new	  order,	  the	  contours	  of	  which	  are	  becoming	  more	  discernible,	  even	  though	  the	  final	  form	  is	  still	  unclear.	  The	  consequences	  of	  this	  shift	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  profound,	  affecting	  the	  prosperity	  and	  security	  of	  every	  global	  citizen.	  And	  they	  pose	  daunting	  challenges	  in	  foreign	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policy,	  trade	  and	  national	  security	  for	  Australians,	  the	  like	  of	  which	  we	  have	  not	  confronted	  before.32	  	  
Australian	  Views	  on	  the	  Country’s	  Future	  Security	  	  
Security	  uncertainties	  and	  risks	  In	  recent	  years	  Australia’s	  defense	  white	  papers	  and	  other	  core	  security	  documents	  have	  noted	  that	  the	  changing	  strategic	  environment	  offers	  opportunities	  for	  Australia	  to	  strengthen	  its	  security	  by	  working	  pro-­‐actively	  with	  allies	  and	  partners	  to	  shape	  the	  future	  in	  positive	  ways.	  However,	  these	  documents	  also	  emphasize	  that	  there	  is	  little	  room	  for	  complacency.	  The	  security	  environment	  of	  the	  future	  will	  pose	  risks	  for	  Australia,	  including	  the	  possibility	  of	  serious	  coercion,	  attacks	  on	  close	  allies	  and	  friends	  and	  a	  possible	  broader	  breakdown	  in	  global	  order.	  In	  consequence,	  successive	  Australian	  governments	  have	  endorsed	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  a	  highly	  capable	  defense	  force	  and	  have	  been	  prepared	  to	  invest	  accordingly.	  	  	  However,	  as	  a	  middle	  power	  with	  a	  population	  and	  tax	  base	  of	  some	  24	  million	  people,	  the	  scope	  for	  maintaining	  independent	  defense	  capabilities	  is	  limited.	  Hence,	  Australia	  has	  long	  built	  its	  security	  on	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  strategies	  and	  practical	  measures.	  Within	  that	  larger	  framework	  effective	  deterrence	  continues	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role.	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  Alan	  Dupont,	  “Pax	  Americana	  to	  Give	  Way	  to	  a	  New	  World	  Order,”	  The	  Australian,	  29	  November	  2014.	  Accessed	  at:	  http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/pax-­‐americana-­‐to-­‐give-­‐way	  on	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Deterrence	  and	  extended	  deterrence	  face	  new	  pressures	  Australian	  strategic	  planners	  tend	  to	  view	  their	  national	  deterrence	  operating	  at	  three	  layers,	  each	  of	  which	  has	  come	  under	  increased	  pressure	  in	  recent	  years.	  First,	  is	  the	  nation’s	  own	  capability	  to	  marshal	  deterrence	  power	  by	  exploiting	  its	  unusual	  geographic,	  economic	  and	  other	  characteristics	  and	  developing	  highly	  capable	  armed	  forces.	  This	  focus	  is	  emphasized	  in	  almost	  identical	  language	  in	  the	  last	  several	  Defense	  White	  Papers.	  The	  2013	  White	  Paper	  states:	  The	  highest	  priority	  task	  for	  the	  ADF	  is	  to	  deter	  and	  defeat	  armed	  attacks	  on	  Australia	  without	  having	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  combat	  or	  combat	  support	  forces	  of	  another	  country.33	  	  However,	  despite	  deterrence	  of	  coercion	  or	  attacks	  on	  Australia	  being	  a	  priority	  defense	  task,	  the	  country’s	  national	  security	  planners	  realize	  that	  these	  capabilities	  on	  their	  own	  may	  be	  inadequate	  in	  coming	  decades.	  The	  second	  layer	  of	  Australian	  deterrence	  is	  that	  conferred	  by	  its	  close	  alliance	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  A	  key	  benefit	  of	  ANZUS	  is	  that	  in	  the	  event	  of	  Australia	  facing	  serious	  coercion	  or	  attack,	  an	  aggressive	  foreign	  power	  would	  need	  to	  weigh	  the	  prospect	  that	  such	  an	  attack	  is	  likely	  to	  precipitate	  conflict	  not	  only	  with	  Australia	  but	  with	  the	  United	  States	  as	  well.	  While	  this	  risk	  would	  almost	  certainly	  give	  any	  foreign	  aggressor	  pause	  for	  thought,	  a	  relative	  weakening	  of	  American	  military	  capabilities	  and	  the	  frequent	  hesitancy	  of	  Washington	  in	  dealing	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  Department	  of	  Defence,	  Defence	  White	  Paper	  2013	  (Canberra:	  Department	  of	  Defence,	  2013),	  28.	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with	  international	  crises	  in	  recent	  years	  appears	  to	  have	  blunted	  the	  sharpness	  of	  allied	  deterrence.	  One	  of	  the	  long-­‐standing	  benefits	  of	  a	  close	  alliance	  with	  the	  U.S.	  is	  the	  American	  declaratory	  policy	  that	  an	  attack	  on	  an	  ally	  is	  considered	  equivalent	  to	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Since	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  this	  concept	  of	  extended	  deterrence	  has	  been	  used	  to	  deter	  military	  attacks	  on	  the	  Pacific	  allies	  and	  reinforce	  the	  strategic	  significance	  of	  their	  independent	  defense	  efforts.	  It	  has	  also	  been	  employed	  within	  the	  alliance	  network	  to	  dissuade	  allies	  such	  as	  Australia,	  Canada,	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea	  from	  contemplating	  the	  acquisition	  of	  independent	  nuclear	  forces.	  Washington	  has	  repeatedly	  assured	  these	  allies	  that	  any	  major	  attack,	  including	  a	  nuclear	  attack,	  by	  a	  belligerent	  state	  on	  their	  territory	  would	  trigger	  swift	  American	  retaliation.	  	  Unfortunately,	  when	  Australian	  strategic	  thinkers	  review	  this	  logic	  in	  current	  strategic	  circumstances,	  many	  conclude	  that	  a	  number	  of	  developments	  have	  undermined	  the	  credibility	  of	  these	  American	  assurances.	  First,	  the	  substantial	  shift	  in	  the	  “correlation	  of	  forces”	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  is	  reducing	  markedly	  Washington’s	  freedom	  of	  action	  in	  this	  theater,	  including	  its	  flexibility	  to	  assist	  allies	  in	  future	  crises.	  	  Second,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  respond	  to	  a	  nuclear	  attack	  on	  an	  American	  ally	  with	  one	  or	  more	  nuclear	  retaliatory	  strikes	  stretched	  credibility	  in	  the	  1980s	  when	  Washington	  had	  over	  12,000	  strategic	  nuclear	  warheads	  at	  its	  disposal.	  With	  the	  U.S.	  strategic	  nuclear	  capability	  now	  reduced	  to	  1,600	  warheads	  and	  heading	  for	  1,250	  or	  even	  to	  1,000,	  the	  prospect	  that	  any	  U.S.	  administration	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would	  use	  its	  thinly	  spread	  nuclear	  arsenal	  to	  defend	  an	  ally	  seems	  even	  less	  credible.	  With	  several	  other	  nuclear	  weapon	  states	  now	  holding	  hundreds	  of	  nuclear	  warheads,	  American	  strategic	  flexibility	  and	  extended	  deterrence	  is	  significantly	  weakened.	  Third,	  U.S.	  international	  security	  policy	  has	  been	  characterized	  in	  recent	  years	  by	  caution	  and	  periodic	  timidity.	  This	  reflects	  the	  American	  public’s	  war	  weariness	  and	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  predilection	  to	  let	  regional	  actors	  settle	  most	  regional	  disputes.	  A	  further	  motivation	  is	  a	  strengthened	  resolve	  in	  both	  the	  administration	  and	  Congress	  to	  rein	  in	  defense	  spending	  and	  reduce	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  country’s	  budget	  deficit.	  A	  key	  consequence	  of	  this	  more	  hesitant	  American	  posture	  is	  to	  weaken	  global	  perceptions	  of	  American	  leadership.	  Fourth,	  encouraged	  by	  the	  changing	  correlation	  of	  forces	  and	  American	  international	  caution,	  China,	  Russia	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  North	  Korea	  have	  launched	  a	  succession	  of	  tailored	  coercive	  operations	  against	  U.S.	  allies	  and	  friends	  that	  always	  fall	  below	  the	  threshold	  for	  triggering	  American	  nuclear	  or	  even	  conventional	  force	  responses.	  The	  most	  notable	  area	  of	  such	  operations	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  is	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  where	  Chinese	  forces	  of	  various	  types	  have	  built	  new	  islands	  on	  underwater	  coral	  reefs	  and	  undertaken	  repeated	  small	  incursions	  and	  provocations.	  Over	  several	  years	  they	  have	  given	  substance	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  more	  than	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  these	  international	  waters	  and	  numerous	  islets	  and	  reefs	  come	  under	  Beijing’s	  sovereignty.	  China	  has	  sought	  to	  “create	  new	  facts”	  and	  set	  new	  international	  rules	  in	  this	  theatre.	  Washington	  has	  so	  far	  responded	  with	  expressions	  of	  displeasure	  and	  occasional	  aircraft	  and	  ship	  passages	  through	  
	   44	  
contested	  areas.	  Many	  Australian	  security	  planners	  have	  been	  underwhelmed	  by	  the	  American	  response.	  The	  leading	  Australian	  researcher	  on	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  Professor	  Carl	  Thayer,	  has	  argued	  that	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  done:	  First,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  a	  campaign	  of	  “information	  warfare”	  to	  publicize	  details	  of	  Chinese	  unilateral	  destabilizing	  activities	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  ensuring	  that	  this	  information	  is	  put	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  for	  use	  by	  the	  media,	  scholars,	  security	  specialists,	  other	  analysts,	  and	  elected	  officials…	  	  Second,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  develop	  a	  strategy	  to	  counter	  Chinese	  activities	  using	  primarily–	  but	  not	  exclusively	  –	  nonmilitary	  assets.	  Under	  this	  new	  strategy,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  avoid	  directly	  confronting	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  Navy	  warships	  with	  its	  own	  naval	  forces.	  The	  United	  States	  should	  implement	  a	  cost	  imposition	  strategy	  involving	  joint	  and	  combined	  cooperation	  between	  civilian	  maritime	  agencies	  of	  like-­‐minded	  external	  powers	  and	  the	  Philippines	  and	  Vietnam.	  This	  strategy	  should	  be	  carried	  out	  on	  three	  levels:	  among	  like-­‐minded	  ASEAN	  dialogue	  partners	  (Australia,	  Japan,	  South	  Korea,	  New	  Zealand,	  and	  India);	  multilaterally	  with	  regional	  allies	  and	  security	  partners;	  and	  bilaterally	  with	  regional	  states.34	  	  Senior	  Australian	  officials	  have	  also	  expressed	  unease	  about	  the	  current	  situation.	  	  Amongst	  them	  is	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Dennis	  Richardson:	  The	  speed	  and	  scale	  of	  China’s	  land	  reclamation	  on	  disputed	  reefs	  and	  other	  features	  does	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  intent	  and	  purpose;	  it	  is	  legitimate	  to	  ask	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  land	  reclamation	  –	  tourism	  appears	  unlikely.	  China	  now	  has	  more	  law	  enforcement	  and	  Coast	  Guard	  vessels	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea	  than	  the	  other	  regional	  countries	  put	  together.	  And	  given	  the	  size	  and	  modernization	  of	  China’s	  military,	  the	  use	  by	  China	  of	  land	  reclamation	  for	  military	  purposes	  would	  be	  of	  particular	  concern.	  It	  is	  not	  constructive	  to	  give	  the	  appearance	  of	  seeking	  to	  change	  facts	  on	  the	  ground	  without	  any	  clarification	  of	  actual	  claims.	  It	  is	  legitimate	  to	  raise	  such	  questions	  and	  express	  such	  concerns	  because	  tensions	  and	  potential	  miscalculations	  are	  not	  in	  anyone's	  interest.35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Carlyle	  A.	  Thayer,	  Indirect	  Cost	  Imposition	  Strategies	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea:	  U.S.	  
Leadership	  and	  ASEAN	  Centrality	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Center	  for	  a	  New	  American	  Security,	  2015),	  8.	  35	  Brendan	  Nicholson,	  “’China	  land	  grab	  a	  danger	  for	  all’:	  Dennis	  Richardson,”	  The	  
Australian	  (28	  May	  2015)	  Accessed	  at:	  http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-­‐
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   Fifth,	  China,	  Russia,	  Iran,	  North	  Korea	  and	  other	  non-­‐democratic	  states	  have	  proven	  adept	  at	  fostering	  divisions	  within	  the	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  countries	  by	  modulating	  threats	  and	  coercive	  actions	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  with	  apparently	  reasonable	  pleas	  for	  cooling-­‐off	  periods,	  negotiations	  and	  even	  for	  offers	  of	  various	  types	  of	  partnership	  on	  the	  other.	  A	  key	  consequence	  has	  been	  to	  complicate	  American	  foreign	  policy,	  reduce	  the	  coherence	  of	  Washington’s	  security	  priorities	  and	  undermine	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  U.S.	  to	  firmly	  oppose	  some	  challenges	  to	  its	  own	  and	  its	  allies’	  key	  interests.	  These	  developments,	  in	  combination,	  have	  serious	  implications	  for	  the	  hard-­‐nosed	  judgments	  Australian	  security	  planners	  must	  make	  about	  the	  level	  of	  deterrence	  membership	  of	  the	  U.S.	  alliance	  will	  confer	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  in	  recent	  years	  allied	  deterrence	  has	  been	  undermined	  from	  both	  above	  and	  below.	  From	  above,	  America’s	  nuclear	  and	  conventional	  force	  superiority	  in	  the	  region	  is	  greatly	  reduced	  and	  Washington’s	  freedom	  of	  action	  has	  been	  significantly	  constrained.	  Simultaneously	  allied	  deterrence	  is	  being	  undermined	  from	  below	  by	  a	  succession	  of	  carefully	  crafted	  actions	  by	  Beijing,	  Moscow	  and	  Pyongyang	  that	  have	  seriously	  threatened	  core	  interests	  of	  allies	  and	  friends	  without	  triggering	  anything	  more	  than	  muted	  and	  largely	  ineffective	  responses	  from	  Washington.	  Many	  Australian	  security	  planners	  are	  reluctantly	  concluding	  that	  allied	  deterrence	  is	  not	  what	  it	  used	  to	  be.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  affairs/defence/china-­‐land-­‐grab-­‐a-­‐danger-­‐for-­‐all-­‐dennis-­‐richardson/story-­‐e6frg8yo-­‐1227371948850	  on	  7	  October,	  2015.	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There	  is,	  however,	  a	  third	  layer	  of	  Australian	  deterrence.	  This	  is	  the	  layer	  of	  deterrence	  that	  is	  conferred	  by	  the	  broader	  international	  community	  and	  the	  rules-­‐based	  global	  security	  order.	  Successive	  Australian	  governments	  have	  worked	  hard	  to	  foster	  strong	  relationships	  with	  neighboring	  countries,	  across	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific,	  in	  North	  America	  and	  in	  Europe.	  They	  have	  also	  built	  considerable	  credibility	  for	  the	  country	  in	  the	  primary	  international	  institutions	  of	  relevance,	  especially	  in	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Hence,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  serious	  threat	  developing	  to	  Australia	  international	  actors	  of	  influence	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  deeply	  concerned	  and	  many	  would	  be	  active	  in	  helping	  to	  thwart	  an	  aggressor.	  However,	  the	  limited	  international	  resolve	  and	  constrained	  military	  capabilities	  of	  many	  of	  these	  broader	  international	  actors	  is	  reducing	  the	  potency	  of	  this	  deterrence	  layer	  as	  well.	  
	  
Implications	  for	  Australian	  Policymakers	  
Recognition	  that	  traditional	  security	  assumptions	  need	  review	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  tendency	  in	  most	  large	  bureaucratic	  systems	  to	  focus	  heavily	  on	  internal	  processes	  and	  very	  short-­‐term	  issues.	  Australia’s	  national	  security	  community	  is	  no	  exception.	  Some	  members	  of	  this	  community	  have	  sought	  to	  ignore	  or	  play-­‐down	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  major	  changes	  underway	  in	  the	  country’s	  security	  outlook.	  Others	  have	  acknowledged	  the	  new	  security	  challenges	  but	  been	  slow	  to	  implement	  effective	  analytical,	  policy	  and	  budgetary	  responses.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  a	  general	  consensus	  amongst	  the	  leaders	  of	  Australia’s	  national	  security	  community	  that	  the	  challenges	  now	  developing	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  significantly	  different	  from	  those	  of	  recent	  decades.	  New	  thinking	  is	  required,	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strategies	  and	  investment	  priorities	  need	  to	  be	  reviewed	  and	  some	  important	  new	  initiatives	  should	  be	  developed.	  	  
Australia’s	  alliance	  with	  the	  U.S.	  needs	  more	  work	  A	  core	  conclusion	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  under	  considerable	  pressure	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	  The	  “correlation	  of	  forces	  in	  the	  economic,	  political	  and	  military	  realms	  has	  shifted	  substantially	  against	  it	  during	  the	  last	  decade	  and	  until	  the	  U.S.	  economy,	  programs	  of	  defense	  investment	  and	  strategic	  confidence	  recover,	  the	  security	  outlook	  for	  Australia	  and	  its	  key	  allies	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  will	  be	  weakened.	  Most	  Australian	  government	  officials	  and	  strategic	  analysts	  are	  very	  uncomfortable	  with	  this	  situation.	  Successive	  Australian	  assessments	  have	  emphasized	  the	  country’s	  enduring	  interest	  in	  sustaining	  the	  U.S.-­‐led	  security	  order	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific.	  There	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  unless	  the	  current	  tides	  of	  change	  are	  reversed,	  U.S.	  and	  Western	  influence	  in	  the	  region	  could	  be	  further	  reduced,	  allied	  deterrence	  eroded	  further	  and	  potential	  enemies	  emboldened	  to	  embark	  on	  new	  adventures.	  	  	  	  There	  are	  several	  prominent	  views	  on	  how	  Australia’s	  approach	  to	  the	  U.S.	  alliance	  should	  adapt.	  One	  relatively	  modest-­‐sized	  group	  advocates	  a	  more	  conditioned	  and	  even	  semi-­‐neutral	  stance	  between	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  For	  instance,	  Tom	  Switzer	  has	  summarized	  this	  argument	  as	  follows:	  But	  one	  thing	  seems	  clear:	  China	  matters	  more	  to	  us	  than	  ever,	  which	  means	  in	  certain	  circumstances	  Australia	  may	  regard	  the	  U.S.	  alliance	  not	  just	  as	  the	  centerpiece	  of	  our	  foreign	  policy	  but	  as	  a	  pragmatic	  device	  to	  be	  adjusted	  to	  changing	  conditions.	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  It	  means	  we	  have	  to	  learn	  to	  be	  much	  more	  agile,	  discriminating,	  ambiguous	  and	  flexible	  in	  our	  foreign	  policy	  outlook.36	  	   The	  second	  and	  normally	  dominant	  school	  of	  Australian	  thought	  is	  that	  while	  a	  changing	  security	  environment	  is	  buffeting	  the	  alliance,	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  the	  alliance	  and	  its	  value	  are	  unchanged.	  	  Peter	  Varghese,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  neatly	  encapsulated	  this	  view	  when	  he	  remarked:	  With	  multipolarity	  inevitably	  comes	  a	  reduced	  margin	  of	  influence	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  But	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  America’s	  power	  will	  stay	  more	  multidimensional	  and	  more	  global	  than	  China’s.	  The	  U.S.	  will	  remain	  in	  a	  league	  of	  its	  own	  in	  global	  military	  reach	  and	  readiness	  to	  use	  force.	  	  	  Our	  alliance	  with	  the	  U.S.	  is	  the	  bedrock	  of	  our	  strategic	  policy.	  The	  alliance	  is	  a	  deterrent	  to	  potential	  aggressors,	  an	  irreplaceable	  source	  of	  intelligence	  and	  defense	  technology	  and	  a	  communion	  of	  values.	  The	  last	  is	  important	  because	  the	  convergence	  of	  interests	  and	  values	  is	  a	  powerful	  combination	  in	  foreign	  policy.37	  	   A	  third	  relatively	  strong	  view	  in	  official	  circles	  complements	  the	  second	  by	  arguing	  that,	  in	  addition,	  Australia	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  work	  even	  more	  closely	  with	  Washington,	  help	  the	  core	  allies	  develop	  a	  more	  coherent	  and	  effective	  strategy	  for	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  and,	  through	  these	  measures,	  make	  a	  disproportionate	  contribution	  to	  shaping	  a	  better	  security	  outlook	  for	  the	  region.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Tom	  Switzer,	  “Sino-­‐U.S.	  Rivalry	  Puts	  Us	  in	  a	  Bind,”	  The	  Australian,	  22	  May	  2015,	  Accessed	  at:	  http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/sino-­‐us-­‐rivalry-­‐puts-­‐us-­‐in-­‐a-­‐bind/story-­‐e6frg6zo-­‐1227364158759	  on	  23	  September	  2015.	  37	  Peter	  Varghese,	  “An	  Australian	  World	  View:	  A	  Practitioner’s	  Perspective”	  (A	  speech	  delivered	  at	  the	  Lowy	  Institute,	  20	  August,	  2015)	  Accessed	  at:	  http://dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/an-­‐australian-­‐world-­‐view-­‐a-­‐practitioners-­‐perspective.aspx	  on	  23	  September,	  2015.	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For	  instance,	  Michael	  Thawley,	  Prime	  Minister	  Tony	  Abbott’s	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Cabinet	  has	  been	  reported,	  as	  follows:	  Mr.	  Thawley	  warned	  against	  "hysterical"	  debates	  about	  China's	  rising	  power	  and	  American	  decline.	  Australia's	  role	  was	  to	  encourage	  American	  leadership	  and	  "get	  our	  economy	  back	  in	  gear"	  while	  also	  maximizing	  our	  military	  power,	  he	  said:	  	  "Given	  that	  we	  think	  in	  my	  view	  that	  U.S.	  leadership	  is	  going	  to	  be	  crucial	  in	  the	  period	  ahead,	  we	  ought	  to	  maximize	  our	  capacity	  to	  influence	  U.S.	  strategy	  and	  to	  make	  sure	  it	  maintains	  its	  alliance	  commitments."	  	  Mr.	  Thawley's	  views	  carry	  considerable	  weight	  in	  Canberra….38	  	  A	  fourth	  and	  final	  school	  of	  thought	  argues	  that	  the	  most	  important	  immediate	  priority	  in	  strengthening	  Australia’s	  security	  is	  to	  do	  everything	  possible	  to	  boost	  the	  economy	  even	  if	  this	  means	  placing	  a	  lower	  priority	  on	  external	  security	  and	  the	  alliance.	  This	  logic	  is	  virtually	  never	  argued	  explicitly	  but	  it	  is	  periodically	  evident	  in	  the	  behavior	  of	  some	  ministers	  and	  senior	  officials.39	  In	  the	  case	  of	  at	  least	  some	  of	  these	  people,	  it	  also	  reflects	  a	  very	  shallow	  understanding	  of	  Chinese	  strategy	  and	  the	  aggressive	  nature	  of	  Beijing’s	  international	  cyber	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See	  John	  Garnaut	  and	  David	  Wroe,	  “China	  not	  fit	  for	  global	  leadership,	  says	  top	  Canberra	  official	  Michael	  Thawley,”	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  30	  June	  2015.	  Accessed	  at:	  http://www.smh.com.au/federal-­‐politics/political-­‐news/china-­‐not-­‐fit-­‐for-­‐global-­‐leadership-­‐says-­‐top-­‐canberra-­‐official-­‐michael-­‐thawley-­‐20150630-­‐gi1o1f.html#ixzz3lsMmLt7Z	  on	  23	  September	  2015.	  39	  This	  line	  of	  economy-­‐first	  thinking	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  unexpected	  approval	  of	  a	  bid	  by	  a	  Chinese	  company	  to	  secure	  a	  99-­‐year	  lease	  on	  strategically	  important	  commercial	  port	  facilities	  in	  the	  northern	  city	  of	  Darwin.	  Although	  there	  were	  many	  complications	  arising	  from	  the	  specific	  circumstances	  of	  this	  deal,	  there	  was	  never	  any	  doubt	  that,	  should	  the	  Australian	  Government	  concluded	  that	  the	  deal	  entailed	  a	  security	  risk	  it	  had	  the	  constitutional	  power	  to	  do	  so.	  To	  the	  surprise	  of	  most	  national	  security	  experts	  and	  many	  senior	  officials	  (privately	  expressed)	  the	  government	  chose	  not	  to	  do	  so.	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espionage	  operations.	  It	  also	  reflects	  a	  degree	  of	  national	  security	  complacency	  amongst	  some	  senior	  Australians.	  Australian	  views	  of	  the	  alliance	  with	  the	  U.S.	  are,	  in	  consequence,	  mostly	  not	  whether	  the	  alliance	  should	  be	  maintained,	  but	  rather	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  alliance	  should	  receive	  short-­‐term	  priority.	  Public	  opinion	  polling	  routinely	  displays	  the	  	  	  commitment	  of	  the	  Australian	  public	  to	  the	  alliance.	  The	  latest	  Lowy	  Institute	  poll	  of	  Australian	  attitudes	  on	  international	  affairs	  found	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  (78	  percent)	  of	  Australians	  say	  the	  U.S.	  alliance	  is	  either	  “very”	  or	  “fairly	  important”	  for	  Australia’s	  security.40	  	  	  At	  its	  National	  Conference	  in	  July	  2015,	  Australia’s	  major	  opposition	  party,	  the	  Australian	  Labor	  Party,	  maintained	  its	  strong	  commitment	  to	  the	  Alliance	  but	  wound	  back	  its	  language.	  	  The	   2011	   Labor	   platform	   had	   the	   usual	   language	   about	   the	   U.S.	   as	   the	   closest	  security	  ally	  and	  a	  vital	  global	  partner,	  and	  then	  added	  to	  this	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  alliance	  “is	  one	  of	  Australia’s	  great	  national	  assets.”	  The	  2015	  policy	  dropped	  the	  great-­‐national-­‐asset	  line.	  	  The	  deputy	  leader	  of	  the	  Opposition	  and	  Labor’s	  shadow	  Foreign	  Minister	  Tanya	  Plibersek	   told	   the	   Financial	   Review	   that	   the	   changes	   to	   the	   policy	   platform	   on	  ANZUS	  aimed	  to	  emphasize	  a	  relationship	  that	  was	  “strong,	  long	  and	  deep	  but	  not	  compliant.41	  	   Amongst	  the	  more	  obvious	  steps	  available	  to	  Canberra	  are	  to	  further	  lift	  its	  defense	  spending,	  it	  could	  take	  extra	  steps	  to	  strengthen	  defense	  force	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Alex	  Oliver,	  The	  Lowy	  Institute	  Poll	  2014	  (Sydney:	  Lowy	  Institute	  for	  International	  Policy,	  2014),	  5.	  Accessed	  at:	  http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lowy-­‐institute-­‐poll-­‐2014	  on	  7	  October	  2015.	  41	  For	  details	  see:	  Graeme	  Dobell,	  “Australia-­‐East	  Asia/U.S.	  Relations:	  Alliance,	  Trade,	  Climate,	  and	  China,”	  Comparative	  Connections,	  (September	  2015),	  2.	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interoperability	  with	  the	  U.S.	  and	  it	  could	  continue	  to	  make	  helpful	  contributions	  to	  allied	  operations	  in	  more	  distant	  theatres.	  In	  addition,	  Canberra	  could	  significantly	  expand	  its	  contribution	  of	  raw	  and	  processed	  intelligence,	  extend	  its	  sharing	  of	  wide-­‐area	  surveillance	  data	  and	  participate	  more	  actively	  in	  the	  development	  of	  allied	  strategies	  and	  plans	  for	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  to	  senior	  U.S.	  officials.42	  The	   Secretary	   of	   the	  Defense	  Department,	   Dennis	   Richardson,	   summarized	  the	  situation	  as	  follows:	  Expressed	  in	  its	  most	  simple	  and	  basic	  terms,	  our	  relationship	  with	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  can	  be	  summarised	  in	  one	  simple	  phrase:	   friends	  with	  both,	  allies	  with	  one.”	  Richardson	  said	  that	  America’s	  superpower	  stature	  is	  not	  at	  risk	  over	  the	   short	   to	   medium	   term.	   The	   U.S.	   is	   committed	   to	   maintaining	   its	   global	  primacy,	   Richardson	   said,	   but	   as	   it	   juggles	   many	   pressing	   priorities,	   the	   U.S.	  “looks	  for	  much	  more	  help	  from	  allies	  such	  as	  Australia.43	  	  The	  centerpiece	  of	  the	  Obama’s	  administration’s	  economic	  approach	  to	  Asia,	  the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  (TPP),	  is	  embraced	  by	  Australia	  as	  “one	  possible	  pathway	  toward	  realizing	  the	  vision	  of	  a	  free	  trade	  area	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific.”	  44	  The	  Australian	  Government	  could	  also	  invite	  the	  U.S.	  and	  other	  close	  allies	  to	  use	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  defense	  and	  related	  facilities	  in	  Australia	  to	  strengthen	  their	  regional	  military	  presence	  and	  capacities	  to	  conduct	  contingent	  operations	  in	  the	  theater.	  The	  Australian	  Government	  could	  make	  clear	  to	  Washington	  that	  it	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  These	  options	  are	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  in	  Babbage,	  Game	  Plan,	  73-­‐88.	  43	  “Defence	  secretary	  warns	  of	  China’s	  ‘unprecedented’	  land	  reclamation	  activity	  in	  South	  China	  Sea,”	  The	  Conversation	  (27	  May,	  2015).	  Accessed	  at:	  http://theconversation.com/defence-­‐secretary-­‐warns-­‐of-­‐chinas-­‐unprecedented-­‐land-­‐reclamation-­‐activity-­‐in-­‐south-­‐china-­‐sea-­‐42435	  on	  7	  October,	  2015.	  44	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  About	  the	  TPP	  Negotiations	  Accessed	  at:	  http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/pages/trans-­‐pacific-­‐partnership-­‐agreement-­‐tpp.aspx	  on	  7	  October,	  2014.	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prepared	  to	  facilitate	  the	  long-­‐term	  stationing	  of	  U.S.	  military	  and	  related	  units	  at	  substantially	  expanded	  Australian	  defense	  bases.45	  Canberra	  could	  also	  invite	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  allies	  and	  friends	  to	  make	  more	  frequent	  use	  of	  the	  country’s	  extensive	  network	  of	  large	  and	  relatively	  unconstrained	  exercise	  and	  range	  areas.	  Australia	  could,	  in	  addition,	  offer	  to	  support	  American	  forces	  operating	  in	  Australia	  by	  providing	  priority	  access	  to	  Australia’s	  extensive	  technological,	  industrial	  and	  broader	  logistic	  capabilities.46	  By	  offering	  to	  assist	  Washington	  in	  these	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  practical	  ways,	  Canberra	  would	  hope	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  feel	  encouraged	  to	  strengthen	  its	  own	  strategic	  commitment	  to	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  for	  the	  long	  term	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  rebuild	  allied	  deterrence	  and	  strategic	  confidence.	  In	  short,	  there	  are	  signs	  that	  Australia	  may	  be	  prepared	  to	  work	  steadily	  to	  become	  an	  even	  closer	  and	  more	  valuable	  ally	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  
	  
Australia’s	  needs	  to	  reinforce	  regional	  security	  partnerships	  There	  are	  also	  signs	  that	  the	  Australian	  Government	  is	  considering	  additional	  steps	  to	  reinforce	  its	  security	  relationships	  with	  a	  range	  of	  regional	  countries,	  especially	  in	  East,	  Southeast	  and	  South	  Asia	  and	  in	  the	  Southwest	  Pacific.	  The	  primary	  goals	  would	  be	  to	  further	  strengthen	  security	  understanding,	  provide	  assistance	  to	  overcome	  security	  weaknesses,	  foster	  greater	  security	  resilience	  and	  strengthen	  habits	  of	  close	  security	  cooperation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  These	  options	  are	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  in	  Babbage,	  Game	  Plan,	  82-­‐85.	  46	  These	  options	  are	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  in	  Babbage,	  Game	  Plan,	  86-­‐87.	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The	  precise	  form	  of	  these	  initiatives	  will	  likely	  depend	  on	  the	  circumstances	  of	  each	  nation,	  the	  priorities	  of	  the	  relevant	  security	  and	  defense	  leadership	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Australia	  is	  capable	  of	  assisting	  in	  an	  effective	  manner.	  Australia’s	  efforts	  will	  require	  coordinated	  whole-­‐of-­‐government	  action,	  including	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  the	  Australian	  Federal	  Police,	  state	  and	  territory	  police,	  the	  Department	  of	  Immigration	  and	  Border	  Protection,	  etc.	  Over	  time	  the	  intent	  would	  be	  to	  significantly	  improve	  regional	  confidence	  and	  security	  resilience	  by	  fostering	  a	  network	  of	  security	  partners	  across	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific.	  In	  the	  event	  of	  external	  aggression	  it	  would	  be	  hoped	  that	  these	  countries	  would	  conduct	  cooperative	  operations	  to	  bolster	  the	  region’s	  resilience	  and	  mutual	  defenses.	  An	  important	  additional	  goal	  would	  be	  to	  encourage	  the	  security	  leaders	  of	  regional	  countries	  to	  view	  Australia	  as	  their	  closest	  and	  most	  responsive	  security	  partner.	  	  
Australia’s	  national	  defense	  effort	  needs	  to	  be	  sustained	  For	  most	  of	  Australia’s	  history	  the	  threat	  environment	  has	  been	  low	  and	  close	  allies	  have	  carried	  much	  of	  the	  load.	  In	  these	  circumstances	  the	  penalties	  for	  loose	  Australian	  defense	  priorities	  and	  limited	  discipline	  in	  budgeting	  have	  been	  modest.	  	  	  A	  clear	  conclusion	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  those	  relaxed	  days	  are	  over.	  There	  is	  a	  growing	  consensus	  amongst	  Australia’s	  defense	  planners	  that	  there	  is	  now	  a	  need	  to	  sharpen	  investment	  priorities	  and	  embark	  on	  a	  sustained	  program	  of	  defense	  investment.	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Australia	  is	  currently	  spending	  about	  1.8	  per	  cent	  of	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)	  on	  defense.	  Across	  the	  last	  decade	  Australian	  defense	  spending	  has	  fluctuated	  between	  1.6	  per	  cent	  and	  1.86	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP.	  However,	  during	  serious	  crises	  in	  the	  past	  Australia	  has	  spent	  much	  more.	  Defense	  spending	  rose	  to	  4	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  5	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  Korean	  conflict	  and	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  it	  peaked	  at	  32	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP.47	  The	  current	  Australian	  government	  was	  elected	  in	  2013	  with	  a	  promise	  to	  spend	  2	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  on	  defense	  within	  a	  decade.	  The	  previous	  government’s	  2013	  Defense	  White	  Paper	  also	  committed	  to	  increasing	  defense	  funding	  towards	  2	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  but	  cautioned:	  “this	  is	  a	  long-­‐term	  objective	  that	  will	  be	  implemented	  in	  an	  economically	  responsible	  manner	  as	  and	  when	  fiscal	  circumstances	  allow.”	  48	  The	  level	  of	  defense	  spending	  ultimately	  rests	  upon	  the	  depth	  of	  public	  and	  political	  concern	  for	  the	  country’s	  security	  and	  the	  state	  of	  the	  national	  economy.	  Given	  Australia	  is	  currently	  suffering	  the	  effects	  of	  low	  productivity	  levels,	  reduced	  terms	  of	  trade,	  a	  reform	  impasse	  in	  the	  Senate	  and	  the	  prospect	  of	  budget	  deficits	  for	  many	  years	  to	  come,	  extra	  funding	  for	  defense	  will	  not	  be	  easily	  won.	  Indeed,	  the	  ascension	  of	  Malcolm	  Turnbull	  to	  the	  Prime	  Ministership	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  reassessment	  of	  the	  coalition	  parties’	  commitment	  to	  spend	  at	  least	  2	  per	  cent	  on	  defense	  and	  push	  the	  timeframe	  for	  achieving	  that	  goal	  out	  to	  the	  late	  2020s.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  For	  details	  see:	  Mark	  Thomson,	  The	  Cost	  of	  Defence:	  ASPI	  Defence	  Budget	  Brief	  2014-­‐15	  (Canberra:	  Australian	  Strategic	  Policy	  Institute,	  2014),	  178-­‐179	  48	  Department	  of	  Defence,	  Defence	  White	  Paper	  2013	  (Canberra:	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  2013),	  72.	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Alternatively,	  a	  major	  crisis	  or	  series	  of	  crises	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  might	  so	  concern	  the	  Australian	  people	  and	  government	  that	  defense	  spending	   is	  boosted	  rapidly	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  priorities.	  	  Raising	  defense	  spending	  to	  between	  2	  per	  cent	  and	  2.5	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  during	  the	  coming	  decade	  and	  sharpening	  investment	  priorities	  to	  execute	  preferred	  strategies	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  would	  render	  Australia	  far	  more	  secure	  and	  also	  strengthen	  allied	  and	  regional	  partner	  deterrence	  and	  security	  confidence.	  	  	  
	  
Conclusions	  Australians	  need	  to	  address	  their	  changing	  strategic	  circumstances	  from	  a	  unique	  perspective.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  Australian	  continent	  is	  impressively	  large	  -­‐	  similar	  in	  size	  to	  the	  continental	  United	  States.	  Australia	  also	  has	  several	  offshore	  territories	  in	  the	  Indian,	  Pacific	  and	  Southern	  Oceans,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  similar	  distances	  from	  the	  mainland	  as	  Hawaii	  is	  from	  North	  America.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  this	  vast	  country	  Australia	  only	  possesses	  a	  population,	  economy	  and	  tax	  base	  comparable	  to	  Texas.	  This	  means	  that	  Australia	  currently	  has	  a	  defense	  budget	  that	  is	  less	  than	  one-­‐fortieth	  that	  which	  is	  available	  to	  the	  Pentagon.	  This	  funds	  a	  permanent	  defense	  force	  that	  numbers	  just	  over	  half	  a	  Melbourne	  Cricket	  Ground	  crowd.	  Hence,	  a	  central	  challenge	  for	  Australian	  defense	  planners	  is	  how	  to	  strengthen	  deterrence	  and	  defensive	  capabilities	  in	  the	  more	  demanding	  strategic	  environment	  now	  developing	  when	  the	  country’s	  independent	  resources	  are	  so	  limited.	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Moreover,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Australia	  is	  now	  close	  to	  the	  center-­‐stage	  of	  superpower	  rivalry	  and	  a	  likely	  region	  for	  any	  future	  major	  war.	  Australians	  are	  finding	  themselves	  in	  the	  unfamiliar	  and	  rather	  uncomfortable	  position	  of	  no	  longer	  being	  located	  in	  a	  strategic	  backwater.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  many	  Australians	  now	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  living	  in	  a	  front-­‐line	  state.	   The	  approaches	  to	  this	  situation	  do,	  however,	  vary	  significantly	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  Australian	  society.	  For	  instance,	  many	  business	  people	  are	  strongly	  attracted	  by	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  Chinese	  market	  and	  the	  potential	  to	  team	  with	  Chinese	  corporations	  to	  compete	  for	  global	  business.	  The	  recently	  agreed	  Australia-­‐China	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  is	  expected	  to	  further	  broaden	  the	  opportunities	  for	  Australian	  enterprises	  in	  China.	  However,	  many	  business	  people	  also	  appreciate	  that	  future	  Chinese	  growth	  will	  be	  slower,	  business	  operations	  in	  China	  carry	  an	  unusual	  range	  of	  risks,	  Chinese	  medium-­‐technology	  manufacturing	  is	  losing	  its	  competitive	  edge	  and	  other	  developing	  societies	  may	  offer	  more	  attractive	  options	  in	  the	  decades	  ahead.	  Those	  Australians	  more	  concerned	  about	  human	  rights	  issues	  are	  disturbed	  by	  the	  scale	  and	  rate	  of	  continuing	  abuses	  in	  China	  and	  by	  the	  number	  of	  Australian	  citizens	  who	  have	  fallen	  foul	  of	  the	  Chinese	  criminal	  justice	  system	  in	  apparently	  dubious	  circumstances.	  Another	  group	  of	  Australians	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  foreign	  policy	  and	  tactical	  management	  of	  relations	  with	  China.	  These	  people	  are	  more	  concerned	  by	  the	  perceived	  need	  to	  foster	  a	  positive	  diplomatic	  atmosphere,	  to	  develop	  stronger	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personal	  relationships	  and	  to	  carefully	  control	  the	  language	  used	  in	  formal	  and	  informal	  dialogues,	  even	  if	  this	  requires	  a	  periodic	  marginalization	  of	  important	  Australian	  interests.	  A	  final	  group	  of	  Australians	  focuses	  more	  on	  the	  national	  security	  and	  the	  defense	  implications	  of	  the	  changing	  landscape.	  These	  people	  worry	  more	  deeply	  about	  the	  potential	  for	  serious	  crises	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  and	  whether	  and	  how	  the	  country	  could	  effectively	  deter	  serious	  coercion	  and	  attacks.	  	  Despite	  this	  diversity	  of	  interests	  and	  opinions,	  there	  is	  a	  broad	  appreciation	  that	  major	  changes	  are	  underway	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  security	  environment.	  	  Australians,	  especially	  in	  the	  northern	  half	  of	  the	  country,	  possess	  a	  sensitive	  defense	  nerve.	  Public	  opinion	  polling	  and	  other	  indicators	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  gradual	  increase	  in	  concern	  about	  rising	  security	  risks.	  	  How	  these	  trends	  develop	  in	  the	  coming	  decade	  will	  depend	  very	  much	  on	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  and	  in	  Washington	  in	  the	  next	  few	  years.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  a	  range	  of	  precautionary	  steps	  is	  likely	  to	  receive	  increased	  attention	  in	  Canberra.	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Chapter	  3	  
Challenges	  to	  Extended	  Deterrence	  in	  the	  Japan-­‐U.S.	  Alliance:	  From	  
Gray	  Zone	  to	  Nuclear	  Deterrence	  	  	  
Introduction	  The	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  is	  the	  most	  dynamic	  region	  in	  the	  world,	  with	  its	  remarkable	  region-­‐wide	  economic	  development	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  when	  Japanese	  companies	  expanded	  their	  production	  network	  toward	  Asia	  after	  the	  Plaza	  Accord	  and	  China’s	  rapid	  economic	  development	  following	  Deng	  Xiaoping’s	  initiative	  of	  economic	  reformation.	  Despite	  this	  economic	  success	  story,	  however,	  the	  security	  environment	  in	  this	  region	  is	  not	  necessarily	  stable.	  Even	  immediately	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  1995	  version	  of	  Japan’s	  National	  Defense	  Program	  Guidelines	  (NDPG),	  the	  capstone	  document	  of	  Japan’s	  defense	  strategy,	  described	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region	  as	  “unclear	  and	  uncertain.”	  In	  the	  21st	  century,	  this	  “unclear	  and	  uncertain”	  situation	  is	  getting	  even	  worse	  due	  to	  China’s	  rapid	  military	  modernization	  and	  its	  assertive	  military	  and	  paramilitary	  activities	  in	  this	  region	  as	  well	  as	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  and	  missile	  developments.	  These	  trends	  in	  the	  regional	  security	  environment	  pose	  significant	  challenges	  to	  regional	  deterrence.	  	   In	  some	  senses,	  however,	  the	  security	  environment	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region	  is	  less	  uncertain	  than	  that	  of	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  this	  decade,	  horizon-­‐scanning	  projects,	  such	  as	  NATO’s	  Multiple	  Futures	  Project49	  and	  U.S.	  Global	  Trends	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  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization,	  Allied	  Command	  Transformation,	  “Multiple	  Futures	  Project	  Final	  Report:	  Navigating	  Toward	  2030,”	  (April	  2009),	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reports,50	  led	  by	  the	  Western	  countries	  have	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  “power	  diffusion”	  from	  states	  to	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  movements	  including	  influence	  from	  religion.	  ISIL	  in	  Middle	  East	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  visible	  cases	  of	  such	  “power	  diffusion.”	  By	  contrast,	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region,	  especially	  in	  East	  Asia,	  states	  still	  virtually	  monopolize	  power.	  Even	  in	  countries	  like	  Myanmar	  and	  North	  Korea,	  which	  have	  serious	  domestic	  social	  unrest,	  state-­‐based	  governance	  is	  still	  solid.	  This	  mitigates	  uncertainty	  in	  regional	  security.	  Surely	  North	  Korea	  poses	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  region,	  but	  if	  it	  collapses	  or	  an	  insurgency	  erupts	  and	  a	  Syria-­‐like	  situation	  arises,	  the	  region	  would	  need	  to	  tackle	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  serious	  security	  challenge	  more	  like	  the	  current	  Mediterranean	  and	  European	  countries.	  While	  nobody	  can	  deny	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  North	  Korean	  collapse	  out	  of	  the	  blue,	  the	  current	  challenge	  from	  the	  North	  Korean	  state	  armed	  with	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  ballistic	  missiles	  is	  the	  more	  immediate	  threat.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  remains	  a	  “state-­‐centric”	  region.	  	  	   This	  continuing	  “state-­‐centric”	  characteristic	  of	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  traditional	  concepts	  of	  deterrence	  remain	  as	  relevant	  today	  as	  they	  were	  in	  the	  past.	  Rather,	  fundamental	  and	  tectonic	  challenges	  to	  traditional	  deterrence	  strategy	  and	  structures	  are	  now	  emerging:	  creeping	  gray-­‐zone	  expansion,	  anti-­‐access/area	  denial	  (A2/AD)	  threats,	  and	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  weapon	  and	  ballistic	  missile	  as	  a	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  (accessed	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  50	  National	  Intelligence	  Council,	  Global	  Trends	  2030:	  Alternative	  Worlds,	  (December	  2012),	  (http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  28,	  2015).	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geostrategic	  game	  changer.	  This	  paper	  will	  to	  analyze	  the	  characteristic	  of	  these	  challenges	  and	  assess	  their	  significance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  regional	  deterrence.	  	  
1. Creeping	  Gray-­‐Zone	  Expansion	  
What	  are	  “Creeping	  Gray-­‐Zone	  Expansions?	  One	  of	  the	  key	  features	  of	  the	  contemporary	  security	  environment	  around	  the	  world	  is	  that	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  peacetime	  and	  wartime	  is	  no	  longer	  relevant;	  serious	  security	  challenges	  occur	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  “gray-­‐zone”	  between	  wartime	  and	  peacetime.	  Looking	  back	  at	  major	  military	  operations	  since	  the	  Gulf	  War	  in	  1991,	  most	  operations	  took	  place	  in	  such	  a	  “gray	  zone”:	  Operations	  Northern	  Watch	  and	  Southern	  Watch	  at	  Iraq	  after	  the	  Gulf	  War	  1991,	  the	  peacekeeping	  operation	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Kosovo,	  counter	  insurgency	  /	  stabilization	  operations	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,	  international	  counter	  piracy	  operations	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	  as	  well	  as	  various	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  peacekeeping	  operations.	  The	  intensity	  of	  these	  military	  operations	  is	  lower	  than	  conventional	  warfare,	  but	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  traditional	  peacetime	  training	  and	  exercise.	  	  The	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  security	  environment	  is	  no	  exception	  to	  this	  trend.	  The	  showdown	  between	  Japanese	  and	  Chinese	  coast	  guards	  in	  East	  China	  Sea,	  friction	  between	  China	  and	  Southeast	  Asian	  countries	  in	  South	  China	  Sea,	  and	  North	  Korea’s	  provocations	  in	  Korean	  Peninsula	  are	  such	  kind	  of	  “gray	  zone	  security	  challenges.”	  In	  a	  sense,	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  kinetic	  conflict,	  these	  are	  definitely	  not	  wartime	  situations,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  military/paramilitary	  showdowns	  are	  observed	  casting	  a	  shadow	  of	  military	  options,	  and	  that	  although	  a	  diplomatic	  solution	  is	  not	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yet	  abandoned	  but	  nobody	  is	  optimistic,	  these	  are	  not	  necessarily	  appropriate	  to	  define	  as	  peacetime	  situations.	  	   In	  East	  China	  Sea,	  there	  are	  two	  security	  challenges.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  now	  well	  known	  the	  Senkaku	  Islands.	  About	  a	  century	  ago,	  the	  Government	  of	  Japan	  surveyed	  the	  Senkaku	  Islands	  multiple	  times	  from	  1885	  to	  1895,	  and	  confirmed	  that	  the	  Senkaku	  Islands	  were	  not	  only	  uninhabited	  but	  showed	  no	  trace	  of	  having	  been	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  of	  China.	  Following	  this	  confirmation,	  the	  Government	  of	  Japan	  made	  a	  Cabinet	  Decision	  on	  January	  14,	  1895,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  “occupation	  of	  terra	  nullius,”	  formally	  to	  incorporate	  these	  islands	  into	  the	  territory	  of	  Japan.51	  Since	  then,	  including	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Peace	  Treaty	  of	  1955	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  no	  country	  challenged.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  a	  U.N.	  agency	  (Economic	  Commission	  for	  Asia	  and	  the	  Far	  East:	  ECAFE)	  indicated	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  petroleum	  resources	  on	  the	  East	  China	  Sea	  in	  the	  1970s	  that	  Taiwan	  and	  China	  started	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  Senkaku	  Islands	  are	  their	  territory.52	  	  	   After	  September	  2010,	  when	  a	  Chinese	  fishing	  boat	  intentionally	  clashed	  with	  a	  Japan	  Coast	  Guard	  (JCG)	  vessel	  to	  escape	  from	  Japanese	  territorial	  waters	  and	  was	  arrested	  by	  the	  JCG	  after	  that	  clash,	  the	  Senkaku	  Island	  was	  going	  to	  be	  a	  hot	  issue.	  In	  September	  2012,	  the	  Government	  of	  Japan	  purchased	  the	  Senkaku	  Islands	  from	  a	  private	  Japanese	  citizen,	  who	  owned	  these	  islands.	  Since	  then,	  China	  has	  continuously	  dispatched	  government	  vessels	  near	  Senkaku	  Islands,	  to	  challenge	  the	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  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  “Senkaku	  Q	  and	  A,”	  (June	  5,	  2013),	  (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-­‐paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html#q9)	  (accessed	  on	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  10,	  2015).	  52	  Ibid.	  
	   62	  
status	  quo.	  Since	  then,	  a	  showdown	  between	  these	  vessels	  and	  the	  JCG	  continues.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  vessels,	  assertive	  military	  activities	  in	  these	  areas	  have	  been	  observed,	  including	  fire	  control	  radar	  illumination	  from	  PLA	  destroyer	  of	  JMSDF	  destroyer	  on	  January	  2013	  and	  infringement	  of	  Japanese	  territorial	  airspace	  on	  December	  2012,	  and	  China’s	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	  an	  Air	  Defense	  Identification	  Zone	  (ADIZ)	  including	  the	  Senkaku	  Islands	  on	  November	  2013.	  	   The	  other	  issue	  in	  the	  East	  China	  Sea	  between	  Japan	  and	  China	  is	  about	  demarcation	  of	  Economic	  Exclusive	  Zones	  (EEZs).	  Under	  UNCLOS,	  a	  country	  can	  extend	  its	  EEZ	  200	  nautical	  miles	  from	  territorial	  ground.	  In	  some	  cases,	  however,	  since	  the	  distance	  between	  two	  countries	  is	  shorter	  than	  400	  nautical	  miles,	  these	  two	  countries	  need	  to	  agree	  about	  demarcation	  to	  solve	  issues	  that	  arise	  from	  overlapping	  EEZs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  East	  China	  Sea	  between	  Japan	  and	  China,	  the	  Government	  of	  Japan’s	  position	  is	  that	  “boundary	  delimitation	  based	  on	  the	  geographical	  equidistance	  line	  is	  regarded	  as	  an	  equitable	  solution	  in	  the	  delimitation	  of	  such	  maritime	  area.”53	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  China	  claims	  the	  natural	  prolongation	  of	  its	  continental	  shelf	  to	  the	  Okinawa	  Trough,	  which	  gives	  a	  vast	  area	  of	  EEZ	  to	  China	  compared	  to	  demarcation	  based	  on	  the	  geographical	  equidistance	  line.	  Without	  the	  two	  countries’	  agreement	  on	  demarcation,	  China	  has	  built	  many	  rigs	  to	  drill	  for	  natural	  gas	  from	  that	  area.	  Despite	  Japan	  and	  China	  having	  issued	  a	  joint	  press	  statement	  for	  East	  China	  Sea	  cooperation	  and	  agreed	  to	  joint	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  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  “Japan’s	  legal	  position	  on	  the	  development	  of	  natural	  resources	  in	  the	  East	  China	  Sea,”	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  (accessed	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development	  in	  one	  specific	  zone	  and	  Japanese	  corporation’s	  participation	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  existing	  oil	  and	  gas	  field	  in	  June	  200854,	  China	  continues	  to	  install	  rigs	  (as	  of	  September	  2015,	  14	  rigs	  are	  installed)55	  without	  any	  follow-­‐up	  efforts	  for	  joint	  development	  and	  Japanese	  corporation’s	  participation.	  	   In	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  with	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  participants,	  there	  exist	  multiple	  territorial	  disputes,	  mainly	  over	  the	  Paracel	  Islands	  and	  Spratly	  Islands.	  In	  1992,	  China	  enacted	  the	  Act	  on	  the	  Territorial	  Sea	  and	  the	  Contiguous	  Zone	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  which	  clearly	  mentions	  China’s	  claims	  over	  territorial	  rights	  of	  these	  islands.	  In	  addition,	  China	  also	  claims	  that	  the	  “nine	  dash	  line”,	  which	  encompasses	  most	  parts	  of	  the	  South	  China	  Sea	  without	  clear	  definition	  of	  that	  line.	  Although	  related	  parties,	  ASEAN	  and	  China	  signed	  the	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Conduct	  of	  Parties	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea	  (DOC)	  in	  2002	  to	  facilitate	  the	  peaceful	  resolution	  of	  maritime	  disputes,	  China’s	  military	  and	  paramilitary	  vessels	  have	  actively	  operated	  around	  the	  Scarborough	  Shoal	  and	  the	  Second	  Thomas	  Shoal,	  near	  the	  Philippines	  and	  the	  James	  Shoal	  and	  the	  South	  Luconia	  Shoal	  near	  Malaysia.	  Similar	  military	  and	  paramilitary	  activities	  have	  been	  conducted	  against	  Vietnam	  as	  well.	  	  	   In	  addition,	  China	  has	  recently	  begun	  rapidly	  promoting	  land	  reclamation	  at	  islets	  and	  rocks	  within	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  such	  as	  Johnson	  South	  Reef,	  Woody	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  “Japan-­‐China	  Joint	  Press	  Statement:	  Cooperation	  between	  Japan	  and	  China	  in	  the	  East	  China	  Sea,”	  (June	  18,	  2008);	  “Understanding	  on	  Japan-­‐China	  Joint	  Development	  in	  the	  East	  China	  Sea,”	  (June	  18,	  2008);	  “Understanding	  on	  the	  development	  of	  Shirakaba	  (Chinese	  name:	  Chunxiao)	  oil	  and	  gas	  field”	  (June	  18,	  2008),	  (http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000091726.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  10,	  2015).	  55	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  “The	  Current	  Status	  of	  China’s	  Unilateral	  Development	  of	  Natural	  Resources	  in	  the	  East	  China	  Sea,”	  (September	  24,	  2015),	  (http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/page3e_000356.html)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  10,	  2015).	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Island	  and	  Fiery	  Cross	  Reef.	  This	  land	  reclamation	  includes	  building	  airstrips	  and	  port	  facilities,	  which	  can	  be	  utilized	  for	  military.	  If	  military	  assets	  were	  deployed	  to	  these	  facilities,	  they	  would	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  freedom	  of	  navigation	  and	  overflight.	  To	  demonstrate	  the	  fundamental	  importance	  of	  these	  principles,	  the	  U.S.	  destroyer	  U.S.S	  Lassen	  transited	  near	  Subi	  Reef,	  a	  rock	  submerged	  at	  high	  tide	  from	  which	  cannot	  extend	  territorial	  water	  and	  airspace,	  as	  a	  part	  of	  Freedom	  of	  Navigation	  mission	  on	  October	  2015.	  In	  this	  way,	  like	  the	  East	  China	  Sea,	  military	  and	  paramilitary	  showdowns	  are	  observed	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea	  and	  these	  situations	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  continued	  for	  a	  while.	  	  	  
Challenge	  to	  Extended	  Deterrence	  According	  to	  deterrence	  theory,	  there	  are	  some	  “windows	  of	  deterrence”	  situation	  which	  deterrence	  hardly	  works,	  including	  fait	  accompli	  and	  probing	  situations.56	  Fait	  accompli	  is	  a	  situation	  whereby	  the	  adversary	  adopts	  a	  strategy	  in	  which	  it	  attempts	  to	  change	  the	  status	  quo	  before	  the	  deterring	  state	  can	  start	  to	  respond	  militarily.	  If	  the	  challenger	  estimates	  that	  he	  can	  act	  quicker	  than	  the	  deterrer	  and	  there	  is	  a	  high	  probability	  of	  occupying	  an	  island	  or	  some	  piece	  of	  land	  before	  the	  deterrer’s	  reaction,	  or	  if	  the	  aggressor	  expects	  no	  military	  reaction	  from	  the	  deterrer’s	  side	  once	  the	  status	  quo	  has	  physically	  been	  changed,	  this	  kind	  of	  challenge	  is	  highly	  difficult	  to	  deter.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Alexander	  L.	  George	  and	  Richard	  Smoke,	  Deterrence	  in	  American	  Foreign	  Policy:	  
Theory	  and	  Practice,	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1974).	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To	  deter	  such	  challenges,	  a	  tripwire	  like	  continuous	  presence	  in	  the	  location	  where	  challenger	  may	  intend	  to	  occupy	  before	  deterrer’s	  reaction	  would	  be	  effective.	  In	  reality,	  however,	  deploying	  a	  continuous	  presence	  is	  not	  always	  an	  easy	  or	  even	  a	  feasible	  option,	  either	  because	  of	  resource	  limitations	  or	  of	  geographical	  conditions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  maritime	  issues	  in	  the	  East	  China	  Sea	  and	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  the	  deterrer	  cannot	  build	  physically	  fixed	  barriers	  in	  the	  sea	  to	  prevent	  a	  fait	  accompli.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  deterrer	  could	  deploy	  a	  small	  military	  or	  paramilitary	  presence	  as	  a	  tripwire	  on	  the	  disputed	  islets	  which	  are	  the	  target	  of	  the	  challenger’s	  fait	  accompli	  tactics,	  but	  they	  might	  not	  do	  it	  because	  such	  a	  pre-­‐deployment	  of	  physical	  presence	  might	  be	  portrayed	  by	  the	  challenger	  as	  a	  “unilateral	  change	  and	  escalation	  of	  the	  situation,”	  and	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  the	  challenger	  would	  take	  advantage	  of	  such	  pre-­‐deployment	  as	  a	  pretext	  for	  military	  escalation.	  	  Probing	  is	  a	  situation	  whereby	  the	  adversary	  launches	  challenges	  to	  find	  out	  the	  lower	  ceiling	  of	  deterrence	  commitment.	  This	  form	  of	  challenge	  intends	  to	  “probe”	  to	  determine	  under	  what	  circumstances	  the	  deterrer	  responds	  with	  a	  military	  reaction.	  If	  the	  defender	  reacts	  appropriately,	  the	  challenger	  stops	  trying	  to	  change	  the	  status	  quo.	  In	  this	  sense,	  by	  definition,	  this	  kind	  of	  challenge	  cannot	  be	  deterred,	  because	  that	  challenge	  only	  occurs	  below	  the	  deterrence	  commitment.	  	  These	  two	  forms	  of	  creeping	  expansion	  are	  often	  referred	  as	  “salami	  tactics.”	  Thomas	  Schelling	  referred	  to	  “salami	  tactics”	  as	  “invented	  by	  a	  child,”	  who	  is	  told	  not	  to	  go	  into	  the	  water	  by	  his	  parents	  and	  gradually	  tries	  to	  go	  into	  the	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water.57	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  most	  commitments	  are	  ultimately	  ambiguous	  in	  detail.	  That	  ambiguity	  means	  that	  there	  exist	  some	  rooms	  for	  a	  challenger	  to	  “test”	  the	  deterrer’s	  commitment	  through	  probing	  aggression,	  like	  “pretending	  the	  trespass	  was	  inadvertent	  or	  unauthorized	  if	  one	  meets	  resistance,	  both	  to	  forestall	  the	  reaction	  and	  to	  avoid	  backing	  down.”58	  Once	  a	  challenger	  clarifies	  the	  deterrer’s	  commitment	  in	  such	  a	  way,	  next	  time	  it	  may	  challenge	  again	  by	  slicing	  the	  salami	  in	  a	  thinner	  way.	  The	  serious	  challenge	  for	  deterrence	  of	  such	  “salami	  tactics”	  comes	  from	  the	  deterrer’s	  difficulty	  of	  responding	  after	  the	  challenger	  has	  already	  sliced	  the	  salami.	  Once	  the	  salami	  is	  sliced,	  what	  is	  expected	  for	  deterrence	  is	  to	  prevent	  another	  slice,	  rather	  than	  to	  put	  the	  sliced	  salami	  back	  together.	  To	  return	  to	  pre-­‐sliced	  situation,	  the	  deterrer	  needs	  to	  put	  its	  hand	  into	  the	  challenger’s	  stomach	  and	  bring	  it	  back	  from	  that	  stomach.	  This	  is	  “compellence”	  rather	  than	  deterrence.	  These	  difficulties	  in	  deterring	  creeping	  expansion	  through	  fait	  accompli	  and	  probing	  are	  the	  key	  intellectual	  challenge	  facing	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  create	  a	  theory	  of	  deterrence	  in	  the	  gray	  zone.	  Possessing	  the	  war	  fighting	  capability	  to	  win	  the	  kinetic	  war	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  sufficient	  to	  deter	  such	  threats.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  recent	  ongoing	  land	  reclamation	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  the	  airstrips	  and	  port	  facilities	  that	  China	  has	  constructed	  could	  be	  neutralized	  very	  rapidly	  by	  cruise	  missiles	  strikes,	  were	  military	  conflict	  to	  break	  out.	  However,	  unless	  a	  kinetic	  conflict	  were	  to	  break	  out,	  the	  U.S.	  cannot	  destroy	  these	  facilities,	  because	  gray	  zone	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Thomas	  Schelling,	  Arms	  and	  Influence,	  with	  a	  new	  preface	  and	  afterword,	  Kindle	  edition,	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  location	  1103.	  58	  Ibid.,	  location	  1115.	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security	  challenges	  lie	  below	  the	  level	  of	  military	  conflict.	  Unless	  a	  war	  has	  started,	  physical	  strikes	  against	  these	  facilities	  cannot	  be	  an	  option.	  And	  as	  long	  as	  actual	  military	  conflict	  has	  not	  broken	  out,	  these	  facilities	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  “gunboat	  diplomacy”	  to	  influence	  regional	  country’s	  decision	  making.	  	  
How	  Should	  Extended	  Deterrence	  Adapt	  to	  the	  Challenge?	  In	  short,	  extended	  deterrence	  is	  country	  “A”	  provides	  security	  guarantee	  for	  country	  “B”	  to	  deter	  aggression	  against	  country	  “B”	  by	  other	  countries.	  However,	  in	  case	  of	  creeping	  gray-­‐zone	  expansion,	  explicit	  armed	  aggression	  often	  does	  not	  occur.	  Rather,	  as	  ongoing	  situation	  in	  South	  China	  Sea	  and	  East	  China	  Sea	  illustrate,	  creeping	  gray-­‐zone	  expansion	  often	  occurs	  at	  the	  level	  of	  paramilitary/law	  enforcement	  organization.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  gray	  zone	  situation	  remains	  at	  the	  law	  enforcement	  level,	  regional	  allies’	  law	  must	  be	  enforced,	  rather	  than	  the	  law	  of	  a	  country	  that	  provides	  extended	  deterrence	  for	  the	  allies.	  Thus,	  building	  deterrent	  at	  the	  gray-­‐zone,	  efforts	  (including	  paramilitary	  sector)	  by	  regional	  allies	  are	  crucially	  important.	  The	  role	  of	  a	  provider	  of	  extended	  deterrence	  is	  to	  assist	  regional	  allies’	  efforts	  to	  deter	  and	  respond	  to	  gray-­‐zone	  situation	  including	  building	  partner	  capacities	  and	  supporting	  regional	  allies’	  response	  against	  creeping	  expansion	  to	  prevent	  escalation	  such	  as	  sending	  clear	  political	  and	  military	  signal	  to	  a	  challenger.	  As	  a	  meaning	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  both	  sides’	  efforts	  is	  important,	  this	  is	  more	  like	  “collective”	  deterrence	  rather	  than	  “extended”	  deterrence.	  	  Japan’s	  effort	  to	  develop	  robust	  deterrence	  against	  gray-­‐zone	  security	  challenges	  and	  recent	  development	  in	  the	  Japan-­‐U.S.	  Alliance	  could	  be	  one	  of	  the	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cases	  to	  build	  gray-­‐zone	  deterrence	  structure.	  In	  Japan,	  creeping	  gray-­‐zone	  expansion	  has	  been	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  agenda	  in	  recent	  security	  and	  defense	  strategy.	  For	  example,,	  Japan’s	  2010	  NDPG	  for	  the	  first	  time	  referred	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  gray	  zone	  security	  situations.	  Given	  the	  strategic	  environment	  of	  that	  time,	  NDPG	  2010	  intended	  to	  enhance	  Japan’s	  deterrence	  posture	  against	  opportunistic	  creeping	  expansion	  by	  rolling	  out	  a	  concept	  of	  “dynamic	  deterrence,”	  which	  complements	  a	  traditional	  posture	  to	  deter	  high-­‐end	  conventional	  conflict.59	  In	  particular,	  through	  continuous	  steady-­‐state	  ISR,	  information	  gathering,	  military	  exercises	  and	  demonstration	  of	  operational	  effectiveness	  and	  readiness,	  dynamic	  deterrence	  seeks	  to	  sensitize	  a	  challenger	  that	  they	  are	  always	  watched	  over	  and	  there	  are	  no	  “windows	  of	  opportunity”	  for	  them	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  fait	  accompli	  or	  probing.	  Two	  years	  following	  NDPG	  2010,	  in	  September	  2012,	  after	  Japan	  purchased	  the	  Senkaku	  Islands,	  China	  began	  continuously	  dispatching	  government	  vessels	  to	  the	  vicinity	  of	  the	  islands.	  In	  a	  sense,	  “dynamic	  deterrence”	  as	  described	  in	  NDPG	  2010	  did	  not	  effectively	  work	  to	  deter	  China’s	  challenge	  to	  the	  status	  quo,	  because	  Japan	  did	  not	  show	  any	  physical	  window	  of	  opportunity	  at	  that	  time.	  Under	  such	  a	  security	  environment,	  Japan	  reviewed	  the	  NDPG	  again	  and	  released	  a	  new	  version	  of	  the	  NDPG	  in	  December	  2013.60	  As	  with	  its	  2010	  version,	  NDPG	  2013	  also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  About	  the	  concept	  of	  “dynamic	  deterrence,”	  see	  National	  Institute	  for	  Defense	  Studies,	  East	  Asian	  Strategic	  Review	  2011,	  (Tokyo:	  The	  Japan	  Times,	  2011),	  255-­‐257,	  (http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-­‐asian/pdf/2011/east-­‐asian_e2011_08.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  28,	  2015).	  60	  Government	  of	  Japan,	  The	  National	  Defense	  Program	  Guidelines,	  for	  FY	  2014	  and	  
Beyond	  (December	  17,	  2013),	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emphasized	  gray-­‐zone	  security	  challenges,	  stating	  “there	  are	  ongoing	  regional	  conflicts	  involving	  various	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  so-­‐called	  ‘gray-­‐zone’	  situations,	  that	  is,	  neither	  pure	  peacetime	  nor	  contingencies	  over	  territory,	  sovereignty	  and	  maritime	  economic	  interests,”	  and	  also	  expressed	  the	  concern	  as	  such	  gray-­‐zone	  security	  challenges	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region	  “tend	  to	  linger,	  raising	  concerns	  that	  they	  could	  develop	  into	  more	  serious	  contingencies.”	  As	  this	  language	  suggests,	  this	  NDPG	  recognizes	  that,	  compared	  to	  the	  time	  when	  the	  NDPG	  2010	  was	  formulated,	  the	  “gray-­‐ness”	  of	  gray	  zone	  is	  getting	  darker.	  Given	  this	  situation,	  NDPG	  2013	  redefined	  gray	  zone	  deterrence.	  In	  the	  security	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  NDPG	  2013	  was	  formulated,	  not	  only	  have	  darker	  gray-­‐zone	  situations	  already	  occurred,	  but	  also	  it	  is	  feared	  that	  these	  situations	  will	  linger	  or	  even	  escalate.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  control	  the	  risk	  of	  escalation	  when	  promoting	  effective	  deterrence	  and	  responding	  to	  such	  situations.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  NDPG	  2013	  states	  that	  “the	  SDF	  will	  conduct	  strategic	  training	  and	  exercises	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  swiftly	  build	  a	  response	  posture	  including	  advance	  deployment	  of	  units	  in	  response	  to	  the	  security	  environment	  and	  rapid	  deployment	  of	  adequate	  units.	  Thus	  Japan	  will	  demonstrate	  its	  will	  and	  highly	  developed	  capability	  to	  prevent	  further	  escalation.”61	  This	  language	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  sending	  a	  signal	  to	  the	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  28,	  2015).	  61	  Ibid.	  
	   70	  
party	  by	  swiftly	  conducting	  military	  operations,	  including	  exercises	  in	  response	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  situation,	  in	  other	  words,	  flexible	  deterrent	  option	  (FDO).	  	  
2. A2/AD	  Threats	  
What	  are	  A2/AD	  Challenges?	  A2/AD	  threats	  are	  a	  hot	  topic	  in	  the	  current	  strategic	  debate.	  Debate	  on	  “Air-­‐Sea	  Battle,”	  following	  QDR	  2010	  and	  the	  CSBA	  report	  about	  it,	  was	  significant.62	  The	  Joint	  Operational	  Access	  Concept,	  published	  by	  the	  Joint	  Staff,	  defines	  anti	  access	  (A2)	  as	  “actions	  and	  capabilities,	  usually	  long-­‐range,	  designed	  to	  prevent	  an	  opposing	  force	  from	  entering	  an	  operational	  area”	  and	  area	  denial	  as	  “actions	  and	  capabilities,	  usually	  of	  shorter	  range,	  designed	  not	  to	  keep	  an	  opposing	  force	  out,	  but	  to	  limit	  its	  freedom	  of	  action	  within	  the	  operational	  area.”63	  This	  paper	  uses	  these	  definitions	  as	  its	  working	  definition.	  	   Attention	  to	  A2/AD	  threats,	  however,	  existed	  before	  recent	  concerns	  over	  China’s	  military	  modernization.	  Rather,	  concern	  over	  the	  proliferation	  of	  such	  capabilities	  was	  revealed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	  QDR	  2001,	  which	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review	  Report,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  February	  2010),	  (http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  28,	  2015);	  Jan	  van	  Tol	  with	  Mark	  Gunzinger,	  Andrew	  Krepinevich,	  and	  Jim	  Thomas,	  AirSea	  Battle:	  A	  Point-­‐of-­‐Departure	  Operational	  Concept	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  and	  Budgetary	  Assessments,	  2010)	  	  (http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2010/05/2010.05.18-­‐AirSea-­‐Battle.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  28,	  2015);	  T.	  X.	  Hammes,	  “Offshore	  Control:	  A	  Proposed	  Strategy	  for	  an	  Unlikely	  Conflict,”	  Strategic	  Forum,	  No.	  278,	  (June	  2012).	  63	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  “Joint	  Operational	  Access	  Concept,	  ver	  1.0,”	  (17	  January,	  2012)	  (http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  28,	  2015).	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released	  on	  September	  30,	  2001,	  dedicated	  one	  chapter	  to	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  anti-­‐access	  threats,	  while	  most	  readers	  focused	  on	  how	  the	  Pentagon	  describes	  “war	  on	  terror.”	  In	  that	  chapter,	  “Creating	  the	  U.S.	  Military	  of	  the	  21st	  Century,”	  the	  document	  indicates	  concern	  over	  future	  U.S.	  power	  projection	  through	  saturation	  attacks	  with	  ballistic	  and	  cruise	  missiles;	  access	  denial	  by	  advanced	  air	  defense	  systems	  against	  non-­‐stealthy	  aircraft;	  threats	  against	  naval	  forces	  by	  anti-­‐ship	  cruise	  missiles,	  advanced	  diesel	  submarines,	  and	  advanced	  mines;	  and	  space	  denial	  capabilities	  such	  as	  ground	  based	  laser	  systems.64	  Although	  it	  did	  not	  discuss	  anti-­‐ship	  ballistic	  missiles	  (ASBMs),	  QDR	  2001’s	  concern	  over	  A2/AD	  threats	  was	  soon	  realized.	  	  More	  updated	  concern	  by	  the	  Pentagon	  about	  A2/AD	  threats	  can	  be	  found	  in	  its	  annual	  report	  on	  Chinese	  military	  modernization.	  The	  latest	  one,	  the	  2015	  version	  of	  that	  reports,	  specifically	  describes	  about	  China’s	  A2/AD	  capabilities:	  information	  operations,	  cyber	  operations,	  long	  range	  precision	  strike	  capability,	  ballistic	  missile	  defense,	  surface	  and	  underwater	  operation	  capability,	  space	  operation	  capability,	  and	  integrated	  air	  and	  missile	  defense	  capability.65	  	   Ironically,	  but	  not	  surprisingly,	  these	  Chinese	  capabilities	  have	  been	  developed	  to	  counter	  U.S.	  high-­‐tech	  conventional	  military	  capabilities.	  After	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review	  Report,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  September	  30,	  2001),	  31,	  (http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  28,	  2015).	  65	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress:	  Military	  and	  Security	  
Developments	  Involving	  the	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China	  2015	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Office	  of	  Security	  of	  Defense,	  2015),	  34-­‐37,	  (http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  28,	  2015).	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1991	  Gulf	  War,	  when	  the	  U.S.	  clearly	  demonstrated	  its	  dominant	  information	  based	  precision	  strike	  capability,	  and	  the	  1995-­‐96	  Taiwan	  Strait	  Crisis,	  when	  the	  U.S.	  sent	  two	  aircraft	  carriers	  through	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait	  to	  send	  a	  robust	  message	  to	  China	  not	  to	  intimidate	  Taiwan’s	  voters	  for	  its	  first	  presidential	  election,	  China	  established	  “local	  war	  under	  high-­‐tech	  condition”	  as	  a	  key	  strategic	  concept	  and	  kicked	  off	  huge	  research	  and	  development	  programs,	  to	  develop	  “counter	  intervention”	  capability	  against	  potential	  U.S.	  military	  intervention	  in	  case	  of	  Taiwan	  Strait	  contingency.66	  	   To	  be	  sure,	  anti-­‐access	  is	  not	  a	  new	  concept	  in	  any	  means.	  In	  the	  history	  of	  war,	  the	  weaker	  side	  usually	  seeks	  to	  block	  the	  entry	  of	  significant	  of	  adversary	  force	  to	  the	  main	  battlefield,	  since	  the	  Peloponnesian	  War.67	  The	  current	  version	  of	  anti-­‐access	  includes	  non-­‐traditional	  strategic	  domain	  such	  as	  cyber	  and	  space.	  Capabilities	  in	  these	  two	  domains	  also	  can	  affect	  force-­‐entry	  operation.	  	  
Challenge	  to	  Extended	  Deterrence	  The	  1991	  Gulf	  War	  dramatically	  demonstrated	  its	  tremendous	  effects	  of	  U.S.	  global	  power	  projection	  with	  advanced	  precision	  strike	  capabilities.	  Countering	  this	  U.S.	  military	  power,	  the	  security	  experts	  in	  the	  world	  have	  witnessed	  two	  asymmetrical	  responses:	  terrorism/insurgency	  like	  9/11,	  Iraq,	  and	  Afghanistan;	  and	  the	  development	  of	  A2/AD	  capabilities.	  China’s	  development	  of	  advanced	  A2/AD	  capabilities	  is	  one	  such	  reaction	  to	  counter	  U.S.	  “full	  spectrum	  dominance,”	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  See	  Tai	  Ming	  Cheng,	  Forging	  China’s	  Military	  Might:	  A	  New	  Framework	  for	  
Assessing	  Innovation	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  2014).	  67	  Sam	  J.	  Tangredi,	  Anti-­‐Access	  Warfare:	  Countering	  A2/AD	  Strategies,	  (Annapolis:	  Navy	  Institute	  Press,	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the	  Pentagon	  sought	  in	  the	  1990s.68	  In	  this	  sense,	  development	  of	  A2/AD	  is	  a	  natural	  reaction	  to	  challenge	  the	  U.S.	  deterrent.	  Specifically,	  in	  the	  contemporary	  context	  of	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  security,	  two	  challenges	  have	  emerged,	  or	  will	  emerge,	  because	  of	  China’s	  development	  of	  A2/AD	  capabilities.	  	   The	  first	  challenge	  comes	  from	  its	  implication	  for	  creeping	  gray-­‐zone	  expansion.	  First	  of	  all,	  combining	  creeping	  gray-­‐zone	  expansion	  with	  the	  development	  of	  A2/AD	  capability,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies	  would	  face	  a	  competing	  demand.	  One	  logical	  reaction	  to	  the	  A2/AD	  threat	  is	  to	  disperse	  forward-­‐deployed	  forces	  to	  multiply	  the	  number	  of	  targets	  facing	  challengers	  with	  A2/AD	  capabilities	  in	  order	  to	  make	  their	  operational	  planning	  more	  complicated	  and	  avoid	  “putting	  all	  eggs	  on	  one	  basket.”	  And	  some	  discussions	  suggest	  that	  a	  light	  forward	  presence	  combined	  with	  standoff	  strike	  from	  outside	  of	  A2/AD	  range	  would	  be	  a	  better	  operational	  concept.69	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  one	  of	  logical	  reactions	  to	  creeping	  expansion	  in	  the	  gray	  zone	  is	  to	  maintain	  significant	  forward	  presence,	  rather	  than	  light	  presence,	  because	  the	  lack	  of	  significant	  forward	  presence	  would	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  creeping	  expansion	  to	  gradually	  change	  the	  status	  quo.	  Through	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  of	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  Staff,	  Joint	  Vision	  2010,	  (Washington,	  D.C.,	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  1996),	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  (accessed	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  Robert	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such	  competing	  demands,	  combination	  of	  A2/AD	  threats	  with	  gray	  zone	  security	  challenge	  complicates	  alliance	  responses	  to	  enhance	  deterrence	  in	  gray	  zone.	  	  The	  second	  challenge	  comes	  from	  A2/AD’s	  implications	  for	  regional	  crisis	  stability.	  If	  all	  related	  parties	  have	  no	  first	  strike	  advantage,	  or	  if	  all	  parties	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  other	  party’s	  invulnerable	  second	  strike	  capability,	  crisis	  stability	  can	  be	  maintained,	  because	  first	  strike	  would	  not	  bring	  about	  any	  kind	  of	  advantage	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  tense	  crisis.	  In	  this	  vein,	  a	  situation	  of	  vulnerability	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  elements	  of	  crisis	  stability.	  	  By	  developing	  A2/AD	  capabilities,	  the	  PLA	  acquired	  significant	  strike	  capabilities	  against	  regional	  countries	  through	  ballistic	  and	  cruise	  missiles	  and	  bombers.	  By	  contrast,	  regional	  countries,	  including	  Japan,	  do	  not	  have	  such	  capabilities	  for	  counter-­‐strike,	  except	  for	  Taiwan’s	  small	  missile	  forces.	  In	  addition,	  most	  regional	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  are	  island	  nations	  that	  lack	  strategic	  depth,	  whereas	  China	  enjoys	  continental	  strategic	  depth.	  In	  short,	  there	  exists	  a	  lop-­‐sided	  vulnerability	  between	  China	  and	  regional	  countries.	  In	  this	  sense,	  U.S.	  air	  and	  maritime	  strike	  capabilities	  are	  indispensable	  to	  offset	  such	  an	  asymmetric	  level	  of	  vulnerability.	  Facing	  highly	  advanced	  U.S.	  strike	  capabilities,	  even	  China	  cannot	  be	  invulnerable.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  such	  asymmetric	  vulnerability,	  U.S.	  strike	  forces	  are	  essential	  to	  regional	  crisis	  stability.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  nuclear	  component	  of	  extended	  deterrence	  should	  also	  to	  be	  considered.	  If	  China’s	  advanced	  A2/AD	  capabilities	  hold	  U.S.	  ground-­‐based	  tactical	  aircraft,	  aircraft	  carriers,	  and	  sea-­‐based	  tactical	  strike	  capabilities	  at	  risk,	  and	  if	  China	  succeeds	  in	  neutralizing	  these	  capabilities,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  lose	  a	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significant	  part	  of	  its	  strike	  forces	  and	  would	  be	  left	  with	  relying	  upon	  its	  underwater	  and	  strategic	  nuclear	  capability.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  the	  U.S.	  strategic	  nuclear	  force	  maintains	  a	  robust	  second-­‐strike	  capability,	  which	  both	  forms	  the	  ultimate	  foundation	  of	  deterrence	  and	  augments	  regional	  deterrence.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  China	  is	  making	  efforts	  to	  modernize	  its	  nuclear	  force,	  in	  addition	  to	  its	  conventional	  A2/AD	  capabilities.	  While	  the	  centerpiece	  of	  China’s	  current	  strategic	  nuclear	  modernization	  is	  the	  road-­‐mobile	  DF-­‐31	  ICBM,	  China	  is	  also	  deploying	  SSBNs	  armed	  with	  nuclear	  SLBMs	  to	  form	  the	  maritime	  leg	  of	  its	  nuclear	  force.	  Since	  China’s	  road	  mobile	  ICBM	  force	  gives	  it	  an	  invulnerable	  second-­‐strike	  capability,	  the	  SLBM/SSBN	  deployment	  is	  not	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  a	  game	  changer.	  	  It	  does,	  however,	  enhance	  China’s	  second	  strike	  capability.	  	  Given	  the	  modernization	  of	  China’s	  nuclear	  force,	  the	  U.S.-­‐China	  nuclear	  deterrent	  relationship	  is	  an	  important	  issue	  for	  regional	  security.	  More	  specifically,	  	  U.S.	  Government	  acceptance	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  condition	  of	  mutual	  vulnerability	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  could	  cause	  deterioration	  in	  the	  regional	  security	  environment	  through	  the	  “stability	  -­‐	  instability	  -­‐	  paradox.”	  The	  “stability-­‐instability-­‐paradox”	  describes	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  mutual	  deterrence	  at	  the	  strategic	  level	  causes	  challenger’s	  aggressive	  behavior	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  because	  that	  challenger	  perceives	  that	  the	  counterpart	  would	  refrain	  from	  responding	  to	  avoid	  escalation.	  In	  the	  current	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region,	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  U.S.	  explicitly	  accepts	  mutual	  vulnerability	  with	  China,	  combined	  with	  China’s	  A2/AD	  capability	  and	  asymmetrical	  vulnerability,	  China	  may	  take	  even	  bolder	  moves	  with	  the	  risk	  of	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escalation	  from	  gray	  zone	  to	  conventional	  conflict,	  based	  on	  overconfidence	  in	  their	  deterrent	  against	  a	  U.S.	  response.	  To	  avoid	  such	  a	  situation,	  even	  given	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  PLA’s	  second	  strike	  capability,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  maintain	  its	  current	  “neither	  confirms	  nor	  denies”	  position	  about	  mutual	  vulnerability,	  which,	  should	  be	  continued.	  Under	  such	  strategic	  environment,	  deterrence	  need	  to	  be	  maintained	  in	  an	  integrated	  way	  of	  all	  potential	  components	  of	  the	  deterrent,	  including	  tactical	  strike	  capabilities,	  efforts	  for	  base	  resiliency	  of	  forward	  deployed	  tactical	  strike	  forces,	  missile	  defense	  capability,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  nuclear	  component	  of	  extended	  deterrence.	  The	  third	  challenge	  that	  arises	  from	  China’s	  A2/AD	  capability	  arises	  from	  its	  implication	  for	  alliance	  management.	  China’s	  development	  of	  A2/AD	  capabilities	  raises	  the	  potential	  cost	  and	  risk	  to	  the	  U.S.	  of	  intervening	  in	  regional	  conflicts.	  Regardless	  of	  how	  the	  U.S.	  government	  actually	  makes	  decisions	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  contingency	  under	  A2/AD	  threat,	  this	  situation	  would	  affect	  China	  and	  regional	  countries’	  views	  of	  U.S.	  strategic	  calculations.	  	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  regional	  states	  would	  perceive	  the	  United	  States	  as	  being	  more	  cautious	  than	  had	  been	  the	  case	  prior	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  A2/AD	  threat.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  “shadow”	  of	  the	  A2/AD	  threat	  could	  influence	  patterns	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  China	  and	  other	  regional	  countries	  on	  U.S.-­‐related	  security	  issues.	  For	  example,	  a	  challenger	  that	  possess	  more	  advanced	  anti-­‐access	  capability	  could	  perceive	  a	  fait	  accompli-­‐like	  challenge	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  prospect	  for	  success	  than	  had	  previously	  been	  the	  case	  because	  his	  anti-­‐access	  capability	  would	  make	  the	  response	  more	  costly.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  deterrer’s	  actual	  strategic	  calculation	  of	  the	  response,	  if	  a	  challenger	  perceives	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that	  it	  can	  deter	  the	  deterrer’s	  reaction	  to	  a	  fait	  accompli	  through	  A2/AD	  capabilities,	  deterrence	  will	  less	  likely	  to	  succeed.	  	  
How	  Should	  Extended	  Deterrence	  Adapt	  to	  the	  Challenge?	  There	  are	  no	  easy	  solutions	  to	  these	  challenges.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  is	  to	  enhance	  the	  resiliency	  of	  theater-­‐based	  military	  presence.	  Although	  this	  is	  not	  so	  easy,	  enhancing	  the	  resiliency	  of	  forward	  deployed	  military	  force	  could	  mitigate	  competing	  demands	  to	  respond	  to	  creeping	  gray	  zone	  expansion	  and	  to	  counter	  A2/AD	  threats.	  If	  forward	  deployment	  forces	  retain	  their	  resiliency	  in	  the	  face	  of	  A2/AD	  threats,	  a	  source	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  these	  forces,	  geographical	  proximity,	  can	  be	  turned	  into	  a	  strength,	  through	  being	  an	  effective	  staging	  point	  to	  neutralize	  A2/AD	  threats.	  With	  resiliency,	  forces	  deployed	  in	  these	  bases	  would	  not	  be	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  access.	  In	  other	  words,	  “resilient”	  and	  “forward”	  stationed	  bases	  should	  be	  a	  key	  element	  to	  counter	  A2/AD	  threats.	  In	  addition,	  a	  “resilient”	  forward	  deployed	  force	  improves	  crisis	  stability	  by	  eliminating	  an	  adversary's	  first	  strike	  advantage.	  The	  actual	  challenge	  is	  how	  to	  realize	  resiliency.	  For	  tactical	  air	  assets,	  fighter-­‐based	  air	  defense,	  active	  defense	  such	  as	  missile	  defense,	  passive	  defense	  such	  as	  the	  physical	  hardening	  of	  facilities,	  and	  tactical	  dispersion	  among	  multiple	  in-­‐theater	  bases	  are	  all	  potential	  measures	  for	  enhancing	  resiliency.	  In	  the	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  alliance,	  closer	  cooperation	  on	  missile	  defense,	  synchronized	  operations	  between	  JSDF	  air	  defense	  and	  U.S.	  strike	  operations,	  and	  shared	  use	  of	  air	  bases	  by	  both	  countries’	  fighter	  units	  are	  measures	  to	  enhance	  extended	  deterrence	  in	  the	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alliance.	  For	  maritime	  assets	  including	  aircraft	  carrier	  and	  amphibious	  forces,	  anti-­‐ship	  ballistic	  and	  cruise	  missile	  and	  submarines	  poses	  grave	  risks.	  Air	  cover	  from	  resilient	  in-­‐theater	  fighter	  and	  anti-­‐submarine	  warfare	  (ASW)	  aircraft	  can	  reduce	  these	  vulnerabilities,	  while	  other	  countermeasures	  such	  as	  a	  blinding	  campaign	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  deal	  with	  ASBM.70	  Without	  a	  resilient	  ground	  base	  structure,	  both	  defensive	  counter-­‐air	  and	  ASW	  are	  difficult	  to	  effectively	  conduct.	  In	  this	  way,	  resiliency	  in	  the	  air	  and	  maritime	  domains	  are	  closely	  linked.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  enhancing	  resiliency	  is	  no	  easy	  thing.	  The	  U.S.	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  fulfill	  its	  treaty	  obligation	  to	  defend	  regional	  allies	  even	  without	  perfect	  (or	  near	  perfect)	  resiliency	  against	  A2/AD	  threats.	  However,	  military	  operations	  to	  fulfill	  treaty	  obligations	  would	  be	  riskier	  than	  in	  the	  past.	  	  .	  This	  situation	  makes	  a	  “zero-­‐casualty”	  mindset	  outdated	  and	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  end	  of	  the	  “post-­‐heroic	  war”	  era.	  Alliances	  in	  the	  contemporary	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region	  need	  to	  be	  managed	  based	  on	  the	  recognition	  of	  such	  a	  reality.	  For	  the	  U.S.,	  extra	  efforts	  are	  needed	  to	  assure	  regional	  allies,	  such	  as	  retaining	  forward-­‐based	  forces	  even	  without	  sufficient	  resiliency,	  and	  regional	  allies	  need	  to	  upgrade	  the	  value	  of	  the	  alliance	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Such	  efforts	  were	  made	  in	  NATO	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  In	  this	  sense,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  new	  challenge	  in	  international	  security,	  but	  rather	  a	  renewed	  challenge	  to	  alliance	  management	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Sugio	  Takahashi,	  “Counter	  A2/AD	  in	  Japan-­‐U.S.	  Defense	  Cooperation:	  Toward	  ‘Allied	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle,”	  Futuregram,	  12-­‐003,	  (Project	  2049,	  April	  18,	  2012),	  (https://project2049.net/documents/counter_a2ad_defense_cooperation_takahashi.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  28,	  2015).	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3. North	  Korea’s	  Ballistic	  Missile	  and	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  
Situation	  regarding	  North	  Korea’s	  Ballistic	  Missile	  and	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  In	  terms	  of	  ballistic	  missile	  proliferation,	  Northeast	  Asia	  is	  a	  region	  rich	  of	  great	  concern.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  PLA’s	  rapidly	  modernizing	  conventional	  and	  nuclear	  missile	  force,	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  and	  ballistic	  missile	  development	  is	  a	  source	  of	  even	  greater	  concern	  for	  stability	  in	  the	  region.	  North	  Korea	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  developing	  and	  deploying	  several	  types	  of	  ballistic	  missile:	  the	  Toksa	  solid	  fuel	  short	  range	  ballistic	  missile	  with	  120km	  range;	  Scud	  variant	  ballistic	  missiles	  (Scud-­‐B	  with	  300	  km	  range,	  Scud-­‐C	  with	  500	  km	  range,	  and	  Scud	  Extended	  Range	  with	  1000	  km	  range);	  the	  No-­‐Dong	  with	  a	  1300km	  range;	  the	  Taepo-­‐Dong	  1	  with	  a	  1500	  km	  range;	  the	  Musudan,	  which	  is	  suspected	  to	  be	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  SS-­‐N-­‐6	  submarine	  launched	  ballistic	  missile	  (SLBM)	  of	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union,	  possibly	  with	  a	  range	  of	  2500-­‐4000	  km;	  the	  Taepo-­‐Dong	  2	  with	  a	  6000	  km	  range;	  the	  KN08	  demonstrated	  at	  the	  military	  parade	  in	  2012	  and	  2013	  and	  estimated	  to	  be	  an	  ICBM;	  and	  potentially	  SLBM	  about	  which	  there	  is	  little	  information.	  Among	  these,	  North	  Korea	  is	  estimated	  to	  have	  deployed	  several	  hundred	  of	  the	  Scud	  variants	  and	  No	  Dong.	  The	  Taepo-­‐Dong	  2,	  which	  can	  reach	  to	  the	  United	  States	  mainland,	  is	  still	  under	  development.	  	  The	  Taepo-­‐Dong	  1	  may	  be	  developed	  as	  an	  interim	  experiment	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missile	  in	  development	  process	  of	  Taepo-­‐Dong	  2.	  	  Most	  of	  these	  systems	  are	  road-­‐mobile.71	  	  In	  parallel	  with	  its	  missile	  development,	  North	  Korea	  is	  also	  developing	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  It	  conducted	  nuclear	  tests	  in	  October	  2006,	  May	  2009,	  February	  2013,	  and	  January	  2016.	  According	  to	  Japan’s	  Defense	  White	  Paper’s	  estimate,	  “the	  possibility	  that	  North	  Korea	  has	  achieved	  the	  miniaturization	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  has	  acquired	  nuclear	  warheads	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out.”72	  Under	  such	  a	  situation,	  from	  the	  worst	  case	  thinking	  perspective,	  defense	  planner	  needs	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  situation	  that	  North	  Korea	  has	  deployed	  or	  going	  to	  deploy	  nuclear	  tipped	  ballistic	  missiles.	  
	  
Challenge	  to	  Extended	  Deterrence	  Combined	  with	  P’yongyang’s	  nuclear	  development	  program,	  North	  Korea’s	  missile	  forces	  create	  serious	  security	  concerns	  in	  the	  region.	  However,	  North	  Korean	  thinking	  about	  nuclear	  strategy	  is	  unclear.	  More	  precisely,	  it	  is	  actually	  unclear	  whether	  North	  Korea	  even	  has	  a	  “nuclear”	  strategy.	  	  Looking	  at	  North	  Korea’s	  behavior	  in	  this	  decade,	  however,	  the	  development	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  itself	  looks	  like	  a	  part	  of	  a	  campaign	  of	  provocation.	  One	  possible	  observation	  is	  that	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  actually	  a	  part	  of	  their	  “provocation,”	  rather	  than	  the	  instrument	  of	  a	  distinct	  nuclear	  deterrence	  strategy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  Defense	  of	  Japan	  2015	  (Tokyo:	  Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  2015),	  20-­‐25.	  (http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_1-­‐1-­‐2_web.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  29,	  2015).	  72	  Ibid.,19.	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In	  other	  words,	  they	  may	  believe	  that	  the	  full	  range	  of	  military	  force	  can	  be	  used	  for	  provocation	  rather	  than	  formulating	  a	  separate	  military	  strategy	  for	  the	  nuclear	  component.	  If	  North	  Korea’s	  leadership	  has	  thoughts	  about	  nuclear	  strategy,	  whether	  it	  sees	  nuclear	  weapons	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  deterrence	  or	  war-­‐fighting	  is	  an	  important	  question.	  Considering	  the	  huge	  gap	  in	  conventional	  military	  force	  between	  North	  Korea	  and	  the	  U.S.-­‐ROK	  alliance,	  the	  early	  employment	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  military	  conflict	  would	  logical,	  just	  as	  it	  was	  for	  NATO	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  This	  question	  could	  be	  an	  important	  caveat	  when	  thinking	  about	  tailored	  deterrence	  and	  extended	  deterrence	  against	  North	  Korea.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  even	  if	  North	  Korea	  crosses	  the	  threshold	  of	  using	  nuclear	  weapons,	  the	  size	  of	  its	  nuclear	  arsenal	  will	  be	  limited.	  With	  such	  limited	  size,	  the	  only	  potential	  form	  of	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  strategy	  would	  be	  “minimum-­‐deterrence,”	  something	  like	  existential	  deterrence,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  the	  psychological	  effects	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  on	  the	  others’	  mind	  and	  which	  seeks	  to	  restrict	  their	  range	  of	  behaviors,	  rather	  than	  a	  strategy	  based	  upon	  the	  actual	  physical	  effects	  and	  military	  utility	  of	  nuclear	  weapon.	  	  In	  conventional	  approaches	  to	  deterrence	  warhead	  yield,	  missile	  accuracy,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  nuclear-­‐tipped	  missiles,	  are	  important	  variables	  to	  assess	  the	  credibility	  of	  deterrence,	  because	  these	  variables	  determine	  the	  kinetic	  effects	  of	  nuclear	  forces.	  However,	  considering	  the	  technological	  unreliability	  of	  North	  Korea’s	  ballistic	  missiles	  and	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  potential	  nuclear	  warheads	  that	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P’yongyang	  will	  have	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  strategy	  may	  not	  be	  based	  on	  conventional	  concepts	  of	  nuclear	  deterrence.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  strategy	  and	  the	  physical	  characteristics	  of	  its	  nuclear	  force,	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  tipped	  theater	  ballistic	  missiles	  can	  be	  a	  geostrategic	  game	  changer	  in	  Northeast	  Asia.	  Since	  the	  1950	  Korean	  War,	  Northeast	  Asia	  had	  actually	  consisted	  of	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  theaters:	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  and	  Japan.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  battlefield	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  and	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  United	  Nation	  Command	  operated	  from	  Japan	  to	  support	  the	  battlefield	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula.	  In	  other	  words,	  at	  that	  time	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  was	  a	  battlefield	  theater	  and	  Japan	  was	  a	  safe	  staging	  theater.	  Under	  such	  a	  geostrategic	  situation,	  the	  U.S.	  concluded	  two	  separate	  alliances	  with	  Japan	  and	  Republic	  of	  Korea.	  This	  basic	  geostrategic	  format	  endured	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  when	  the	  first	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  crisis	  happened	  and	  Japan	  and	  the	  U.S.	  revised	  their	  Defense	  Guidelines	  in	  1997.	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  tipped	  theater	  ballistic	  missiles	  fundamentally	  transformed	  this	  geostrategic	  setting.	  Before	  acquiring	  theater	  ballistic	  missiles,	  North	  Korea	  had	  no	  means	  to	  attack	  Japan	  except	  sabotage	  by	  special	  operation	  forces.	  But	  with	  the	  deployment	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  ballistic	  missiles,	  North	  Korea	  can	  use	  nuclear	  blackmail	  to	  intimidate	  Japan	  not	  to	  support	  U.S.	  operations	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula.	  P’yongyang	  could	  also	  strikes	  by	  ballistic	  missiles	  with	  nuclear	  warheads	  to	  physically	  disrupt	  U.S.	  operation	  and	  force	  flow.	  In	  short,	  Japan	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  safe	  staging	  theater.	  Now	  this	  theater	  can	  also	  be	  a	  battlefield.	  In	  this	  way,	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  tipped	  ballistic	  missiles	  “integrate”	  two	  formerly	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separated	  theaters	  and	  change	  geostrategic	  dynamics.	  In	  other	  words,	  Japan	  loses	  its	  “sanctuary”	  status	  from	  North	  Korea’s	  military	  attack	  and	  in	  case	  of	  military	  conflict	  in	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  Japan	  now	  needs	  to	  take	  more	  serious	  risk	  to	  support	  the	  U.S.	  If	  Japan	  is	  intimidated	  by	  North	  Korea	  and	  decided	  not	  to	  provide	  any	  support	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  North	  Korea	  can	  drastically	  improve	  its	  military	  situation	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula.	  Considering	  such	  a	  huge	  strategic	  benefit	  for	  North	  Korea,	  nuclear	  blackmail	  and	  actual	  strike	  against	  Japan	  should	  be	  a	  situation	  to	  be	  prepared	  for.	  For	  Japan,	  more	  robust	  assurances	  and	  deterrence	  are	  absolutely	  required	  for	  Tokyo	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  to	  support	  the	  U.S.	  under	  such	  serious	  threat	  from	  North	  Korea.	  In	  short,	  this	  is	  a	  challenge	  to	  extended	  deterrence	  from	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  tipped	  ballistic	  missiles.	  
	  
How	  Should	  Extended	  Deterrence	  Adapt	  to	  the	  Challenge?	  In	  Northeast	  Asia,	  the	  U.S.	  provides	  nuclear	  guarantee	  for	  both	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea.	  This	  guarantee	  of	  strategic	  deterrence	  is	  a	  critical	  component	  of	  the	  regional	  security	  architecture,	  while	  North	  Korea	  continuously	  challenges	  its	  stability.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  however,	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  tipped	  ballistic	  missile	  worked	  as	  a	  geostrategic	  game	  changer.	  It	  has	  strategically	  integrated	  two	  separately	  handled	  sub-­‐theaters	  so	  far	  into	  one	  theater.	  This	  means	  that	  Japan	  is	  now	  exposed	  to	  a	  much	  graver	  risk	  than	  before.	  Therefore,	  now	  is	  the	  time	  to	  strengthen	  the	  coordination	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  and	  U.S.-­‐South	  Korea	  alliances,	  which	  were	  established	  and	  developed	  separately.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  recent	  development	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of	  trilateral	  Japan-­‐U.S.-­‐South	  Korea	  defense	  cooperation	  is	  one	  application	  of	  extended	  deterrence	  to	  the	  new	  geostrategic	  environment.73	  One	  important	  aspect	  of	  this	  “game	  change”	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  come	  from	  North	  Korea’s	  improvement	  of	  its	  strike	  capability	  against	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  augmenting	  assurance	  to	  Japan	  does	  not	  comes	  from	  a	  questioning	  of	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  U.S.	  to	  fulfill	  its	  treaty	  obligation.	  Even	  after	  the	  development	  of	  a	  nuclear	  tipped	  ICBM	  that	  can	  reach	  the	  U.S.,	  regional	  allies	  should	  continue	  to	  have	  a	  legitimate	  belief	  that	  they	  can	  rely	  on	  U.S.	  deterrence.	  Were	  the	  U.S.	  to	  be	  “deterred”	  by	  North	  Korea,	  it	  would	  “prove”	  that	  a	  handful	  of	  nuclear	  weapon	  would	  be	  enough	  to	  deter	  the	  U.S.	  	  This,	  in	  turn,	  would	  undermine	  nuclear	  nonproliferation	  because	  North	  Korea	  would	  “prove”	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  deter	  the	  U.S.	  	  Such	  kind	  of	  post-­‐event	  implication	  would	  raise	  skeptical	  assessment	  among	  other	  U.S.	  allies	  to	  the	  will	  of	  the	  U.S.	  to	  fulfill	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  extended	  deterrence	  for	  them.	  This	  is	  an	  unaffordable	  cost	  for	  U.S.	  global	  security	  commitment.	  Therefore,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  U.S.	  intends	  to	  be	  a	  leader	  of	  international	  security	  affairs,	  regional	  allies	  can	  continue	  to	  expect	  the	  U.S.	  will	  continue	  to	  maintain	  current	  robust	  deterrence	  posture	  against	  North	  Korea.	  	  	   In	  short,	  to	  think	  about	  a	  question	  how	  extended	  deterrence	  for	  the	  Japan-­‐U.S.	  alliance	  should	  adapt,	  how	  to	  reinforce	  assurance	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  About	  recent	  development	  of	  Japan-­‐U.S.-­‐South	  Korea	  trilateral	  defense	  cooperation,	  see	  “United	  States,	  Republic	  of	  Korea,	  Japan	  Defense	  Trilateral	  Talks	  Joint	  Statement”	  (April	  17,	  2015)	  (http://www.defense.gov/News/News-­‐Releases/News-­‐Release-­‐View/Article/605465)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  28,	  2015);	  “U.S.-­‐ROK-­‐Japan	  Defense	  Ministers	  Meeting	  Joint	  Press	  Statement,”	  (May	  30,	  2015),	  (http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/US-­‐ROK-­‐Japan-­‐Defense-­‐Ministers-­‐Meeting-­‐Joint-­‐Press-­‐Statement.pdf)	  (accessed	  on	  November	  29,	  2015).	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certainly	  fulfill	  treaty	  obligation	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  right	  answer.	  The	  real	  answer	  should	  be	  how	  to	  minimize	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  attacked	  by	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  one	  of	  the	  measures	  is	  BMD,	  which	  Japan	  and	  the	  U.S.	  have	  developed	  cooperatively	  since	  1998.	  And	  now,	  although	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan	  have	  already	  deployed	  a	  ballistic	  missile	  defense	  system,	  it	  cannot	  guarantee	  protection	  against	  incoming	  missiles.	  Even	  if	  it	  succeeds	  in	  intercepting	  nearly	  100	  percent	  of	  incoming	  weapons,	  only	  one	  leakage	  of	  nuclear	  warhead	  will	  inflict	  tragic	  damage.	  From	  that	  perspective,	  to	  minimize	  risk	  of	  nuclear	  strike,	  combining	  full	  range	  of	  U.S.	  military	  capability	  would	  be	  definitely	  necessary.	  In	  short,	  developing	  the	  coordination	  of	  two	  bilateral	  alliances	  and	  combining	  every	  asset	  to	  work	  to	  neutralize	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  blackmail	  and/or	  actual	  nuclear	  strikes	  are	  a	  key	  component	  to	  adapt	  extended	  deterrence	  to	  the	  new	  geostrategic	  environment.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  In	  the	  contemporary	  world,	  there	  is	  no	  scarcity	  of	  security	  challenges	  in	  any	  part	  of	  the	  world.	  Compared	  to	  other	  regions,	  the	  unique	  character	  of	  security	  challenges	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  comes	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  mainly	  come	  from	  state	  actors,	  whereas	  the	  influence	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  have	  emerged	  more	  evidently	  in	  other	  regions.	  In	  some	  senses,	  this	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  revival	  of	  the	  security	  challenges	  that	  existed	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  era.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  have	  also	  been	  “renewed”	  under	  21st	  century	  international	  relations.	  Regarding	  creeping	  gray	  zone	  expansion,	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  parties	  employ	  paramilitary	  rather	  than	  military	  means	  is	  to	  avoid	  being	  accused	  of	  “military	  escalation.”	  if	  one	  party	  deploys	  a	  naval	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vessel	  before	  the	  other,	  the	  global	  media	  would	  argue	  that	  that	  party	  had	  escalated	  the	  situation	  and	  it	  would	  be	  in	  a	  difficult	  position	  to	  handle	  following	  situation.	  Such	  influence	  by	  global	  media	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  era.	  	  Regarding	  the	  A2/AD	  threat,	  the	  risk	  of	  retaining	  forward	  deployed	  forces	  is	  going	  to	  increase	  compared	  to	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  era,	  the	  U.S.	  maintained	  huge	  forward	  deployment	  forces	  under	  the	  range	  of	  Soviet	  tactical	  and	  theater	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  both	  Europe	  and	  Asia	  and	  had	  a	  contingency	  plan	  to	  send	  aircraft	  carrier	  battle	  groups	  even	  under	  the	  threat	  of	  nuclear	  tipped	  anti-­‐ship	  cruise	  missiles.	  Compared	  to	  the	  risk	  posed	  by	  these	  nuclear	  A2/AD	  capabilities,	  the	  current	  risk	  to	  forward	  deployed	  forces	  from	  China’s	  conventional	  A2/AD	  capabilities	  is	  less	  grave	  by	  any	  definition.	  After	  two	  decades’	  experiences	  of	  “zero-­‐casualty”	  conventional	  war	  (this	  “conventional”	  means	  that	  it	  does	  not	  include	  counter-­‐insurgency),	  however,	  preparing	  for	  bloody	  war,	  which	  was	  prepared	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  era,	  is	  no	  easy	  job.	  The	  geostrategic	  effects	  of	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  tipped	  theater	  ballistic	  missiles	  cannot	  be	  underestimated.	  Rather,	  such	  missiles	  fundamentally	  are	  transforming	  regional	  geostrategic	  dynamics.	  The	  regional	  alliance	  structure,	  however,	  was	  formed	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  era	  and	  started	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  geostrategic	  reality	  only	  very	  recently.	  Considering	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  North	  Korea,	  the	  renewal	  of	  extended	  deterrence	  should	  proceed	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  From	  gray	  zone	  to	  nuclear	  strike,	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region	  has	  the	  full-­‐range	  of	  state	  made	  security	  challenges.	  Tectonic	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  power	  structure	  triggered	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  China	  and	  nuclear	  proliferation	  by	  North	  Korea	  amplify	  the	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magnitude	  of	  these	  challenges.	  Responding	  to	  these	  challenges,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  credibility	  of	  U.S.	  extended	  deterrence,	  both	  assurance	  and	  deterrence	  need	  to	  be	  enhanced.	  With	  the	  mounting	  severity	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  security	  environment,	  more	  efforts	  must	  be	  made	  to	  “think	  about	  the	  unthinkable”	  to	  prepare	  for	  actual	  contingencies	  and	  accumulate	  specific	  capabilities	  for	  deterring	  these	  contingencies.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  while	  these	  efforts	  are	  to	  reduce	  risk	  for	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  regional	  allies,	  these	  are	  highly	  difficult	  work	  and	  nobody	  should	  be	  optimistic	  for	  deterrence	  success,	  considering	  complexity	  of	  the	  challenges.	  Si	  vis	  pacem,	  para	  bellum,	  is	  now	  very	  true	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  is	  a	  geostrategic	  reality.	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Chapter 4 
American Views of Extended Deterrence 
 	  	   There	  has	  been	  a	  bipartisan	  consensus	  in	  U.S.	  defense	  circles	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  that	  Asia’s	  global	  strategic	  weight	  is	  growing.	  	  Although	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  announcement	  of	  a	  “pivot”	  or	  “rebalance”	  to	  the	  Pacific	  has	  justifiably	  received	  considerable	  attention,	  recognition	  of	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	  Asia	  and	  calls	  for	  a	  growth	  in	  U.S.	  presence	  in	  the	  region	  have	  much	  deeper	  roots.	  	  The	  two	  East	  Asian	  security	  reports	  produced	  by	  the	  George	  H.W.	  Bush	  administration	  in	  1990	  and	  1992	  foretold	  the	  rise	  of	  Asia,	  whereas	  the	  1995	  and	  1998	  Clinton	  administration	  reports	  even	  more	  clearly	  pointed	  to	  a	  rising	  Asia’s	  importance	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Subsequent	  strategy	  documents	  reiterated	  this	  importance,	  including	  the	  2001	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review,	  2005	  National	  Defense	  
Strategy,	  the	  2006	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review,	  2008	  National	  Defense	  Strategy,	  the	  2010	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review,	  and	  the	  2012	  Defense	  Strategic	  Guidelines.74	  	   These	  policy	  pronouncements	  are	  testimony	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  favorable	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  Asia	  is	  key	  to	  protecting	  vital	  American	  interests.	  Although	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review	  Report	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  September	  30,	  2001),	  at	  http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.	  	  The	  report	  noted,	  “In	  particular,	  Asia	  is	  gradually	  emerging	  as	  a	  region	  susceptible	  to	  large-­‐scale	  military	  competition,”	  (4).	  	  See	  also	  National	  Defense	  Strategy	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  of	  America	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  2005);	  Quadrennial	  
Defense	  Review	  Report	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  February	  6,	  2006);	  National	  Defense	  Strategy	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  June	  2008);	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review	  Report	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  February	  2010);	  Sustaining	  U.S.	  Global	  Leadership:	  Priorities	  for	  21st	  Century	  
Defense	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  January	  2012).	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administrations	  may	  use	  very	  different	  words	  to	  convey	  U.S.	  objectives	  in	  Asia,	  the	  historical	  record	  of	  U.S.	  behavior	  demonstrates	  remarkable	  continuity.	  	  	   Today	  as	  in	  the	  past,	  U.S.	  strategy	  in	  the	  region	  rests	  on	  an	  underpinning	  of	  military	  power.	  	  Across	  decades,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  pursued	  a	  consistent	  set	  of	  objectives	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  	  Defending	  American	  lives	  and	  property	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  The	  United	  States	  also	  looks	  to	  its	  military	  to	  help	  reassure	  U.S.	  allies	  against	  attack	  or	  coercion	  by	  aggressive	  neighbors.	  	  It	  also	  seeks	  to	  deter	  aggression	  by	  competitors.	  	  But	  reassurance	  and	  deterrence	  ultimately	  require	  credible	  combat	  power	  and	  a	  strategy	  for	  employing	  it.	  	  If	  the	  credibility	  of	  U.S.	  military	  power	  is	  called	  into	  question,	  then	  allies	  may	  question	  the	  U.S.	  commitment	  to	  help	  defend	  them,	  and	  competitors	  may	  become	  tempted	  to	  take	  action.	  	   Several	  challenges	  have	  begun	  to	  undermine	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  U.S.	  commitment	  to	  stability	  in	  Asia.	  	  The	  most	  consequential	  of	  these	  is	  the	  growth	  of	  Chinese	  power	  and	  Chinese	  military	  modernization,	  which	  threatens	  not	  only	  to	  deny	  the	  United	  States	  access	  to	  areas	  of	  vital	  national	  interest,	  but	  also	  to	  erode	  the	  alliances	  that	  have	  served	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  regional	  stability	  for	  over	  half	  a	  century.	  
	   A	  second	  challenge	  arises	  from	  North	  Korea’s	  communist	  regime,	  which	  has	  embarked	  upon	  increasingly	  aggressive	  behavior	  since	  it	  tested	  its	  first	  atomic	  weapon	  in	  2006.	  	  It	  has	  tested	  nuclear	  weapons	  four	  times	  (in	  2006,	  2009,	  2013,	  and	  2016),	  and	  has	  also	  conducted	  a	  number	  of	  flight	  tests	  of	  long-­‐range	  missiles.	  	  It	  is	  also	  a	  proliferator	  of	  nuclear	  technology,	  having	  sold	  a	  nuclear	  reactor	  to	  Syria	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and	  signed	  an	  identical	  cooperation	  agreement	  with	  Iran.	  	  The	  North	  Koran	  government	  is	  responsible	  for	  sinking	  the	  South	  Korean	  naval	  vessel	  Cheonan	  on	  March	  26,	  2010,	  killing	  46	  crewmen.	  	  P’yongyang	  is	  also	  responsible	  for	  shelling	  Yeonpyeong	  Island	  in	  May	  2011,	  injuring	  16	  soldiers	  and	  3	  civilians.	  	  If	  the	  North	  Korean	  regime	  is	  bellicose,	  it	  is	  also	  weak.	  	  Looking	  to	  the	  future,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  may	  face	  not	  only	  the	  need	  to	  plan	  to	  respond	  to	  North	  Korean	  provocation,	  but	  also	  the	  prospect	  of	  North	  Korean	  instability	  and	  collapse.	  	  Responding	  to	  a	  collapse	  of	  authority	  in	  North	  Korea,	  safeguarding	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  material,	  and	  stabilizing	  the	  country	  could,	  in	  turn,	  require	  nearly	  half	  a	  million	  men	  to	  execute	  successfully.75	  	  	   This	  chapter	  begins	  by	  describing	  America’s	  enduring	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  Asia,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  strategy	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  pursued	  for	  more	  than	  a	  half	  century	  to	  protect	  those	  interests.	  	  It	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  challenges	  to	  that	  strategy	  in	  peace	  and	  war.	  It	  then	  weighs	  strategic	  alternatives	  to	  meet	  U.S.	  objectives,	  and	  then	  describes	  the	  elements	  of	  a	  forward-­‐leaning	  strategy	  to	  protect	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  Asia	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  	  
Enduring	  U.S.	  Interests	  in	  Asia	  
Discerning	  U.S.	  objectives	  from	  strategy	  statements	  can	  often	  prove	  challenging.	  	  The	  Congressionally-­‐mandated	  National	  Security	  Strategies,	  which	  are	  prepared	  for	  domestic	  and	  international	  consumption,	  tend	  to	  speak	  in	  general	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Bruce	  W.	  Bennett	  and	  Jennifer	  Lind,	  “The	  Collapse	  of	  North	  Korea:	  Military	  Missions	  and	  Requirements,”	  International	  Security	  36,	  no.	  2	  (Fall	  2011),	  84-­‐119.	  
	   91	  
terms.	  	  Rather	  than	  a	  limited	  and	  prioritized	  set	  of	  objectives,	  they	  often	  contain	  undifferentiated	  lists	  of	  desirable	  ends.	  	  Rather	  than	  discussing	  particular	  countries	  that	  threaten	  our	  interests,	  they	  tend	  to	  speak	  of	  challenges	  in	  only	  the	  most	  vague	  of	  terms.	  	  	  One	  should,	  therefore,	  look	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  U.S.	  national	  security	  policy	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  enduring	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  Asia.	  	  At	  least	  since	  World	  War	  II	  the	  United	  States	  has	  pursued	  a	  consistent	  set	  of	  objectives	  in	  the	  region.	  	  First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  acted	  to	  defend	  U.S.	  territory	  against	  attack.	  	  This	  includes	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  the	  Continental	  United	  States,	  Hawaii,	  Alaska,	  Guam	  and	  the	  Northern	  Mariana	  Islands.	  	  The	  United	  States	  is	  also	  bound	  by	  treaty	  to	  defend	  American	  Samoa,	  the	  Federated	  States	  of	  Micronesia,	  the	  Republic	  of	  the	  Marshall	  Islands,	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Palau.	  	  Since	  World	  War	  II,	  U.S.	  strategy	  has	  been	  predicated	  upon	  meeting	  threats	  to	  the	  United	  States	  as	  far	  from	  America’s	  shores	  as	  possible	  through	  the	  forward	  stationing	  and	  rotational	  deployment	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  U.S.	  territory	  and	  allied	  territory	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	  Second,	  the	  United	  States	  is	  committed	  by	  law	  to	  protect	  its	  allies.	  	  In	  Asia,	  these	  include	  Australia,	  Japan,	  South	  Korea,	  the	  Philippines	  and	  Thailand.	  	  The	  United	  States	  is	  also	  obligated	  to	  help	  defend	  quasi-­‐allies	  such	  as	  Taiwan.	  The	  Taiwan	  Relations	  Act	  requires	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  both	  provide	  arms	  and	  services	  of	  a	  defensive	  nature	  to	  Taiwan	  and	  maintain	  U.S.	  military	  capacity	  to	  resist	  coercion	  of	  Taiwan	  by	  China.	  
The	  United	  States	  defends	  its	  allies	  through	  a	  strategy	  of	  extended	  deterrence	  and	  reassurance.	  Part	  of	  the	  U.S.	  defense	  commitment	  includes	  the	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pledge	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  defense	  of	  allies.	  As	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  Gates	  stated	  in	  October	  2009,	  "North	  Korea	  continues	  to	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  South	  Korea,	  to	  the	  region,	  and	  to	  others…	  	  And	  as	  such,	  I	  want	  to	  reaffirm	  the	  unwavering	  commitment	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  the	  alliance	  and	  to	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  (ROK).	  The	  United	  States	  will	  continue	  to	  provide	  extended	  deterrence,	  using	  the	  full	  range	  of	  military	  capabilities	  including	  the	  nuclear	  umbrella	  to	  ensure	  ROK	  security.”76	  The	  United	  States	  also	  reaffirmed	  its	  extended	  deterrence	  guarantee	  to	  Japan	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  ballistic	  missile	  tests.77	  Such	  an	  approach	  has	  helped	  promote	  stability	  in	  the	  face	  of	  provocation	  and	  has	  discouraged	  U.S.	  allies	  from	  taking	  destabilizing	  actions,	  such	  as	  acquiring	  nuclear	  weapons	  of	  their	  own.	  
Complementing	  deterrence	  is	  reassurance.	  	  The	  United	  States	  seeks	  to	  reassure	  its	  allies	  regarding	  its	  security	  commitments	  through	  a	  host	  of	  measures,	  including	  the	  deployment	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  their	  territory,	  foreign	  military	  sales,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  joint	  programs,	  including	  research	  and	  development,	  acquisition,	  training,	  and	  command	  arrangements.	  	  The	  United	  States	  effort	  to	  assist	  the	  Japan	  Ground	  Self	  Defense	  Force	  in	  developing	  an	  amphibious	  capability	  is	  one	  important	  recent	  example	  of	  this;	  cooperation	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Japan	  on	  maritime	  ballistic	  missile	  defense	  is	  another.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  41st	  U.S.-­‐ROK	  Security	  Consultative	  Meeting	  Joint	  Communiqué,	  October	  22,	  2009,	  DoD	  release.	  77	  Keith	  Payne,	  Thomas	  Scheber,	  Kurt	  Guthe,	  U.S.	  Extended	  Deterrence	  and	  
Assurance	  for	  Allies	  in	  Northeast	  Asia	  (Fairfax,	  VA:	  National	  Institute	  for	  Public	  Policy,	  March	  2010),	  at	  http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20Extend-­‐Deter-­‐for%20print.pdf	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Third,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  acted	  over	  decades	  to	  assure	  access	  to	  the	  global	  commons	  in	  peacetime	  and	  commanding	  them	  in	  wartime.	  Command	  of	  the	  commons	  has	  benefited	  not	  only	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  others	  as	  well	  –	  none	  more	  than	  China.	  The	  free	  flow	  of	  goods,	  services	  and	  information	  has	  undergirded	  economic	  growth	  and	  prosperity	  for	  decades.	  	  It	  has	  lifted	  literally	  millions	  out	  of	  poverty	  and	  served	  as	  the	  midwife	  of	  globalization.	  	  	  Fourth,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  for	  the	  past	  century	  sought	  to	  preserve	  a	  favorable	  balance	  of	  power	  across	  Eurasia.	  United	  States	  has	  repeatedly	  used	  force	  when	  its	  territory	  or	  allies	  were	  attacked	  and	  when	  a	  would-­‐be	  hegemon	  has	  threatened	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  Eurasia.	  	  The	  United	  States	  twice	  intervened	  on	  the	  European	  continent	  when	  it	  appeared	  that	  Germany	  was	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  dominating	  the	  Continent.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  United	  States	  resisted	  Japan’s	  attempt	  at	  hegemony	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  United	  States	  sought	  to	  prevent	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  becoming	  a	  Eurasian	  hegemon.	  	  And	  U.S.	  defense	  planning	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  similarly	  sought	  to	  prevent	  a	  would-­‐be	  hegemon	  from	  arising.78	  	  	  
Finally,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  acted	  for	  the	  common	  good	  by	  providing	  humanitarian	  assistance	  and	  disaster	  relief.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  United	  States	  generally	  leads	  international	  relief	  efforts.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  U.S.	  Navy,	  Marine	  Corps,	  and	  Coast	  Guard	  are	  often	  first	  on	  the	  scene	  to	  render	  assistance	  to	  those	  in	  need.	  	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  See,	  for	  example,	  Eric	  S.	  Edelman,	  “The	  Strange	  Career	  of	  the	  1992	  Defense	  Planning	  Guidance,”	  in	  Melvin	  P.	  Leffler	  and	  Jeffrey	  W.	  Legro,	  editors,	  In	  Uncertain	  
Times:	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  After	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  and	  9/11	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2011).	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response	  to	  Typhoon	  Haiyan	  is	  but	  the	  most	  recent	  instance	  of	  such	  efforts.	  	  The	  United	  States	  is	  thus	  not	  only	  a	  global	  power,	  but	  also	  one	  that	  is	  active	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  	  	  
U.S.	  Strategy	  in	  Asia	  	   Since	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  developed	  a	  characteristic	  approach	  to	  protecting	  its	  interests	  in	  Asia.	  In	  peace	  and	  in	  war,	  the	  U.S.	  position	  in	  Asia	  has	  rested	  on	  a	  set	  of	  alliances,	  ground	  and	  air	  forces	  deployed	  on	  allied	  and	  U.S.	  territory,	  and	  carrier	  strike	  groups	  operating	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	  	  The	  United	  States	  has	  deployed	  ground	  and	  air	  forces	  on	  allied	  territory	  in	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea	  and	  on	  U.S.	  territory	  (Hawaii,	  Alaska,	  and	  Guam)	  to	  reassure	  allies	  and	  deter	  adversaries.	  	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  this	  included	  the	  forward	  basing	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  on	  U.S.	  Navy	  ships	  and	  on	  allied	  territory	  for	  U.S.	  Air	  Force	  strike	  aircraft	  as	  an	  extended	  nuclear	  deterrent.	  	  The	  United	  States	  has	  also	  routinely	  deployed	  U.S.	  Navy	  Carrier	  Strike	  Groups	  (CSG)	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  to	  demonstrate	  U.S.	  presence,	  reassure,	  and	  deter.	  	   Significantly,	  the	  U.S.	  approach	  to	  demonstrating	  its	  presence,	  reassuring	  allies,	  and	  deterring	  aggressors	  mirrors	  its	  concept	  of	  operations	  in	  wartime.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  United	  States	  uses	  its	  most	  powerful	  naval	  assets,	  its	  CSGs,	  as	  instruments	  of	  peacetime	  presence,	  assurance,	  and	  deterrence.	  	  In	  time	  of	  war,	  these	  forward-­‐deployed	  naval	  forces	  would	  serve	  as	  instruments	  of	  power	  projection.	  	  	  	   It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  such	  a	  posture	  represents	  an	  historical	  novelty.	  	  Traditionally,	  sea	  powers	  (whether	  Britain	  in	  the	  18th	  through	  20th	  centuries	  or	  the	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United	  States	  prior	  to	  World	  War	  II)	  relied	  upon	  small	  combatants	  such	  as	  frigates	  to	  show	  the	  flag	  and	  coerce	  adversaries;	  they	  kept	  their	  capital	  ships	  concentrated	  in	  home	  waters	  to	  train	  and	  prepare	  for	  a	  decisive	  fleet	  battle.	  	  Today,	  the	  United	  States	  faces	  the	  dual	  challenge	  of	  not	  having	  enough	  naval	  forces	  for	  peacetime	  missions	  as	  well	  as	  relying	  upon	  increasingly	  vulnerable	  ships	  for	  both	  peacetime	  and	  wartime	  missions.	  	  	  	   There	  is	  a	  danger	  that	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  U.S.	  forces,	  and	  responses	  to	  it,	  will	  undermine	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  American	  commitment	  to	  Asia.	  	  This	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  alternatives	  for	  demonstrating	  U.S.	  presence,	  such	  as	  the	  Littoral	  Combat	  Ship	  (LCS),	  have	  limited	  military	  capabilities,	  whereas	  some	  of	  the	  most	  potent	  strike	  platforms,	  such	  as	  nuclear	  attack	  submarines	  (SSNs),	  may	  have	  limited	  value	  as	  instruments	  of	  presence	  and	  reassurance	  due	  to	  their	  inherent	  stealthiness.	  	   	  
The	  Chinese	  Challenge	  	   China	  has	  for	  some	  time	  been	  working	  systematically	  to	  undermine	  the	  American	  approach	  to	  assurance,	  deterrence,	  and	  warfighting.	  	  Specifically,	  China’s	  military	  modernization	  is	  giving	  it	  the	  ability	  to	  decouple	  America’s	  allies	  from	  the	  U.S.	  extended	  nuclear	  deterrent,	  to	  destroy	  fixed	  bases	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  to	  threaten	  U.S.	  power	  projection	  forces.	  	  This,	  in	  turn,	  could	  allow	  China	  to	  coerce	  U.S.	  allies	  and	  friends	  in	  the	  region,	  hold	  U.S.	  forces	  at	  arms	  length,	  and	  control	  the	  seas	  along	  the	  Asian	  periphery.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  scope	  and	  pace	  of	  Chinese	  developments.	  	  There	  is,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  danger	  of	  overestimating	  the	  extent	  of	  Chinese	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military	  modernization,	  of	  crediting	  China	  with	  capabilities	  that	  it	  does	  not	  possess.	  	  Overestimation	  would	  threaten	  to	  increase	  the	  pressure	  for	  competitive	  arms	  dynamics	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  There	  is	  also,	  however,	  the	  danger	  of	  underestimating	  Chinese	  military	  modernization,	  which	  would	  open	  up	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  regional	  actors	  to	  surprise	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  future	  crisis	  or	  conflict.	  	  	  	  
Decoupling	  our	  allies	  from	  the	  U.S.	  extended	  nuclear	  deterrent	  	   The	  United	  States	  is	  bound	  by	  treaty	  to	  defend	  Australia,	  Japan,	  South	  Korea,	  Thailand	  and	  the	  Philippines.	  	  Part	  of	  the	  U.S.	  defense	  commitment	  to	  Australia,	  Japan,	  and	  South	  Korea	  is	  the	  pledge	  to	  use	  U.S.	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  China’s	  propensity	  for	  secrecy	  and	  deception	  has	  raised	  questions,	  at	  least	  among	  some	  analysts,	  regarding	  the	  overall	  size	  of	  the	  Chinese	  nuclear	  arsenal.79	  	  China	  has	  invested	  heavily	  for	  decades	  in	  tunneling	  and	  underground	  facilities	  to	  conceal,	  among	  other	  things,	  its	  nuclear	  missile	  force.80	  	  Moreover,	  China	  is	  currently	  increasing	  the	  size	  and	  survivability	  of	  its	  nuclear	  force.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Defense	  Department’s	  annual	  report	  to	  Congress	  on	  Chinese	  military	  developments,	  China’s	  nuclear	  arsenal	  currently	  consists	  of	  approximately	  50-­‐60	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missiles	  (ICBMs),	  including	  the	  silo-­‐based	  CSS-­‐4	  Mod	  2	  and	  multiple	  independently-­‐targetable	  re-­‐entry	  vehicle	  (MIRV)-­‐equipped	  Mod	  3	  (DF-­‐5);	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Bret	  Stephens,	  “How	  Many	  Nukes	  Does	  China	  Have?”	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  October	  24,	  2011.	  80	  Phillip	  A.	  Karber,	  “Strategic	  Implications	  of	  China’s	  Underground	  Great	  Wall,”	  briefing,	  September	  26,	  2011,	  at	  http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Karber_UndergroundFacilities-­‐Full_2011_reduced.pdf	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solid-­‐fueled,	  road-­‐mobile	  CSS-­‐10	  Mods	  1	  and	  2	  (DF-­‐31	  and	  DF-­‐31A);	  and	  the	  shorter	  range	  CSS-­‐3	  (DF-­‐3).	  	  The	  CSS-­‐10	  Mod	  2,	  with	  a	  range	  of	  more	  than	  11,200	  km,	  can	  reach	  most	  of	  the	  continental	  United	  States.	  	  China	  is	  also	  developing	  a	  new	  road-­‐mobile	  ICBM,	  the	  CSS-­‐X-­‐20	  (DF-­‐41),	  possibly	  capable	  of	  carrying	  MIRVs.81	  	  China	  also	  possesses	  four	  brigades	  of	  nuclear-­‐armed	  intermediate-­‐range	  and	  medium-­‐range	  ballistic	  missiles	  for	  regional	  nuclear	  strike	  missions.	  	  These	  include	  CSS-­‐2	  intermediate-­‐range	  ballistic	  missiles	  and	  road-­‐mobile,	  solid	  fuel	  CSS-­‐5	  (DF-­‐21C)	  medium-­‐range	  ballistic	  missiles.82	  	  Finally,	  China	  continues	  to	  produce	  the	  Jin-­‐class	  nuclear	  ballistic	  missile	  submarine	  (SSBN)	  (Type	  094)	  with	  associated	  CSS-­‐NX-­‐14	  (JL-­‐2)	  submarine-­‐launched	  ballistic	  missile	  (SLBM)	  that	  has	  an	  estimated	  range	  of	  7,400	  km.83	  	  The	  United	  States,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  reducing	  its	  nuclear	  arsenal.	  	  The	  U.S.	  stockpile	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  has	  decreased	  more	  than	  75	  percent	  since	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  fell	  in	  late	  1989.84	  	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  New	  START	  Treaty,	  the	  United	  States	  will	  further	  reduce	  its	  strategic	  nuclear	  force	  to	  1,550	  deployed	  warheads.	  	  It	  will	  similarly	  be	  limited	  to	  no	  more	  than	  700	  deployed	  ICBMs,	  deployed	  SLBMs,	  and	  nuclear-­‐equipped	  heavy	  bombers.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress:	  Military	  and	  Security	  Developments	  Involving	  the	  
People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  2015),	  8.	  82	  Ron	  Christman,	  “China’s	  Second	  Artillery	  Corps:	  Capabilities	  and	  Missions	  for	  the	  Near	  Seas,”	  presentation	  to	  the	  Naval	  War	  College,	  China	  Maritime	  Studies	  Institute	  Annual	  Conference,	  May	  2011.	  83	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress:	  Military	  and	  Security	  Developments	  Involving	  the	  
People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  2015),	  9.	  84	  “Fact	  Sheet:	  Increasing	  Transparency	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  Stockpile”	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  May	  3,	  2010).	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Of	  greater	  relevance	  to	  the	  U.S.	  extended	  nuclear	  deterrence	  commitments,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  eliminated	  approximately	  90	  percent	  of	  its	  non-­‐strategic	  nuclear	  weapons	  between	  1991	  and	  2009.	  	  	  The	  Obama	  administration’s	  2010	  Nuclear	  Posture	  Review	  went	  further,	  eliminating	  the	  TLAM-­‐N,	  which	  the	  Japanese	  government	  saw	  as	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  U.S.	  extended	  nuclear	  deterrence	  guarantee.	  The	  buildup	  of	  Chinese	  nuclear	  forces,	  combined	  with	  the	  drawdown	  of	  American	  nuclear	  forces,	  means	  that	  in	  a	  future	  crisis	  the	  United	  States	  will	  possess	  a	  limited	  ability	  to	  contain	  escalation.	  	  This,	  in	  turn,	  could	  deter	  the	  United	  States	  from	  intervening	  in	  a	  crisis	  in	  support	  of	  its	  interests.	  In	  addition,	  the	  increasing	  vulnerability	  of	  tactical	  nuclear	  delivery	  platforms	  could	  lead	  to	  crisis	  instability.	  	  
Destroying	  fixed	  targets	  in	  the	  region	  	   The	  United	  States	  relies	  heavily	  upon	  ports,	  airfields,	  and	  logistical	  sites	  along	  the	  Asian	  littoral	  to	  support	  its	  peacetime	  presence,	  to	  reassure	  allies,	  and	  to	  deter	  aggression.	  	  In	  time	  of	  war,	  these	  bases	  would	  serve	  as	  forward	  operating	  bases	  for	  U.S.	  combat	  forces.	  	  These	  include	  key	  sites	  in	  Japan,	  South	  Korea,	  and	  on	  U.S.	  territory	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	  These	  bases	  are	  increasingly	  vulnerable.	  	  China	  continues	  to	  deploy	  large	  numbers	  of	  precision-­‐guided	  ballistic	  and	  cruise	  missiles.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Defense	  Department,	  China	  possesses	  at	  least	  1,200	  short-­‐range	  ballistic	  missiles	  (SRBMs)	  in	  its	  inventory.	  China	  is	  increasing	  the	  lethality	  of	  its	  conventional	  missile	  force	  by	  fielding	  a	  new	  ballistic	  missile,	  the	  CSS-­‐11	  (DF-­‐16),	  which	  possesses	  a	  range	  of	  800-­‐
	   99	  
1,000	  km.	  The	  CSS-­‐11,	  coupled	  with	  the	  already	  deployed	  conventional	  variant	  of	  the	  CSS-­‐5	  (DF-­‐21)	  medium-­‐range	  ballistic	  missile	  (MRBM),	  will	  improve	  China’s	  ability	  to	  strike	  not	  only	  Taiwan,	  but	  also	  other	  regional	  targets.85	  In	  September	  2015,	  China	  revealed	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  DF-­‐26	  IRBM,	  which	  has	  a	  range	  of	  4,000	  kilometers,	  putting	  Guam	  within	  its	  range.	  	  The	  DF-­‐26	  is	  a	  dual-­‐purpose	  missile	  that	  can	  be	  equipped	  with	  either	  nuclear	  or	  conventional	  warheads.86	  	  In	  addition	  to	  ballistic	  missiles,	  China	  has	  deployed	  between	  300	  and	  350	  launchers	  for	  its	  missiles,	  most	  of	  which	  are	  mobile.87	  	  In	  time	  of	  war,	  it	  is	  increasingly	  likely	  that	  Chinese	  missiles	  would	  be	  able	  to	  shut	  down	  operations	  on	  Taiwanese	  airfields,	  preventing	  Taiwan	  from	  controlling	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait,	  as	  well	  as	  U.S.	  airfields	  in	  Japan,	  preventing	  the	  United	  States	  from	  supporting	  Taiwan.88	  	  	  
Threatening	  U.S.	  power	  projection	  forces	  	   China	  is	  also	  increasing	  its	  ability	  to	  threaten	  U.S.	  power	  projection	  forces.	  	  The	  PLA’s	  development	  of	  the	  DF-­‐21D	  anti-­‐ship	  ballistic	  missile	  (ASBM),	  which	  could	  give	  China	  the	  ability	  to	  strike	  ships	  up	  to	  1,500	  km	  from	  China’s	  shores,	  has	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received	  considerable	  attention.89	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  in	  2015	  the	  PLA	  revealed	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  4,000	  km-­‐range	  DF-­‐26,	  which	  reportedly	  includes	  an	  ASBM	  variant.	  	  Moreover,	  at	  least	  one	  analyst	  has	  argued	  that	  longer-­‐range	  systems	  are	  likely	  to	  follow.90	  China’s	  development	  of	  anti-­‐access	  and	  area	  denial	  systems	  goes	  far	  beyond	  ballistic	  missiles,	  however.	  	  China	  is	  deploying	  increasingly	  capable	  diesel	  and	  nuclear	  attack	  submarines	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  firing	  anti-­‐ship	  cruise	  missiles,	  surface	  combatants	  with	  advanced	  anti-­‐air	  and	  anti-­‐ship	  missiles,	  and	  maritime	  strike	  aircraft	  armed	  with	  ASCMs	  to	  engage	  surface	  combatants.91	  	  
Strategic	  alternatives	  The	  United	  States	  faces	  three	  fundamental	  strategic	  alternatives	  as	  it	  seeks	  to	  match	  its	  ends	  and	  its	  means	  in	  an	  increasingly	  turbulent	  environment.	  	  An	  evaluation	  of	  these	  options	  should	  incorporate	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  risks	  and	  rewards	  of	  each	  option.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  differentiate	  among	  different	  types	  of	  risk.	  	  The	  United	  States	  should,	  for	  example,	  seek	  to	  minimize	  strategic	  risk:	  that	  is,	  the	  risk	  to	  achieving	  its	  political	  objectives	  and	  safeguarding	  its	  interests.	  	  The	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United	  States	  should	  also,	  however,	  seek	  to	  reduce	  operational	  risk:	  that	  is,	  the	  risk	  that	  U.S.	  forces	  face.	  	  An	  ideal	  strategy	  would	  seek	  to	  minimize	  both.	  	  Of	  the	  two,	  however,	  strategic	  risk	  the	  more	  dangerous:	  the	  United	  States	  should	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  risk	  its	  forces	  than	  jeopardize	  its	  interests.	  The	  first	  strategic	  alternative	  that	  lies	  before	  the	  United	  States	  is	  to	  continue	  its	  current	  approach	  to	  the	  region	  –	  that	  is,	  to	  pursue	  broad	  objectives	  even	  as	  the	  military	  balance	  shifts	  against	  it.	  	  By	  relying	  upon	  increasingly	  vulnerable	  forward-­‐based	  forces	  for	  reassurance	  and	  deterrence,	  it	  would	  incur	  additional	  risk.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  size	  of	  the	  Navy	  decreases,	  it	  will	  be	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  an	  American	  presence	  across	  the	  region.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  current	  U.S.	  posture	  in	  the	  region	  will	  over	  time	  lead	  to	  progressively	  greater	  strategic	  and	  operational	  risk.	  	   There	  are	  things	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  do	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  to	  forward-­‐based	  forces	  and	  to	  increase	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  American	  commitment	  to	  allies.	  	  These	  range	  from	  hardening	  air	  bases	  and	  other	  military	  facilities	  against	  attack	  and	  diversifying	  the	  U.S.	  basing	  infrastructure,	  to	  the	  renuclearization	  of	  the	  U.S.	  force	  posture	  in	  the	  Pacific	  and	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  United	  States	  might	  contemplate	  escalating	  to	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Such	  measures	  are,	  however,	  expensive	  or	  politically	  problematic.	  	   The	  second	  alternative,	  favored	  by	  neo-­‐isolationists	  of	  various	  stripes	  in	  both	  parties,	  would	  be	  to	  scale	  back	  U.S.	  commitments	  and	  accept	  a	  narrower	  definition	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of	  America’s	  role	  in	  the	  world	  than	  we	  have	  played	  for	  the	  better	  part	  of	  a	  century.92	  	  	  Such	  a	  strategy	  would	  have	  the	  United	  States	  pull	  back	  from	  the	  Asian	  littoral	  and	  rely	  upon	  allies	  to	  shoulder	  a	  greater	  portion	  of	  the	  load,	  husbanding	  its	  resources	  against	  the	  possible	  emergence	  of	  a	  peer	  competitor.	  	  	  Reducing	  commitments	  is,	  however,	  easier	  said	  than	  done.	  	  Protecting	  the	  United	  States	  against	  attack	  is	  one	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  most	  fundamental	  responsibilities.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  lose	  more	  than	  it	  would	  gain	  by	  abrogating	  any	  number	  of	  treaties	  that	  commit	  the	  United	  States	  to	  the	  defense	  of	  allies	  across	  the	  globe.	  	  A	  failure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  continue	  to	  command	  the	  commons	  would	  similarly	  incur	  great	  economic,	  political,	  and	  military	  costs.	  	  It	  would,	  in	  other	  words,	  trade	  reduced	  operational	  risk	  for	  increased	  strategic	  risk.	  	  Moreover,	  offshore	  balancing	  reflects	  a	  sense	  of	  defeatism	  that	  is	  unwarranted.	  	  	  Although	  complacency	  would	  be	  unwise,	  it	  would	  be	  misguided	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  only,	  or	  even	  the	  best,	  option	  for	  the	  United	  States	  is	  to	  reduce	  its	  commitments	  in	  Asia.	  A	  third	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  adopt	  a	  forward-­‐leaning	  strategy,	  one	  that	  would	  balance	  the	  need	  to	  reduce	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  while	  maintaining	  U.S.	  commitments.	  	  It	  would	  rest	  upon	  a	  mixture	  of	  forward-­‐based	  and	  standoff	  capabilities.	  	  Moreover,	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  operational	  risk	  while	  not	  sacrificing	  America’s	  strategic	  interests,	  more	  than	  the	  current	  force	  posture	  it	  would	  feature	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greater	  specialization	  between	  forces	  for	  keeping	  the	  peace	  and	  those	  for	  fighting	  wars.	  	  The	  section	  that	  follows	  describes	  the	  elements	  of	  such	  a	  strategy.	  	  
Elements	  of	  a	  strategy	  	   A	  forward-­‐leaning	  strategy	  for	  Asia	  would	  rest	  upon	  two	  pillars:	  an	  effort	  to	  conduct	  a	  long-­‐term	  competition	  with	  China	  in	  peacetime	  and	  measures	  to	  convince	  China	  that	  it	  cannot	  fight	  and	  win	  a	  quick	  regional	  war.	  	   A	  long-­‐term	  peacetime	  competition	  with	  China	  would	  seek	  to	  blunt	  the	  momentum	  of	  Chinese	  military	  modernization	  and	  channel	  Chinese	  resources	  away	  from	  the	  most	  disruptive	  capabilities.93	  	  It	  would	  do	  so	  in	  three	  ways.	  	  First,	  the	  United	  States	  needs	  to	  develop	  new	  approaches	  to	  presence.	  	  U.S.	  force	  structure	  in	  the	  region	  should	  move	  away	  from	  the	  CSG	  and	  toward	  networks	  of	  capable	  surface	  ships	  as	  the	  most	  visible	  symbol	  of	  U.S.	  presence	  in	  the	  region.94	  	  The	  United	  States	  should	  also	  continue	  to	  bolster	  its	  submarine	  fleet	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  	  Linking	  these	  combatants	  together	  will	  require	  resilient	  intelligence,	  surveillance	  and	  reconnaissance	  (ISR)	  and	  robust	  command,	  control	  and	  communications	  (C3)	  networks.	  	  This,	  in	  turn,	  will	  require	  the	  ability	  to	  exploit	  space	  and	  cyberspace.	  	   Second,	  the	  United	  States	  will	  need	  to	  maintain	  its	  forward	  presence	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  to	  reassure	  allies	  and	  deter	  aggression.	  	  However,	  the	  United	  States	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  subject,	  see	  Thomas	  G.	  Mahnken,	  editor,	  Competitive	  
Strategies	  for	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century:	  Theory,	  History,	  and	  Practice	  (Palo	  Alto,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2012).	  94	  See,	  for	  example,	  VADM	  Thomas	  Rowden,	  RADM	  Peter	  Gumataotao,	  and	  RADM	  Peter	  Fanta,	  “Distributed	  Lethality,”	  U.S.	  Naval	  Institute	  Proceedings	  141,	  no.	  1343	  (January	  2015).	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will	  need	  to	  change	  the	  character	  of	  that	  presence	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  more	  survivable	  and	  hence	  credible.	  	  The	  United	  States	  should,	  for	  example,	  harden	  and	  diversity	  its	  bases	  in	  the	  region.	  	  These	  should	  be	  balanced	  between	  bases	  on	  sovereign	  U.S.	  soil,	  such	  as	  Hawaii	  and	  Guam,	  and	  those	  on	  allied	  territory,	  such	  as	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea.	  	  Bases	  on	  U.S.	  territory	  guarantee	  access,	  whereas	  those	  on	  allied	  territory	  provide	  extended	  deterrence	  and	  reassurance.	  	   Third,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  adopt	  approaches	  to	  impose	  costs	  on	  China.	  	  China’s	  military	  modernization	  is	  currently	  imposing	  significant	  costs	  on	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies.	  	  It	  faces,	  for	  example,	  the	  need	  to	  make	  considerable	  investments	  to	  counter	  China’s	  deployment	  of	  precision-­‐guided	  conventional	  missiles,	  including	  its	  anti-­‐ship	  ballistic	  missiles.	  	  The	  United	  States	  should	  similarly	  force	  China	  to	  take	  on	  difficult	  military	  problems	  –	  problems	  that	  take	  considerable	  time	  and	  resources	  to	  respond	  to.	  	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  for	  example,	  the	  United	  States’	  pursuit	  of	  a	  manned	  penetrating	  bomber	  forced	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  invest	  considerable	  resources	  in	  air	  defenses,	  thereby	  denying	  those	  resources	  to	  more	  offensive	  purposes.95	  	  Today,	  China	  has	  forced	  the	  United	  States	  to	  invest	  in	  costly	  measures	  to	  defend	  against	  its	  ballistic	  missile	  arsenal.	  	  Beijing,	  by	  contrast,	  has	  not	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  a	  similar	  threat	  to	  its	  homeland.	  	  	   The	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  should	  increase	  their	  ability	  to	  strike	  at	  a	  distance,	  and	  to	  strike	  deep	  into	  Chinese	  territory.	  	  	  The	  United	  States	  should,	  for	  example,	  continue	  to	  develop	  a	  Conventional	  Prompt	  Global	  Strike	  capability.	  	  It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  See	  the	  discussion	  in	  Thomas	  G.	  Mahnken,	  Technology	  and	  the	  American	  Way	  of	  
War	  since	  1945	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  163-­‐164.	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should	  also	  begin	  fielding	  the	  Next	  Generation	  Bomber	  to	  provide	  a	  flexible,	  global	  strike	  capability.	  	  By	  bolstering	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  strike	  precisely	  at	  a	  distance,	  the	  United	  States	  will	  not	  only	  strengthen	  deterrence,	  but	  also	  force	  Beijing	  to	  increase	  its	  investments	  in	  active	  and	  passive	  defenses.	  	  The	  evidence	  suggests,	  for	  example,	  that	  Beijing	  already	  devotes	  considerable	  resources	  to	  hardening	  and	  tunneling;	  that	  tendency	  should	  be	  reinforced.	  	  China’s	  resources,	  as	  much	  as	  those	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  are	  limited;	  investments	  in	  defensive	  capabilities	  represent	  resources	  that	  will	  not	  be	  available	  for	  offensive	  arms.	  	   As	  a	  complement	  to	  a	  long-­‐term	  peacetime	  strategy,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  must	  seek	  to	  convince	  China	  that	  it	  cannot	  fight	  and	  win	  a	  quick	  regional	  war.	  	  This,	  in	  turn,	  requires	  that	  the	  United	  States	  prepare	  to	  do	  three	  things.	  	  First,	  it	  must	  posture	  itself	  to	  avoid	  a	  quick	  defeat.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  such	  a	  capability	  could	  tempt	  an	  aggressor	  into	  launching	  a	  first	  strike	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  crippling	  the	  U.S.	  ability	  to	  respond.	  	  The	  United	  States	  relies	  heavily	  on	  forward-­‐based	  forces	  not	  only	  for	  assurance	  and	  deterrence,	  but	  also	  for	  warfighting.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  these	  are	  increasingly	  vulnerable.	  	  However,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  not	  pull	  back	  from	  the	  region.	  	  To	  do	  so	  would	  undermine	  our	  ability	  to	  reassure	  allies	  and	  deter	  potential	  aggressors.	  	  Rather,	  the	  United	  States	  needs	  both	  to	  shift	  the	  balance	  somewhat	  between	  forward-­‐based	  and	  deployable	  forces	  as	  well	  as	  to	  ensure	  that	  forward-­‐based	  forces	  are	  more	  survivable.	  	  Such	  moves	  will	  strengthen	  deterrence	  by	  preventing	  the	  PLA	  from	  believing	  that	  it	  can	  win	  a	  quick	  victory	  through	  a	  first	  strike.	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   Second,	  given	  the	  scope	  and	  magnitude	  of	  Chinese	  military	  modernization,	  it	  is	  increasingly	  unlikely	  that	  any	  war	  involving	  China	  would	  be	  a	  short	  one.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  increasingly	  likely	  that	  any	  such	  conflict	  would	  be	  protracted	  and	  high	  cost.	  	  The	  United	  States	  needs	  to	  prepare	  for	  such	  a	  conflict.	  	  That	  includes	  revitalizing	  the	  U.S.	  defense	  industrial	  base	  and	  reviving	  mobilization	  planning.	  	  Preparedness	  to	  wage	  and	  win	  a	  long	  war	  will	  further	  strengthen	  deterrence	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  a	  first	  strike	  against	  the	  United	  States	  would	  not	  be	  decisive.	  	   Third,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  need	  to	  present	  China	  with	  the	  need	  to	  fight	  a	  wider	  war,	  one	  that	  would	  involve	  many	  U.S.	  allies	  and	  partners,	  rather	  than	  a	  narrow	  one.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  should	  ensure	  that	  China	  would	  have	  to	  fight	  many,	  not	  few.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  should	  confront	  Beijing	  with	  the	  prospect	  that	  a	  war	  in	  Asia	  would	  involve	  many	  states	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  conflict.	  	  Moreover,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  ways	  to	  deter	  a	  conflict	  with	  China	  may	  be	  to	  convince	  the	  leadership	  in	  Beijing	  that	  it	  would	  face	  a	  war	  in	  multiple	  theaters	  rather	  than	  one	  confined	  to	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait	  or	  the	  South	  China	  Sea.	  	  Capabilities	  to	  hold	  at	  risk	  China’s	  sea	  lines	  of	  communication	  (SLOCs),	  for	  example,	  might	  prove	  a	  potent	  deterrent.	  	  	  	  
Acquiring	  Needed	  Capabilities	  	  	  	   For	  the	  U.S.	  military,	  these	  tasks	  may	  seem	  daunting.	  	  	  It	  must	  plan	  for	  a	  peacetime	  competition	  that	  requires	  presence,	  deterrence,	  and	  reassurance	  capabilities	  on	  station	  on	  an	  ongoing	  basis.	  	  It	  must	  also	  plan	  for	  major	  contingencies,	  most	  immediately	  in	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait	  and	  on	  the	  Korean	  peninsula.	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To	  deter	  and	  if	  necessary	  defeat	  China	  in	  any	  contingency	  the	  U.S.	  military	  would	  need	  capabilities	  it	  lacks	  today,	  including	  the	  ability	  to	  break	  a	  prospective	  blockade	  around	  Taiwan,	  de-­‐mine	  waters	  near	  the	  Strait	  and	  in	  the	  East	  China	  Sea,	  conduct	  wide	  area	  anti-­‐submarine	  warfare	  and	  offensive	  mining,	  neutralize	  portions	  of	  the	  PRC’s	  C4ISR,	  and	  possibly	  hit	  large	  numbers	  of	  maritime	  and	  force	  enabling	  PLA	  targets	  such	  as	  over-­‐the-­‐horizon	  radar	  and	  space-­‐based	  surveillance.	  Some	  of	  the	  capabilities	  needed	  to	  perform	  such	  missions	  are	  either	  barely	  existent	  in	  the	  U.S.	  arsenal	  or	  have	  eroded	  to	  the	  point	  of	  irrelevancy.	  	  	  The	  U.S.	  has	  hardly	  any	  minesweepers	  in	  its	  fleet.	  It	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  Japan	  for	  air-­‐based	  ASW,	  it	  is	  facing	  a	  tactical	  aircraft	  shortfall	  (both	  stealthy	  and	  non-­‐stealthy)	  and	  it	  has	  done	  little	  to	  make	  its	  tactical	  aircraft	  more	  survivable	  and	  dispersed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  China’s	  precision-­‐strike	  complex.	  	  Maintaining	  the	  ability	  to	  fight	  and	  win	  wars	  will	  remain	  crucial	  to	  enhancing	  assurance	  and	  deterrence.	  	  U.S.	  forces	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  engaging	  in	  two	  near-­‐simultaneous	  conflict	  scenarios	  while	  continuing	  to	  conduct	  presence	  missions	  in	  unaffected	  areas	  of	  Asia.	  	  The	  arsenal	  needs	  to	  be	  sized	  to	  cope	  with	  stressing	  scenarios.	  	  For	  example,	  SSNs	  should	  be	  available	  in	  numbers	  sufficient	  to	  conduct	  intelligence,	  surveillance,	  and	  reconnaissance	  (ISR)	  and	  strike	  missions	  in	  East	  and	  Southeast	  Asian	  waters.	  Aegis	  cruisers	  and	  destroyers	  should	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  simultaneous	  ballistic	  missile	  defense	  for	  Korea,	  Japan,	  and	  Taiwan.	  	  Naval	  air	  and	  missile	  defenses	  should	  be	  enhanced	  and	  the	  fleet	  enlarged	  to	  allow	  the	  Navy	  to	  project	  air	  power	  across	  China’s	  maritime	  frontier	  while	  retaining	  the	  ability	  to	  project	  power	  simultaneously	  in	  another	  theater.	  The	  United	  States	  needs	  sufficient	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numbers	  of	  survivable	  air	  platforms	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  sustain	  an	  initial	  missile	  salvo	  and	  penetrate	  PLA	  airspace.	  	  Finally,	  the	  Marine	  Corps	  should	  maintain	  a	  MEU	  afloat	  in	  the	  East	  and	  South	  China	  Seas	  for	  speedy	  insertion	  into	  partner	  nations	  under	  attack.	  	   Given	  the	  increasing	  possibility	  of	  surprise	  attack	  and	  escalation	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region,	  the	  U.S.	  military	  must	  both	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  deter	  vertical	  escalation	  with	  nuclear	  forces	  and	  to	  horizontally	  escalate,	  for	  example	  by	  carrying	  out	  distant	  blockades	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean.	  	  This	  imperative	  puts	  a	  high	  stress	  on	  the	  Navy,	  which	  must	  be	  able	  to	  conduct	  interdiction	  operations	  far	  afield	  while	  it	  also	  operates	  in	  defense	  of	  Taiwan,	  Japan,	  or	  others	  closer	  to	  China’s	  shores.	  	  	   Key	  to	  any	  successful	  strategy	  will	  be	  expanding	  allied	  contributions.	  	  The	  United	  States	  is	  not	  the	  only	  state	  in	  the	  region	  that	  has	  reason	  to	  be	  concerned	  by	  the	  changing	  military	  balance.	  	  Other	  regional	  powers	  are	  concerned	  and	  have	  in	  fact	  already	  begun	  to	  respond.	  	  The	  United	  States	  needs	  to	  work	  closely	  with	  its	  allies	  to	  forge	  an	  integrated	  response.	   	  	   There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  things	  that	  Japan	  can	  and	  should	  do	  to	  enhance	  deterrence	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	  	  First,	  it	  can	  ensure	  that	  its	  airfields	  and	  other	  key	  facilities	  are	  survivable	  and	  hardened	  against	  attack.	  	  Second,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Japan	  should	  together	  explore	  new	  arrangements	  to	  ensure	  greater	  access	  to	  Japanese	  airfields	  and	  ports	  for	  both	  U.S.	  forces	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Japan	  Self-­‐Defense	  Force	  (JSDF).	  	  Such	  arrangements	  could	  involve	  increasing	  Japanese	  military	  and	  civilian	  access	  to	  U.S.	  bases	  in	  exchange	  for	  greater	  U.S.	  and	  JSDF	  access	  to	  Japan’s	  civilian	  infrastructure.	  	  Third,	  the	  Japan	  Maritime	  Self-­‐Defense	  Force	  has	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considerable	  expertise	  in	  antisubmarine	  warfare.	  	  It	  should	  continue	  to	  nurture	  and	  expand	  that	  expertise.	  	  Tokyo	  should	  follow	  through	  with	  its	  plans	  to	  expand	  the	  Japanese	  submarine	  force	  and	  should	  also	  modernize	  its	  fleet	  of	  antisubmarine	  warfare	  aircraft.	  	   Fourth,	  Japan’s	  geography	  provides	  it	  an	  opportunity	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  Chinese	  naval	  expansion.	  	  Japan	  should	  follow	  through	  with	  the	  decision	  to	  deploy	  anti-­‐ship	  cruise	  missiles	  on	  its	  southern	  islands.96	  	   Finally,	  Japan	  should	  expand	  existing	  partnerships,	  including	  with	  Australia	  and	  India;	  it	  should	  also	  develop	  new	  ones.	  Tokyo	  should	  also	  improve	  its	  military-­‐to-­‐military	  relationship	  with	  Seoul.	  	  Tokyo’s	  decision	  to	  loosen	  restrictions	  on	  arms	  cooperation	  and	  export	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  creating	  new	  relationships.	  	  The	  agreement	  between	  Japan	  and	  Great	  Britain	  to	  cooperate	  on	  weapons	  development	  is	  a	  good	  step	  in	  this	  direction.	  	  	  	  	   South	  Korea	  similarly	  has	  opportunities	  to	  enhance	  deterrence	  on	  the	  Korean	  peninsula	  and	  prepare	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  instability.	  	  Measures	  to	  harden	  South	  Korea	  against	  North	  Korean	  coercion	  would	  include	  hardening	  airbases	  against	  attack	  and	  investing	  in	  counter-­‐artillery	  and	  counter-­‐SOF	  capabilities.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  military	  requirements	  that	  would	  flow	  from	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  National	  Defense	  Program	  Guidelines	  for	  FY2011	  and	  Beyond	  (Tokyo:	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  2011),	  at	  http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23_ndpg_en.pdf	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P’yongyang	  would	  be	  daunting.97	  This	  suggests	  that	  Seoul	  should	  reconsider	  its	  plans	  to	  reduce	  the	  size	  of	  the	  ROK	  Army.	  	  	  	   Over	  the	  longer	  term,	  Seoul	  should	  plan	  to	  assume	  a	  broader	  regional	  role.	  	  The	  South	  Korean	  military	  distinguished	  itself	  in	  its	  deployment	  to	  northern	  Iraq;	  it	  can	  constructively	  play	  a	  more	  active	  role	  closer	  to	  home	  as	  well.	  	   Australia	  has	  an	  impressive	  military	  for	  a	  middle	  power.	  	  Australian	  forces	  have	  fought	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  with	  American	  troops	  in	  every	  war	  since	  World	  War	  I.	  	  Moreover,	  Australia	  has	  deployed	  its	  forces	  far	  from	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  	  However,	  the	  changing	  military	  balance	  in	  the	  region	  suggests	  that	  Canberra	  will	  face	  a	  tougher	  security	  environment	  closer	  to	  home.	  	  The	  2016	  Australian	  Defense	  White	  Paper	  recognized	  this,	  calling	  for,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  modernization	  and	  expansion	  of	  Australia’s	  attack	  submarine	  fleet.98	  	  	  	  	   Australia	  could	  take	  a	  number	  of	  steps	  that	  would	  both	  increase	  its	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  threats	  unilaterally	  as	  well	  as	  greatly	  enhance	  an	  alliance	  response	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Canberra	  should,	  for	  example,	  increase	  its	  undersea	  cooperation	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  others.	  	  The	  recent	  revision	  of	  Japan’s	  policy	  on	  arms	  cooperation,	  for	  example,	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  Australian	  cooperation	  with	  Japan,	  which	  deploys	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  best	  attack	  submarines.	  	  The	  United	  States	  should	  work	  with	  Australia	  to	  ensure	  that	  whatever	  submarine	  Canberra	  selects	  to	  replace	  the	  Collins	  class	  represents	  a	  step	  forward	  in	  interoperability	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  addition,	  Australia	  should	  develop	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Bruce	  W.	  Bennett	  and	  Jennifer	  Lind,	  “The	  Collapse	  of	  North	  Korea:	  Military	  Missions	  and	  Requirements,”	  International	  Security	  36,	  no.	  2	  (Fall	  2011),	  84-­‐119.	  98	  2016	  Defence	  White	  Paper	  (Canberra:	  Department	  of	  Defence,	  2016).	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deploy	  long-­‐range	  precision	  strike	  systems	  to	  hold	  at	  risk	  forces	  that	  threaten	  Australia.	  	  	  	   Taiwan,	  for	  its	  part,	  could	  do	  much	  more	  than	  it	  has	  to	  harden	  itself	  against	  Chinese	  coercion.	  	  Taipei	  should	  seek	  to	  harden	  key	  military	  infrastructure,	  including	  its	  airfields,	  against	  Chinese	  missile	  attack.	  	  In	  addition,	  Taipei	  should	  invest	  in	  systems,	  such	  as	  ASCMs	  and	  diesel	  submarines,	  which	  will	  allow	  it	  to	  inflict	  costs	  on	  China	  and	  protract	  a	  conflict.	  	   The	  Philippines	  have	  for	  too	  long	  neglected	  its	  defenses.	  	  Manila	  has	  seen	  the	  result	  of	  this	  neglect	  as	  China	  has	  sought	  to	  bully	  the	  Philippines	  over	  its	  territorial	  claims	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea.	  	  The	  United	  States	  should	  help	  build	  the	  Philippines’	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐defense.	  	  Particularly	  important	  in	  this	  regard	  would	  be	  enhancing	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Philippines	  to	  protect	  its	  territorial	  waters,	  enhance	  its	  marine	  forces	  for	  dislodgement	  and	  base	  protection,	  and	  become	  part	  of	  a	  wide	  ocean	  surveillance	  network.	  	   In	  a	  period	  of	  limited	  and	  increasingly	  constrained	  defense	  resources,	  the	  United	  States	  needs	  to	  be	  looking	  for	  defense	  options	  that	  promise	  especially	  high	  leverage	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  changing	  military	  balance	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  	  Four	  such	  option	  stand	  out:	  the	  development	  of	  a	  coalition	  ISR	  network	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific,	  efforts	  to	  bolster	  allied	  undersea	  warfare,	  expanding	  the	  range	  of	  bases	  open	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  measures	  to	  enhance	  nuclear	  deterrence.	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   A	  Coalition	  ISR	  Network	  for	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  In	  light	  of	  the	  changing	  military	  balance	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific,	  it	  makes	  sense	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  seek	  new	  ways	  of	  reassuring	  allies	  and	  friends	  and	  generating	  collective	  responses	  to	  crisis	  and	  aggression.	  	  A	  coalition	  ISR	  network	  represents	  a	  promising	  approach	  to	  do	  just	  that.	  	  First,	  the	  United	  States	  is	  stepping	  up	  its	  ISR	  assets	  in	  the	  region,	  to	  include	  the	  deployment	  of	  Global	  Hawk	  high-­‐altitude,	  long-­‐endurance	  UAVs	  to	  Guam.	  	  Second,	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  U.S.	  allies	  and	  friends	  in	  the	  region	  are	  interested	  in	  acquiring	  new	  ISR	  assets.	  Third,	  key	  allies	  are	  seeking	  to	  increase	  their	  situational	  awareness	  in	  the	  region.	  	  As	  part	  of	  its	  force	  posture	  review,	  for	  example,	  Australia	  has	  explored	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Cocos	  Island	  for	  maritime	  air	  patrol	  and	  surveillance	  activities.99	  Although	  information-­‐sharing	  agreements	  exist	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  and	  partners	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region,	  most	  are	  bilateral.	  	  By	  contrast,	  a	  coalition	  ISR	  architecture	  would	  be	  designed	  to	  be	  open	  to	  all:	  states	  would	  contribute	  ISR	  assets	  and	  would	  in	  return	  receive	  the	  common	  operating	  picture	  the	  network	  generated.	  A	  coalition	  ISR	  architecture	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  would	  have	  several	  advantages.	  	  First,	  it	  would	  provide	  the	  United	  States,	  its	  regional	  allies	  and	  friends	  a	  common	  picture	  of	  activity	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	  	  Such	  a	  shared	  understanding	  may	  be	  a	  necessary	  precondition	  to	  collective	  action.	  	  Second,	  such	  an	  approach	  could	  represent	  a	  significant	  deterrent	  to	  hostile	  action.	  	  It	  would	  be	  harder	  for	  an	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  Australian	  Defence	  Force	  Posture	  Review:	  Initial	  Assessments	  Against	  the	  Review’s	  
Terms	  of	  Reference,	  Attachment	  C,	  at	  http://www.defence.gov.au/oscdf/adf-­‐posture-­‐review/docs/interim/AttachC.pdf.	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aggressor	  to	  act	  without	  being	  caught,	  and	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  network	  would	  amount	  to	  an	  attack	  on	  all	  its	  members.	  	  
Allied	  Undersea	  Warfare	  Cooperation	  The	  United	  States	  has	  enjoyed	  a	  hard-­‐earned	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  undersea	  warfare	  for	  decades.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  United	  States	  is	  fortunate	  to	  have	  as	  allies	  states	  such	  as	  Great	  Britain,	  Japan,	  Australia,	  and	  Canada,	  which	  also	  have	  highly	  capable	  undersea	  forces.	  	  	  The	  United	  States	  should	  ensure	  that	  our	  Pacific	  allies	  and	  we	  retain	  our	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  undersea	  warfare.	  	  We	  should,	  for	  example,	  encourage	  Canberra	  to	  develop	  the	  shore	  infrastructure	  that	  would	  allow	  U.S.	  nuclear	  attack	  submarines	  to	  operate	  out	  of	  or	  rotate	  through	  Perth	  and	  Brisbane.100	  	  We	  should	  also	  facilitate	  cooperation	  with	  and	  among	  Asian	  states	  with	  diesel	  submarines	  and	  develop	  cooperative	  expertise	  in	  anti-­‐submarine	  warfare.	  	  The	  United	  States	  should	  offer	  to	  develop	  increasingly	  capable	  unmanned	  undersea	  vehicles	  with	  our	  close	  allies.	  	  Finally,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  offer	  Australia	  assistance	  with	  its	  program	  to	  replace	  the	  aging	  Collins-­‐class	  attack	  submarines.	  	  	  	  
Expanded	  Basing	  Options	  	   Bases	  are	  a	  key	  element	  of	  the	  U.S.	  strategy	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  	  They	  are	  a	  central	  pillar	  of	  U.S.	  presence,	  reassurance,	  and	  deterrence	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  That	  having	  been	  said,	  the	  risk	  to	  U.S.	  forward-­‐based	  forces	  is	  clearly	  increasing.	  	  As	  the	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United	  States	  moves	  forward,	  we	  need	  to	  balance	  the	  operational	  risk	  to	  our	  forces	  against	  the	  strategic	  risk	  of	  pulling	  back	  from	  the	  region.	  	  A	  balanced	  approach	  to	  basing	  should	  include	  hardening	  existing	  bases	  against	  attack.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  at	  main	  operating	  bases	  such	  as	  Andersen	  Air	  Base	  on	  Guam	  and	  Kadena	  Air	  Base	  in	  Japan.	  	  	  The	  United	  States	  should	  invest	  in	  hardened	  shelters	  as	  well	  as	  rapid	  runway	  repair	  kits	  for	  each	  of	  its	  major	  bases	  in	  the	  theater.	  	  	   Hardening	  existing	  bases	  needs	  to	  be	  complemented	  by	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  U.S.	  basing	  network	  in	  the	  region.	  	  An	  expanded	  network	  should	  balance	  between	  bases	  on	  sovereign	  U.S.	  territory	  and	  those	  on	  allied	  or	  friendly	  territory.	  	  Bases	  on	  U.S.	  territory	  assure	  access,	  whereas	  those	  on	  allied	  other	  nations’	  territory	  provide	  reassurance.	  	  The	  United	  States	  should	  also	  invest	  in	  an	  expeditionary	  basing	  capability.	  	  
Conclusion	  	   The	  United	  States	  faces	  challenging	  times	  ahead	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  	  The	  rise	  of	  China	  and	  Chinese	  military	  modernization,	  combined	  with	  constraints	  on	  the	  U.S.	  defense	  budget,	  mean	  that	  in	  coming	  years	  the	  United	  States	  is	  likely	  to	  face	  an	  increase	  in	  both	  the	  operational	  risk	  to	  U.S.	  forces	  as	  well	  as	  the	  strategic	  risk	  to	  U.S.	  interests.	  	  It	  will	  take	  greater	  effort	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  protect	  its	  historic	  interests	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Failure	  to	  adjust	  the	  structure	  and	  posture	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  in	  the	  region	  threatens	  to	  open	  up	  a	  widening	  gap	  between	  our	  capabilities	  and	  commitments.	  	  	  
	   115	  
	   If	  complacency	  in	  the	  face	  of	  growing	  threats	  would	  be	  unwarranted,	  so	  too	  would	  be	  despair.	  	  There	  is	  quite	  simply	  no	  need	  to	  accept	  a	  narrower	  conception	  of	  the	  American	  role	  in	  the	  world.	  	  The	  United	  States	  has	  it	  in	  its	  power	  to	  field	  forces	  that	  will	  safeguard	  U.S.	  interests	  at	  an	  acceptable	  level	  of	  risk.	  	  This	  report	  has	  outlined	  a	  series	  of	  steps	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  take	  to	  achieve	  that	  aim.	  	  What	  will	  be	  required	  first	  and	  foremost	  is	  the	  political	  will	  to	  explain	  not	  just	  the	  costs	  but	  also	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  vigorous	  U.S.	  role	  in	  the	  region,	  to	  seek	  adequate	  funding	  for	  an	  enhanced	  U.S.	  presence	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  to	  work	  with	  U.S.	  allies	  and	  friends	  in	  the	  region	  to	  make	  that	  posture	  a	  reality.	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Conclusion	  	  	   As	  this	  study	  shows,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  share	  many	  perspectives	  on	  the	  security	  environment	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  also	  a	  number	  of	  differences	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  close	  allies.	  	  Moreover,	  neither	  the	  United	  States,	  nor	  Australia,	  nor	  Japan	  is	  a	  unitary	  actor:	  alternative	  perspectives	  exist	  within	  American,	  Australian,	  and	  Japanese	  societies	  regarding	  the	  security	  environment.	  	  	  First,	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  perceive	  an	  adverse	  shift	  in	  the	  military	  balance	  in	  the	  region.	  	  The	  most	  consequential	  driver	  of	  this	  shift	  is	  the	  rise	  of	  China	  and	  Chinese	  military	  modernization.	  	  In	  particular,	  as	  the	  Australian,	  American,	  and	  Japanese	  contributions	  to	  this	  report	  illustrate,	  China’s	  nuclear	  modernization	  and	  its	  acquisition	  of	  so-­‐called	  anti-­‐access/area	  denial	  (A2/AD)	  capabilities	  both	  highlight	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  U.S.	  bases	  and	  power	  projection	  forces	  in	  the	  region.	  	  An	  important	  subordinate	  trend,	  particularly	  for	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  is	  the	  growth	  of	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  arsenal	  as	  well	  as	  P’yongyang’s	  acquisition	  of	  the	  means	  to	  deliver	  nuclear	  weapons	  over	  long	  ranges,	  to	  include	  its	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile	  (ICBM)	  and	  submarine-­‐launched	  ballistic	  missile	  (SLBM)	  programs.	  	  	  	   Second,	  U.S.	  allies	  are	  increasingly	  expressing	  doubts	  about	  the	  willingness	  and	  ability	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  continue	  to	  play	  its	  traditional	  role	  in	  the	  region.	  	  In	  part,	  these	  concerns	  stem	  from	  the	  shifting	  military	  balance,	  but	  they	  clearly	  also	  go	  beyond	  it.	  	  Allied	  national	  security	  thinkers	  have	  drawn	  lessons	  from	  what	  they	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see	  as	  irresolute	  U.S.	  behavior	  outside	  the	  region	  –	  to	  include	  President	  Obama’s	  walking	  back	  from	  the	  red	  line	  he	  drew	  over	  Syrian	  chemical	  weapons	  use	  as	  well	  as	  the	  perceived	  U.S.	  unwillingness	  to	  confront	  Russian	  aggression	  in	  the	  Crimea	  and	  eastern	  Ukraine	  –	  and	  are	  applying	  them	  to	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  security	  elites	  in	  Australia	  and	  Japan	  are	  expressing	  increased	  concern	  over	  the	  viability	  of	  U.S.	  security	  guarantees	  in	  general,	  and	  extended	  deterrence	  in	  particular.	  	  	  	   Third,	  given	  the	  shifting	  military	  balance	  and	  growing	  concerns	  about	  U.S.	  staying	  power,	  U.S.	  allies	  have	  increased	  their	  efforts	  both	  to	  guarantee	  their	  security	  unilaterally	  and	  to	  explore	  new	  partnerships	  to	  help	  them	  do	  so	  multilaterally.	  	  Both	  Australia	  and	  Japan	  have	  increased	  their	  defense	  spending	  and	  are	  modernizing	  key	  portions	  of	  their	  force	  structure.	  	  Canberra	  and	  Tokyo	  are	  cooperating	  more	  closely	  than	  ever,	  and	  both	  capitols	  are	  reaching	  out	  to	  other	  partners	  in	  the	  region	  and	  beyond.	  	   In	  the	  end,	  this	  report	  raises	  a	  fundamental	  question	  that	  deserves	  further	  study:	  what	  it	  is	  it	  about	  U.S.	  behavior	  that	  assures	  allies,	  and	  what	  behavior	  
undermines	  assurance?	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  pivot/rebalance	  to	  Asia	  has	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  region	  in	  U.S.	  national	  security.	  	  The	  administration’s	  rhetoric	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	  a	  military	  strategy	  that	  has	  emphasized	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region,	  to	  include	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  most	  modern	  and	  capable	  elements	  of	  the	  U.S.	  force	  structure	  to	  Asia	  first.	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  strategic	  focus	  of	  U.S.	  leaders	  remains	  divided	  –	  with	  Europe	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  competing	  with	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region	  for	  time	  and	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attention.	  	  Moreover,	  interest	  in	  international	  engagement	  is	  waning	  among	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  the	  American	  electorate.	  	  Conversely,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  limited	  appetite	  for	  increasing	  defense	  spending,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  near	  term.	  	  A	  better	  appreciation	  of	  the	  drivers	  of	  assurance	  will	  help	  the	  United	  States	  more	  effectively	  manage	  its	  alliance	  relationships	  in	  an	  increasingly	  contested	  security	  environment	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  
